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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the end of World War II, an estimated 250 conflicts have taken
place on almost every continent in the world, resulting in estimated
casualties ranging from seventy million to 170 million, most of whom were
non-combatants.' Almost no region of the world has been spared the
human and material devastation resulting from violations of International
Humanitarian Law (IHL)2  by state as well as non-state actors,
notwithstanding the fact that such violations are contrary to the professed
fundamental values and beliefs of most of those engaged in these conflicts.3
1 See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 45, 513, 570 (2d rev. ed. 1999) [hereinafter CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY]; M. CHERIF
BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 495 (2003); Jennifer Balint,
The Place of Law in Addressing Internal Regime Conflicts, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
103, 103-104 (1996); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Accountability for Violations of International
Humanitarian Law and Other Serious Violations of Human Rights, in POST-CONFLICT
JUSTICE 6 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002) [hereinafter Accountability for Violations of
International Humanitarian Law]; see also PROJECT PLOUGHSHARES, ARMED CONFLICT
REPORT 2007 (2007) (providing the current ongoing conflicts), available at
http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACRText/ACR-TitlePageRev.htm#Preface (last visited
Sept. 8, 2008).
While it is difficult to allocate the casualties that occur in all of these types of conflicts as
between state and non-state actors, an estimate based on the research leads to the conclusion
that the majority of these casualties have been caused by state actors.
2 The term includes genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. M. Cherif
Bassiouni, The Normative Framework on International Criminal Law: Overlaps, Gaps, and
Ambiguities in Contemporary International Law, in I INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW ch. 4.8
(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2008).
3 The issue is not one of values within the societies where these violations occur, but
whether or not these values extend to other social groups and whether the legitimacy of a
given group engaged in the process of violence trumps the legality of the means enforced,
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A number of research organizations, including the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, SIPRI, PIOOM, International Human
Rights Law Institute, and others, have attempted to identify the number of
conflicts of a non-international character and the level of victimization that
has resulted in these conflicts.4 These research projects, however, seldom
distinguish between groups of non-state actors who engage in armed
conflicts that are legally characterized as international, non-international, or
purely internal armed conflicts.5 A number of legal consequences derive
thus rationalizing or justifying the commission of these violations. See M. Cherif Bassiouni,
Legal Controls of International Terrorism: A Policy-Oriented Perspective, 43 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 83 (2002) [hereinafter Legal Controls of International Terrorism]; M. Cherif Bassiouni,
"Terrorism ": Reflections on Legitimacy and Policy Considerations, in VALUES & VIOLENCE:
INTANGIBLE ACTS OF TERRORISM (Wayne McCormack ed., University of Utah, forthcoming
2008); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Terrorism: The Persistent Dilemma of Legitimacy, 36 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 299 (2004).
4 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://www.camegieendowment.org/
(last visited Sept. 8, 2008); International Human Rights Law Institute,
www.law.depaul.edu/centersinstitutes/ihrli/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2008) [hereinafter IHRLI];
Research Program on Root Causes of Human Rights Violations,
http://www.goalsforamericans.org/gallery/v/maps/atf worldconf__map.pdf.html (last visited
Sept. 1, 2008) [hereinafter PIOOM]; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,
http://www.sipri.org/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2008) [hereinafter SIPRI]; see also supra note 1.
5 Some armed conflicts are in part international and in part non-international; some
mutate from non-international to international; and some, like "wars of national liberation"
in the context of colonialism and settler regimes, covered by Article 1(4) of Additional
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, are deemed to be of an international character,
even though one set of combatants are non-state actors. In light of the phenomena during the
1960s and 1970s of colonies rising up against their colonial powers, Protocol I defined
conflicts of this type as "wars of national liberation" and thereby categorized them as
international conflicts for purposes of Protocol I. Article 1(4) states:
The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed conflicts in which peoples
are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the
exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations
and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949 (Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts), Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 Annex I,
reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Geneva Convention Protocol I].
Internal revolutionary activities designed to achieve regime change within the national
context seek to achieve the breakup of the state and the establishment of one or more
independent states; other forms of violent internal disturbances are not covered. For
discussion on self-determination, see U.N. Charter art. 1(2); HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY,
SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS
(1996); S. James Anaya, A Contemporary Definition of the International Norm of Self-
Determination, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131-64 (1993); M. Cherif Bassiouni,
"Self-determination " and the Palestinians, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 31 (1971). Thus, they do not
benefit from the status of POW. LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT
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from these characterizations that impact on compliance with the norms of
IHL, and in turn affect the levels of victimization occurring in these
conflicts.
After World War II, the culture of war changed and a new generation
of means and methods of warfare emerged, which extends until now. This
development raises questions about the continued validity of classic
assumptions underlying what is interchangeably called the Law of Armed
Conflict, the Laws of War, and International Humanitarian Law. The
invalidation by the new wars of the assumptions raises the question of
whether these "laws" are still relevant.6
Three factors command consideration with respect to compliance by
non-state actors. The first is that non-state actors in conflicts of a non-
international or purely internal character are almost always in an
asymmetrical relationship to the strength and resources of the governments
that they oppose. This asymmetry puts them at a military disadvantage that
precludes them from fighting a significantly more powerful opponent with
the same limitations on means and methods of warfare. In fact, this
(2002); LIESBETH ZEGVELD, THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 106-10 (2002); Jann K. Kleffner, From 'Belligerents' to 'Fighters' and
Civilians Directly Participating in Hostilities - On The Principle of Distinction in Non-
International Armed Conflicts One Hundred Years After the Second Hague Peace
Conference, 54 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REV. 315, 322 (2007).
There is a serious question as to whether crimes against humanity and genocide apply to
non-state actor groups or whether it is necessary to have a state policy. By their very nature
crimes against humanity and genocide are the product of state action. Nevertheless, in the
last 50 years, non-state actors have committed these crimes. International criminal law has
not developed along these lines. For example, genocide is still a crime committed by states
or state policy even though decided and carried out by individuals. Torture under the 1984
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel. Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment is limited to states. Annex, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984)
[hereinafter Convention Against Torture]. For a position supporting the requirement of state
policy under contemporary customary international law, see BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY, supra note 1. The ICTY in Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al. held that no such
requirement existed. Case No. IT-96-23-T, Judgement (June 12, 2002). Regrettably their
position, which cited a number of authorities, is unfounded since the authority they relied
upon does not support that proposition. For a discussion of that case in contrast to my
position, see William A. Schabas, Crimes Against Humanity: The State Plan or Policy
Element, in THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI (Leila Nadya Sadat & Michael P. Scharf eds., 2008), at 347
[hereinafter THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW]. See generally
LARRY MAY, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: A NORMATIVE ACCOUNT (2005); GEOFFREY
ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE (W. W. Norton
2006); WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIMES OF CRIMES
(2000).
6 One author even argues that consensual rules of war should be developed as in the case
of contracts. See Robert A. Shoan, Prologue to a Voluntarist War Convention, 106 MICH. L.
REv. 443 (2007).
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asymmetry compels them to resort to unconventional and unlawful means
and methods of warfare as the only way to redress the military and
economic imbalance they face. Without sufficient incentives for non-state
actors to comply with IHL, the asymmetry of power mentioned above
necessarily leads to non-compliance. The second factor is that unlike
conventional armies, non-state actors operate as militias or bands with little
or no military training, little or no command and control structure, and little
or no internal discipline or other system of social control likely to enhance
compliance. The third factor is that non-state actors have no expectation of
accountability for their non-compliance. Combined, all three factors,
coupled with whatever other contextual political factors that may exist in a
given conflict, make voluntary compliance by non-state actors aleatory.7
Non-international and internal conflicts since World War II evidence
the participation of a wide range of groups that had not historically
participated in armed conflicts,8 the latter having been the monopoly of
states9 and thus essentially involving conventional armies.' 0
The term non-state actor is applied to non-governmental groups who
directly or indirectly engage in support of non-governmental combatants in
non-international and purely internal conflicts. These groups take a variety
of forms, including:
(1) Regularly constituted groups of combatants with a military
command structure and a political structure;"
7 In a prescient observation dating back to 1760, Emmerich de Vattel stated:
A civil war breaks the bands of society and government, or at least it suspends their force and
effect; it produces in the nation two independent parties, considering each other enemies, and
acknowledging no common judge: therefore of necessity these two parties must, at least for a
time, be considered as forming two separate bodies, two distinct people, though one of them may
be in the wrong in breaking the continuity of the state, to rise up against lawfully authority, they
are not the less divided in fact; besides, who shall judge them? Who shall pronounce on which
side the right or the wrong lies? On earth they have no common superior. Thus they are in the
case of two nations, who having a dispute which they cannot adjust, are compelled to decide it
by force of arms. Things being thus situated, it is very evident that the common law of war,
those maxims of humanity, moderation and probity ... are in civil wars to be observed by both
sides.
EMMERICH DE VATTEL, III THE LAW OF NATIONS ch. XVIII § 293 (digital ed. 1999),
http://www.constitution.org/vattel/vattel_03.htm.
8 These groups may not be subject to IHL, but they remain subject to the prohibitions on
genocide and crimes against humanity, as well as to other relevant international criminal law
conventions. They are also subject to domestic criminal law. See Kleffner, supra note 5.
9 See Kleffner, supra note 5, at 322.
to GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY 1N WARFARE (1980); GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW
SINCE 1945 (1994); see infra note 187.
11 The existence or absence of a command structure in non-state actor militias is
probably the most significant factor affecting their level of compliance with IHL. Moreover,
an important distinguishing characteristic of these groups is the almost total control by the
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(2) Non-regularly constituted groups of combatants with or without a
command structure and with or without a political hierarchical structure;
(3) Spontaneously gathered groups who engage in combat or who
engage in sporadic acts of collective violence with or without a command
structure and with or without political leadership;
(4) Mercenaries acting as an autonomous group or as part of other
groups of combatants; and
(5) Expatriate volunteers who engage for a period of time in combat or
in support of combat operations, either as separate units or as part of duly
constituted or ad hoc units.
12
These groups also include dual-purpose groups that engage in combat,
as well as pursue other activities relating to their cause. 13 This includes: (1)
leader of the movement as a whole, the leader of the military apparatus, or the commander of
a given military unit over the fighters in these groups. Because such leaders and
commanders have unquestioned power of life and death over the fighters, it can hardly be
expected that the latter will oppose their orders even when they clearly constitute violations
of IHL. The more a given group seeks to emulate army structure, the more likely it is to
* have a command structure with the same characteristics. For example, the Vietcong in their
struggle for national liberation against colonial forces, at first the French and then the United
States, evolved into the conventional structure of almost all armies in the world. The
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in Colombia has, from its inception,
established a command structure similar to that of a conventional army.
However, the situation among African groups other than those involved in decolonization
has been different. See 1 UNDERSTANDING CIVIL WAR: EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS, AFRICA
(Paul Collier & Nicholas Sambanis eds., 2005); 2 UNDERSTANDING CIVIL WAR: EVIDENCE
AND ANALYSIS, EUROPE, CENTRAL ASIA, AND OTHER REGIONS (Paul Collier & Nicholas
Sambanis eds., 2005). Their structure is more akin to what in other societies would be called
gangs because they are characterized by the control of an absolute leader who has powers of
life and death over its members, who is not subject to any limitations, and whose
subordinates are simply expected to carry out orders with total obedience. Notwithstanding
the range of differences in command structure, these groups are different from conventional
military structure in that there is effectively no control by reason of a command structure.
That structure is essentially designed to carry out the orders of the military leader or the
leader of the movement. It is precisely because of the absence of a command and control
system that violations of IHL are products of the military leader's unilateral decision
making, as is discussed below. The absence of a command and control system, to be
distinguished from merely having a command structure, coupled with the characteristic
impunity of the military leader and the movement's political leader (if they are different),
enhances the incentive to commit violations of IHL.
12 This was the case with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, where some militias
acted as organized crime groups. Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (May 27, 1994)
[hereinafter U.N. Final Report]; Annexes to U.N. Final Report, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674/Add.2
at Annexes I (Dec. 28, 1994) (military structure).
13 Supra note 12. The term non-state actor has traditionally been applied to groups
directly involved in the armed conflicts, but it should extend to those who support such
conflicts by aiding or abetting irregularly constituted armed forces, provide arms and
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members of political parties who occasionally engage in combat and
sometimes in acts of violence, which constitute violations of IlHL; and (2)
members of organized crime groups or groups pursuing criminal purposes
while active in armed conflicts and commit violations of IHL.
The major issues discussed in this Article, although not presented in
the following order due to significant overlap, are:
* Whether the new culture of war and its means and methods in conflicts of
a non-international character and purely internal character, necessarily
engender greater violations of IlHL, and thus whether IHL is relevant to
this new culture of war and can be assumed to induce compliance with its
norms;
" Whether the asymmetry of power between non-state and state actors
engaged in conflicts of a non-international or purely internal character is
an insurmountable impediment to compliance with IHL by non-state
actors;
" Whether there is sufficient experiential data arising out of the conflicts
that have taken place since World War II to identify and assess the factors
that enhance or detract from IHL compliance by non-state actors;14
funding, and, in the case of certain conflicts such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Sierra Leone, and Liberia, purchase diamonds and precious stones with the knowledge that
these funds will go into supporting these violent conflicts. See GREG CAMPBELL, BLOOD
DIAMONDS (2002). More recently, the term has been applied to those who finance terrorism.
S.C. Res. 1368, U.N.Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, 39 I.L.M. 270; INT'L MONETARY FUND, SUPPRESSING THE
FINANCING OF TERRORISM: A HANDBOOK FOR LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING (2003); Ahmed Seif El
Dawla, Terrorism Financing, in I INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 2, ch. 6.3; Ilias
Bantekas, The International Law of Terrorist Financing, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 315, 315-33
(2005). Some of these groups engaged in administering occupied territory and also engaged
in organized crime-like operations, which is particularly evident now in the ongoing conflict
in Iraq, where different competing militias are engaging in such activities. See M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Organized Crime and New Wars, in RESTRUCTURING THE GLOBAL MILITARY
SECTOR: NEW WARS (Mary Kaldor & Basker Vashee eds., 1997); M. CherifBassiouni, Post-
Conflict Justice in Iraq: Is the Glass Half-Full, Half-Empty, or is it a Pyrrhic Achievement?,
in SADDAM ON TRIAL: UNDERSTANDING AND DEBATING THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL 245
(Michael P. Scharf& Gregory S. McNeal eds., 2006).
14 Surprisingly, neither the United Nations nor the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) has established a victim and violation-oriented database for the collection of
information relating to conflicts of a non-international character, purely internal conflicts,
and tyrannical regime victimization. The United Nations has established a number of
commissions to investigate or assess violations of international humanitarian law in different
conflicts. Treaty bodies have designated rapporteurs and independent experts, but these
efforts have always been ad hoc. Moreover, these institutional experiences have never been
put together into a coherent database, nor can they be retraced other than through painstaking
individualized research in the archives of each fact-finding mechanism or body. As a result,
a wealth of data which would be helpful is lacking.
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" To what extent do double standards by states contribute to the reduction
of compliance by non-state actors;
* The degree to which enforcement of IHL norms constitutes deterrence
and thus positively impacts on individual and collective compliance, and
mutatis mutandis, whether non-enforcement engenders enhanced non-
compliance;
" Whether among state and non-state actors there is a correlation between
actual conduct in the field and their harmful outcomes on the one hand,
and proclaimed values and declared adherence to the Rule of Law on the
other; and
" Whether the multiplicity of applicable legal regimes, their confusing
overlaps, their normative gaps, and their rigid legal characterizations
contribute to both non-compliance and non-enforcement. 5
is As discussed below, there are several overlapping applicable legal regimes, some of
which have sub-regimes. The problems engendered by the multiplicity of legal and sub-
legal regimes and their gaps and overlaps are symbolically reflected in the terminological
confusion that arises as a result of the diversity of these legal sources.
The three legal regimes are International Humanitarian Law (IHL), International
Criminal Law (ICL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL). IHL encompasses
conventional and customary international law applicable to armed conflict contexts, and its
sources have different applications and consequences. In turn, IHL has two sub-legal
regimes, respectively applicable to conflicts of an international and conflicts of a non-
international character, the latter having less clear norms and much more uncertainty as to
their applicability than the former. More importantly, the rules applicable to conflicts of a
non-international character do nothing more than urge the parties to a conflict to abide by the
principles and norms applicable to conflicts of an international character. They do not
provide non-state actors with the status of combatants or the privileges of POWs. Bassiouni,
supra note 2.
ICL includes certain crimes that reflect the same humanitarian values as those covered by
IHL. It also criminalizes crimes against humanity, which is a historical outgrowth of war
crimes, and genocide, which is in some respects an extension of crimes against humanity.
ICL also criminalizes, inter alia, slavery and slave-related practices and torture, which are
also prohibited by IHL. The difference between these crimes defined by ICL and those
defined by IHL is that the former applies in times of war and peace, while the latter applies
only in times of war. See BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW,
supra note 1, at 141-42.
IHL can be seen as part of IHRL applicable in armed conflict. Louise Doswald-Beck &
Slyvain Vite, International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 293 INT'L REV. RED
CROSS 94, 94 (1993). However, IHRL does not impose criminal penalties, but is instead
enforced through a variety of non-coercive mechanisms which vary depending upon the
treaty-body mechanism that has been created. See generally LINDA MALONE,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (2002); THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW (1989); THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNAL STRIFE: THEIR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION (1987); HENRY J. STEINER, RYAN
GOODMAN & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS,
MORALS (2007); DAVID WEISSBRODT & CONNIE DE LA VEGA, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW: AN INTRODUCTION (2007).
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The above-mentioned factors and others discussed in this article have a
significant bearing on the non-compliance with IHL by non-state actors in
conflicts of a non-international or purely internal character; and whether
non-compliance has reached a crisis proportion that requires a re-
examination of the validity of the assumptions underlying compliance
expectations. The proposition discussed below is how to reduce the
harmful human consequences produced during these conflicts by increasing
the levels of individual and collective compliance with IHL. 16 This requires
assessing the new culture of war and its means and methods, appraising the
factors leading to or detracting from compliance, and reviewing the
applicable law and its enforcement, particularly as regards the dual
standards employed by major states whereby their non-compliance with
IHL becomes the de facto accepted exception. 7
Although empirical data about factors concerning individual and
collective compliance with IHL by non-state actors is limited, anecdotal
data is available to illustrate the issues raised herein. In this area, past
experience is unfortunately more than merely illustrative, it is shockingly
telling.
It should be noted that there are also a number of major gaps in ICL
with respect to non-state actors. For example, both the Genocide
Convention and the Convention Against Torture apply to state actors.
Crimes against humanity has not yet been embodied in a separate
international convention and, under customary international law, applies to
state actors, even though it would be clearly desirable to also have it apply
to non-state actors. There is therefore much need to develop ICL and to fill
the gaps contained therein with respect to non-state actors as there is with
Each one of these legal regimes uses different terminology, even when the subject matter
or the legal protections are the same, thus creating the confusion mentioned above.
Throughout this Article, the term IHL is used largo sensu and includes crimes against
humanity and genocide. Admittedly, these two crimes arise under ICL, but their close
connection to war crimes and the fact that they occur mostly during armed conflicts warrant
their inclusion within the larger meaning of IHL.
16 For the applicability of IHL to internal conflicts, see MOIR, supra note 5; JOHN N.
MOORE, LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD (1974); Rosalyn Higgins,
International Law and Civil Conflict, in THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF CIVIL WARS
(Evan D.T. Luard ed., 1972); Evan D.T. Luard, Civil Conflicts in Modern International
Relations, in THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF CIVIL WARS, supra.
17 American exceptionalism has been growing evident in the past fifty years. See PETER
HUTCHAUSEN, AMERICA'S SPLENDID LITTLE WARS: A SHORT HISTORY OF U.S. MILITARY
ENGAGEMENTS: 1975-2000 (2003); MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS
IN AN AGE OF TERROR (2004); CHALMERS JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE: MILITARISM,
SECRECY AND THE END OF THE REPUBLIC (2005); PHILIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD:
AMERICA AND THE MAKING AND BREAKING OF GLOBAL RULES-FROM FDR'S ATLANTIC




There is also the need to clarify the applicability and enforcement
mechanisms of IHRL in connection with non-state actors.
II. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE REGULATION OF
ARMED CONFLICTS
IHL is the body of norms that regulates the conduct of those who are
involved in armed conflicts.' 9 It includes the prohibition of certain ways
and means of warfare and the prohibition of certain weapons. More
importantly, it is designed to protect certain categories of persons and
property from harm. Although these prohibitions and limitations are based
on different legal sources, they apply during the course of armed conflicts
whether of an international or non-international character. They extend the
same protections to civilians irrespective of the legal characterization of the
conflict. However, they do not extend the same rights and privileges of
combatants to those engaged in combat on the side of insurgents or
belligerents in conflicts of a non-international and purely internal
character.2°  Enforcement of these norms depends on the legal
characterization of the given conflict. Thus, in conflicts of an international
character, the more serious violations of these norms are criminalized under
the label of "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions and as war crimes
18 See supra note 5.
19 These instruments are reprinted in M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, A MANUAL ON
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS (2000); ADAM
ROBERTS & RICHARD GUEFF, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAW OF WAR (3d. ed. 2000); 1-2 THE LAW
OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Leon Friedman ed., 1972); THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS
(Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., rev. ed. 2004).
For commentaries and analyses on these documents and customary IHL, see
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 (Y. Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter COMMENTARY
ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS] ; GERALD I. A. D. DRAPER, THE RED CROSS CONVENTIONS
OF 1949 (1958); INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2006)
[hereinafter ICRC]; HILAIRE MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (1990);
JEAN S. PICTET, I-IV COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949
(ICRC 1952); JEAN S. PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW (1985); JEAN S. PICTET, HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF
WAR VICTIMS (1975); M. SASSOLI & A. A. BOUVIER, HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR?
(ICRC 1999); THE IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Frits
Kalshoven & Yves Sandoz eds., 1989); ZEGVELD, supra note 5; Jean-Marie Henckaerts,
Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the Understanding
and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 175, 187
(2005); see also MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1959).
20 MOIR, supra note 5, at 65-66.
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when these violations occur under customary IHL.21 For these violations,
states have, inter alia, the obligation to criminalize, prosecute, punish, and
extradite. However, in conflicts of a non-international character, the same
depredations are called "violations" and the obligations of states described
above are not necessarily applicable in the same manner. As to purely
internal conflicts, none of the above applies, as only domestic law is
deemed applicable.
International and domestic law do not always converge with respect to
the laws and customs of war. The national laws of almost all countries
address the regulation of armed conflicts as part of their internal military
law, reflecting the obligations of international law. In addition, national
military laws contain other provisions concerned with the way their military
are expected to function. But IHL as codified in these laws is seldom
reflected in national criminal laws applicable to those who are not part of
the armed forces. Nevertheless, the values of national societies have
impacted the laws and customs of war in the international context even
though the values reflected in IHL are found in humanitarian principles,
principles that have evolved in different civilizations over the past five
thousand years.2 2 In time, these humanitarian principles formed an inter-
woven fabric of international principles, norms, and rules of conduct
designed to prevent certain forms of physical harm and hardships from
befalling certain persons. Protected individuals include civilian non-
combatants, those hors de combat such as the sick, wounded, shipwrecked,
prisoners of war, those covered by the Red Cross and Red Crescent
emblems, and those who provide medical and humanitarian assistance in
the course of armed conflicts.23 These norms also extend to protected
21 The most detailed comprehensive listing of these crimes is in Article 8 of the Rome
Statute. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; see also M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, II THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 55-94 (2005); KNUT DORMANIN,
ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT (ICRC 2003).
22 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Humanitarian Law, in I
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 2, ch. 4.1. See also TIMOTHY MCCORMACK & H.
DURHAM, THE CHANGING FACE OF CONFLICT AND THE EFFICACY OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW (1999).
23 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
art.27, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force for the United
States Feb. 2, 1956) [hereinafter Geneva IV] ("Protected persons are entitled, in all
circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious
convictions and practices, and their manners and customs.").
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 13, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force for the United States Feb. 2, 1956)
[hereinafter Geneva III] ("Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated .... ").
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targets, such as civilian installations, hospitals, religious and cultural
monuments, and cultural artifacts.24 These protections are embodied in IHL
in certain enunciated principles and are also contained in specific norms.
Irrespective of whether these international legal principles and norms are
absorbed in national laws, international law provides for obligations
applicable to states.
The interplay between international and national law is particularly
evident in the areas of individual criminal responsibility and the
international responsibility of states for wrongful conduct. Thus, individual
violators of these norms are subject to disciplinary and criminal sanctions
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field art. 26, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered
into force for the United States Feb. 2, 1956) [hereinafter Geneva I] ("The staff of National
Red Cross Societies and that of other Voluntary Aid Societies ... are placed on the same
footing as [medical personnel]").
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and
Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea art. 12, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force for the United States Feb. 2, 1956) [hereinafter Geneva II]
("Members of the armed forces.., who are at sea and who are wounded, sick or
shipwrecked, shall be respected and protected in all circumstances"); id. art. 36 ("The
religious, medical and hospital personnel of hospital ships and their crew shall be respected
and protected .... ").
The 1949 Geneva Conventions are now part of customary international law, since 176 out
of 189 member states of the United Nations have ratified them.
24 In addition to the four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, supra note 23, see
Geneva Convention Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 52(2) ("Attacks shall be limited strictly to
military objectives."); id. art. 53(a) ("[It is prohibited] to commit any acts of hostility
directed against the historic monuments, works or art or places of worship which constitute
the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples."); Protocol II Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949 (Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts), Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 Annex II [hereinafter Geneva
Convention Protocol II]; cf, e.g., Geneva IV, supra note 23, art. 147 ("Grave
breaches.., shall be those involving any of the following acts.., extensive destruction and
appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly.").
This is reflected in the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict and its 1999 Protocols. Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240
[hereinafter 1954 Hague Convention]; Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 1954, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 348
[hereinafter Hague Convention Protocol I]; Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflicts, Mar. 26, 1999, 38 I.L.M.
769 [hereinafter Hague Convention Protocol II]; see also Patty Gerstenblith & Lucille
Roussin, International Cultural Property, 41 INT'L LAW. 613 (2007); Patty Gerstenblith,
From Bamiyan to Baghdad. Warfare the Preservation of Cultural Heritage at the Beginning
of the 21st Century, 37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 245 (2006); James A. R. Nafziger, The Principles for
Cooperation in the Mutual Protection and Transfer of Cultural Material, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L.
147 (2007).
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depending upon the seriousness of the violation by the state of nationality,
but also by any other state under the principle of universal jurisdiction for
"grave breaches" as defined in IHL and as war crimes under customary
international law. Moreover, states whose personnel have committed such
violations may owe compensatory and even punitive damages to the state
whose nationals have been victimized. The foregoing, however, applies
mainly to conflicts of an international character, as these protections and
prohibitions are not necessarily applicable to conflicts of a non-international
and purely internal character.26 In these contexts, international human
rights law and international criminal law apply, subject to the reservations
noted in the conclusion of Section I.
The sources of IHL norms are conventional and customary
international law, commonly referred to respectively as "the Law of
Geneva" (for the conventional law of armed conflicts) and "the Law of The
Hague" (for the customary law of armed conflicts).27 The Law of The
Hague is not, however, exclusively customary law because it is in part
made of treaty law, and also because treaty law has become part of
customary law.28 In turn, the Law of Geneva is not exclusively treaty law,
25 For the latter, see Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 BEVANS 631 [hereinafter Second Hague IV] ("A belligerent party
which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to
pay compensation."). For the former, the "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions, see
Geneva I, supra note 23, art. 49; Geneva II, supra note 23, art. 50; Geneva III, supra note 23,
art. 129; Geneva IV, supra note 23, art. 146.
26 Only Common Article 3 and Geneva Convention Protocol II apply to non-state actors
in conflicts of a non-international character. Such persons do not benefit from the status of
POW. In purely internal conflicts, these norms are not applicable. See MOIR, supra note 5,
chs. 2-3; ZEGVELD, supra note 5, at 55.
27 See BASSIOUNI, supra note 19, at 18. The Four Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949, which, as of January 1, 2007, have been ratified by 194 states, are deemed to reflect
customary international law. ICRC, International Humanitarian Law: Treaties &
Documents, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/CONVPRES?OpenView (last visited Sept. 6, 2008).
Also deemed customary international law are parts of Protocol I (1977), which deals with
conflicts of an international character (ratified by 167 states), and Protocol II (ratified by 163
states). Id. In short, the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 embody customary international
law and ultimately have become customary international law, while the two Additional
Protocols (1977) embody, in part, customary international law, but have not, in their entirety,
risen to the level of customary international law. ICRC, supra note 19. The ICRC undertook
a study published in 2005 on what has become customary international law, and in a sense it
represents the equivalent of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions on the codification of the
customary law of armed conflict. Id. While the ICRC's study may be deemed doctrinal, it
nonetheless fills a gap left open by the political inability of states to update the 1907 Hague
Convention codifying the customary international law of armed conflicts. Id.; see also
HENCKAERTS, supra note 19.
28 BASSIOUNI, supra note 19, at 18.
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because it reflects customary law.29  Thus, the traditional distinction
between conventional and customary law has been substantially eroded. °
Additionally, the treaty law that applies to weapons control derives from
customary, as well as conventional, law and some of its specific norms have
become part of customary law.3
In the last half-century, the term international humanitarian law
initially denoted the protections and obligations arising out of the 1949
Geneva Conventions, 32 whose origins were the 1864 Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field.3 3
Subsequently, the term has been broadened to encompass all violations of
the laws of armed conflict, whether they are contained in the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and the two 1977 Additional Protocols or in customary
international law as first reflected in the 1899 and then in the 1907 Hague
Convention IV and its Annexed Regulations (1907 Hague IV), or that body
of conventional and customary international law applicable to armed
29 Id. at 20.
30 Id.
"1 Id. at 18, 20. With respect to the prohibition of certain weapons on the basis that they
are "indiscriminate" or because they cause "unnecessary pain and suffering," the first
international instrument was the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration which prohibits the use of
dum-dum and explosive bullets. St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of
War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868, 1 Am. J.
INT'L L. Supp. 95 (1907), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL
/130?OpenDocument (last visited Sept. 8, 2008). It was followed by the 1925 Geneva
Convention on Asphyxiating Gases. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or other Gases and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17,
1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65, reprinted in 25 AM. J. INT'L L. 94 (1931); see also
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507; Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons
and on their Destruction, 13 Jan. 1993, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45;
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III),
Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 171, 19 I.L.M. 1534 [hereinafter Protocol III]; Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583
1015 U.N.T.S. 163. There are thirty-five Weapons Control conventions, but few specifically
criminalize the use of these weapons. BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 1, at 142-44. Instead, their criminalization can be adduced from
customary international law and from the writings of the most distinguished publicists. See
e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 156
U.N.T.S. 77 (citing the sources of international law).
32 Geneva I, supra note 23; Geneva II, supra note 23; Geneva III, supra note 23; Geneva
IV, supra note 23.
33 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies
in the Field, Aug. 22, 1864, 18 Martens 440, reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 90 (1907)
(Supp.), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/120?OpenDocument (last visited
Sept. 1, 2008).
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conflicts in connection with the protection of cultural property3 4 and the
prohibition of use of certain weapons.35
The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Protocol I are the
principal instruments of IHL that govern conflicts of an international
character.36 Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949
(Common Article 3) and Additional Protocol II of 1977 (Protocol II) are the
principal instruments applicable to conflicts of a non-international
character.37 The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and parts of Protocols I
and II are deemed part of customary international law.38 But these norms
do not apply to purely internal conflicts, in which non-state actors are
subject only to the criminal laws of the state in whose territory the conflict
occurs and to applicable international criminal law norms, such as those
pertaining to genocide and crimes against humanity.39 Moreover, these
non-state actors who are de facto, but not de jure combatants in such
conflicts, and who are therefore deemed criminals under the national laws
of the state where the conflicts occur, have no specific protection under
IHL, other than vague and general exhortations contained in Common
Article 3 and Protocol 11.40 In short, non-state actors fight "in a twilight
zone between lawful combatancy and common criminality. 'A
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) defines IHL as
the body of rules that protects people during wartime who are not or are no
longer participating in the hostilities.42 Its central purpose is to limit and
34 This is reflected in the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property
in the Event of Armed Conflict and its 1999 Protocols. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note
24; Hague Convention Protocol I, supra note 24; Hague Convention Protocol II, supra note
24.
35 Supra note 31.
36 See generally Geneva I, supra note 23; Geneva II, supra note 23; Geneva III, supra
note 23; Geneva IV, supra note 23; Geneva Convention Protocol I, supra note 5.
37 See generally Geneva I, supra note 23, art. 3; Geneva II supra note 23, art. 3; Geneva
III, supra note 23, art. 3; Geneva IV, supra note 23, art. 3; Geneva Convention Protocol II,
supra note 24, at art. 1.
38 See G.A. Res. 59/36, 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/36 (Dec. 2, 2004) (noting "the virtually
universal acceptance of the Geneva Conventions of 1949" and "the trend towards a similarly
wide acceptance of the two Additional Protocols of 1977").
39 See supra note 5; Kleffner, supra note 5; SCHABAS, supra note 5; SCHABAS, GENOCIDE
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, art. 2, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter
Genocide Convention].
40 MOIR, supra note 5, at 232 (discussing the lack of enforcement provisions).
41 J.E. Bond, Application of the Law of War to Internal Conflicts, 3 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 345, 367.




prevent human suffering in times of armed conflict.43 The rules are to be
observed not only by governments and their armed forces, but also by
belligerent groups and any other parties to a conflict, whether they are state
or non-state actors. 4
Certain principles and norms contained in the Geneva Conventions
derive from customary international law45 and, as stated above, extend to
the protection of cultural property46 and the prohibition of the use of certain
weapons that are regulated by specific treaties.47
After World War II, crimes against humanity emerged out of war
crimes, but remained connected thereto.48 In 1950, the International Law
Commission declared crimes against humanity to be unrelated to war
crimes, and they became a separate category of international crimes,
applicable in times of war and peace.49 In 1948, the Genocide Convention5°
defined the new international crime of genocide, which is also applicable in
both war and peace.5 1 Genocide and crimes against humanity, as well as
war crimes, are deemed jus cogens international crimes, nevertheless there
are questions about whether or not genocide and crimes against humanity
apply to non-state actors. 2
43 Id.
44Id.
45 See PETER MALANCZUK & MICHAEL BARTON AKEHURST ICHAEL AKEHURST,
AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 39-47 (7th ed. 1997)
(discussing customary international law).
46 See generally 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 24; Hague Convention Protocol I,
supra note 24; Hague Convention Protocol II, supra note 24.
47 See generally supra note 19.
48 See BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 1, at 60-68; see also MAY,
supra note 5, at 5-6; ROBERTSON, supra note 5, at 253.
49 See Int'l Law Comm'n, Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of
the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, With Commentaries, 123,
U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950). See also BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 1,
at 178-81; MAY, supra note 5, at 5-6; ROBERTSON, supra note 5, at 260-61.
50 See Genocide Convention, supra note 39, art. 2.; see also SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5.
51 The customary and conventional international law prohibitions mentioned above
overlap in many respects, and also overlap with two other legal regimes, namely
International Criminal Law (ICL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL), as discussed
below. See Bassiouni, supra note 2. Crimes against humanity and genocide apply in both
the context of war and peace, while the law of armed conflicts applies only in times of war.
The first two categories of international crimes have their genesis in war crimes and are
therefore an outgrowth of IHL. All three crimes, however, share the same humanitarian
values and goals. Id.
52 See the discussion of this point in supra note 5 and in the conclusion of Section I. See
also BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 1, at 239-42;
Bassiouni, Accountability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law, supra note 1, at
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The evolution of IHL norms in both customary and conventional
international law evidences the tension between humanitarian values and
states' interests. Proponents of the former have sought to expand the
protective scope for persons and non-military targets, as well as impose
limits on the use of force and the use of certain weapons. Proponents of the
latter have resisted this trend and pushed in the opposite direction by
carving out exceptions, such as the doctrine of "military necessity," and by
leaving certain areas ambiguous, such as the limits on military
bombardments and the use of certain weapons.53
The humanization of armed conflict has 1been difficult, because
traditionally the pursuit of war has been to achieve military success through
the fastest, most effective means and with the least costs to the protagonist,
irrespective of the harm inflicted upon the enemy. Humanitarian arguments
alone have seldom been a sufficient basis to induce states to altruistically
limit the use of their might against their enemies, particularly against those
who are incapable of reciprocating similar harm. Pragmatic and policy
arguments, however, have greatly aided the development of IHL.54
Mutuality of interest and other pragmatic policy considerations have
combined with humanitarian concerns to produce a body of norms and rules
of conduct that carry in them the expectations of voluntary compliance. But
where mutuality of interest and pragmatic considerations do not exist or do
not weigh in the scales of the cost-benefit analysis, voluntary compliance
diminishes or disappears. Last but not least, it must be underscored that the
IHL protective scheme has gaps, overlaps, and ambiguities,55 which provide
escape hatches for states unwilling to enforce IHL.
The two sources of IHL, namely customary and conventional
international law and their respective legal sub-regimes as described below,
not only overlap and have gaps, they also exhibit an unfair imbalance
between rights and protections depending on the legal characterization of
the type of conflict. Thus, a person who would otherwise qualify as a
lawful combatant in a conflict of an international character becomes a
common criminal in a conflict of a non-international character and in an
internal conflict. This unfair imbalance is, by deduction, a factor affecting
voluntary compliance by non-state actors.
The regulation of armed conflicts exists either under customary or
conventional international law. For example, the "Law of the Hague" and
the "Law of Geneva" are also divided according to the legal
53 See supra note 31.
54 THEODOR MERON, THE HUMANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 29-38, 45-50 (2006);
Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 239, 243-47
(2000).
55 See Bassiouni, supra note 2.
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characterization of the types of conflict, namely, conflicts of an
international and non-international character.56 Thus, these two sources of
law have in effect created two sub-legal regimes within the overall regime
of the Law of Armed Conflict. The 1907 Hague IV Convention and its
Annexed Regulations apply only to conflicts of an international character,
namely conflicts between states, 57 as do the Four Geneva Conventions of
1949,58 and Additional Protocol I but with a sub-regime applicable to
conflicts of a non-international character contained in Common Article 3.59
Protocol II deals exclusively with conflicts of a non-international
character.6 ° Common Article 3 is deemed part of customary international
law.61 Only some aspects of Protocol II are however deemed customary
international law, thus leaving open for conjecture what is and what is not
binding under customary international law.62 Purely internal conflicts are
not covered by any of the regimes.
The inequities created'by these multiple regimes are reflected in the
fact that non-state actors in conflicts of a non-international and purely
internal character are not deemed de jure combatants in the way that state
actors are, and they therefore do not benefit from POW status. The only
protection for those non-state actors engaged in a conflict of a non-
56 For the latter, see Geneva I, supra note 23, art. 3; Geneva II, supra note 23, art. 3;
Geneva III, supra note 23, art. 3; Geneva IV, supra note 23, art. 3.
57 Second Hague IV, supra note 25, art. 2.
58 See, e.g., Geneva I, supra note 23, art. 2 ("In addition to the provisions which shall be
implemented in peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or
of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties .... "). The three corresponding Geneva Conventions employ identical language in
their respective Article 2s. See Geneva II, supra note 23, art. 2; Geneva III, supra note 23,
art. 2; Geneva IV, supra note 23, art. 2.
59 See, e.g., Geneva I, supra note 23, art. 3 ("In the case of armed conflict not of an
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each
Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions ... ").
The three corresponding Geneva Conventions employ identical language in their respective
Article 3s. See Geneva II, supra note 23, art. 3; Geneva III, supra note 23, art. 3; Geneva
IV, supra note 23, art. 3.
60 See Geneva Convention Protocol II, supra note 24, art. 1(1) ("This Protocol... shall
apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by [all cases of declared war or of any
other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties]
and which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces
and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups .... ); see also THE LAW OF
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT: PROTOCOL II TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS pt.
I (Howard S. Levie ed., 1987).
61 M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Recognition of Victim's Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 203, 254 n.254 (2006); M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Recognition of Victims'
Rights, in III INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW ch. 4.10 M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 3d ed. 2008).
62 See, e.g., ICRC, supra note 19; MAY, supra note 5, ch. 4; ROBERTSON, supra note 5, at
215; Henckaerts, supra note 19.
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international character derive from Common Article 3 and Protocol II,
which is to be treated, at minimum, in accordance with the specific contents
of those provisions, which summarize the broader and more detailed
protections contained in the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949. Moreover,
such persons can be treated as ordinary criminals who have violated
domestic criminal law, whether or not they have complied with IHL or
national law. Thus, even if non-state actors engaged in a conflict of a non-
international character with a state satisfied all of the requirements of a
lawful combatant under Geneva III and IV and used force only against an
opposing combatant who is a state actor, their action would still be deemed
criminal under domestic law. IHL does not afford them the lawful status of
a combatant like those who are part of the armed forces of a state. This
imbalance is maintained by states that retain the monopoly of legitimate use
of force and want to deny their non-state actor opponents the protections
owed to POWs and the benefit of combatant legitimacy. Scholars and
experts have sought to redress this imbalance by doctrinal development but
with little practical success, as evidenced by the fact that the relevant norms
of IHL have not been amended to date.
One of the early authoritative commentators on the Geneva
Conventions, Jean Pictet, concluded that Common Article 3 should apply as
follows:
(1) That the Party in revolt against the de jure Government possesses an organized
military force, an authority responsible for its acts, acting within a determinate
territory and having the means of respecting and ensuring respect for the Convention.
(2) That the legal Government is obliged to have recourse to the regular military
forces against insurgents organized as military and in possession of a part of the
national territory.
(3) (a) That the dejure Government has recognized the insurgents as belligerents; or
(b) that it has claimed for itself the rights of a belligerent; or
(c) that it has accorded the insurgents recognition as belligerents for the purposes
only of the present Convention; or
(d) that the dispute has been admitted to the agenda of the Security Council or the
General Assembly of the United Nations as being a threat to international peace, a
breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.
(4) (a) That the insurgents have an organization purporting to have the characteristics
of a State.
(b) That the insurgent civil authority exercises de facto authority over persons
within a determinate territory.
(c) That the armed forces act under the direction of the organized civil authority
and are prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war.




Although states' international legal positions and governmental
opinions affirm that they and non-state actors are equally bound by
Common Article 3 and Protocol 11,64 thus giving a false appearance of the
existence of a reciprocal balance, states exclusively reserve to themselves
the determination of when Common Article 3 and Protocol II are
applicable.65 Thus, two questions arise: first, whether the governments of
the High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions deem themselves
obligated other than by their own will; and second, whether non-state actors
deem themselves obligated even if states claim that they are. The actual
practice of states and non-state actors in conflicts of a non-international and
internal character evidences the imbalance arising out of the fact that non-
state actors would be bound by certain obligations, but would not have the
benefits of certain advantages as discussed throughout this Article.
A separate question is the degree to which Common Article 3 is
binding upon states. The application of the Article depends on a state's
determination of whether the conflict is considered a state of belligerency.
However, it is left to the states to determine whether the conflict involving
non-state actors is or is not considered to be part of a state of belligerency.
However, states may claim that in order to be binding, there must be a state
of belligerency. Consequently, if states can determine that a state of
belligerency does not exist, they can argue that Common Article 3 is not
applicable and thus they do not have to treat those who opposed them in
accordance with its provisions. The imbalance results in unfairness and that
in turn leads those who engage in such conflicts against states to ignore the
obligations of humane treatment that are predicated in this situation on the
assumption of reciprocity.66 Scholars argue that the obligation of humane
treatment is binding upon states, whether states declare it to be or not.67
63 PICTET, I COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, supra note
19, at 49-50.
64 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 114, 119 (June
27); ZEGVELD, supra note 5, at 10. See also PICTET, IV COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, supra note 19, at 37; COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS, supra note 19, at 1345.
65 ZEGVELD, supra note 5, at 12-13.
66 See MOIR, supra note 5; MERON, THE HUMANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 54; Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, infra note 68.
67 The writings of legal scholars are neither read nor followed by non-state actors, such
as the FARC, the Janjaweed, or the Lord's Resistance Army. Consequently, it is impossible
to assume that doctrine has much effect on non-state actors. Moreover, very little evidence
exists that scholars writing on customary practices, which in this case includes those of non-
state actors, have had access to any empirical data that supports their arguments about the
practice of non-state actors. Consequently, doctrine is substantially isolated from the reality
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Non-state actors have no inducement for compliance without the assurance
of reciprocity, and certainly none if they are treated as common criminals,
instead of lawful combatants.
To complicate matters, purely domestic conflicts are excluded from the
applicability of IHL, though some experts argue that these conflicts should
be included under Common Article 3 and Protocol II. Most states,
however, consider them outside IHL's protective scheme. 68  Purely
domestic or internal conflicts that do not satisfy the elements of a conflict of
a non-international character as defined in Common Article 3 and Protocol
II are referred to by the ICRC as "internal disturbances or strife" and as
"internal strife., 69  These types of conflict are subject to another legal
regime-that of International Human Rights Law (IHRL), which has no
coercive enforcement mechanism. They are however subject to
International Criminal Law (ICL), subject however to certain limitations of
ICL's applicability to non-state actors as discussed above.
It is anachronistic that these different legal regimes and sub-regimes
apply to the same socially protected interests and reflect the same human
and social values, but differ in their applications depending on the legal
characterization of the type of conflict. Governments maintain these
distinctions for purely political reasons, namely, to avoid giving insurgents
any claim or appearance of legal legitimacy. This political rationale is the
source for the legal disparities in IHL mentioned above.
Experts agree that that there is no valid conceptual basis to distinguish
between the same rights and protections extended to persons and targets
because of how a conflict is legally characterized.7 0  There is no valid
distinction between rights and obligations that emanate from the same
commonly-shared values and intended to apply to the same protected
interests.71 To sidestep their argument, governments argue that the resort to
of the practice, and I submit that this is also true for the practice of state actors (save for the
case of a few military legal experts who have some direct involvement or access into field
practices).
68 See Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 554 (1995); see also BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 1, at 254.
But see Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 8(d) (declaring specifically that the enumerated
violations of armed conflict not of an international character in Article 8(c) do "not apply to
situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of
violence or other acts of a similar nature"). In my opinion, the provisions of the ICC missed
an opportunity inasmuch as they, to a greater or lesser extent, reflect certain political realities
inherent in drafting the statute rather than a progressive codification of international
humanitarian law. See Bassiouni, supra note 2.
69 Non-state actors engaged in these conflicts are not given any legal status under IHL,
but fall under domestic criminal laws. MOIR, supra note 5, at 4, 65.
70 See ZEGVELD, supra note 5, at 34.
71 See MERON, supra note 54, at 58-61; MOIR, supra note 5, at 32-34; ZEGVELD, supra
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violence by domestic insurgent groups is in the nature of "terrorism., 72 In
so doing, states seek to deny non-state actors insurgents' legitimacy, and the
rights and protections contained in the regulation of armed conflict.
7 3
The consequences of this artificial legal distinction are, however,
significant. The 1949 Geneva Conventions and Protocol I are applicable to
conflicts of an international character. They deem "grave breaches" to
include, inter alia: murder, torture, rape, mistreatment of prisoners of war
(POWs) and civilians, wanton and willful destruction of public and private
property, destruction of cultural and religious monuments and objects, use
of civilians and POWs as human shields, and collective punishment of
civilians and POWs. 7 4  These same depredations are not deemed "grave
breaches" in conflicts of a non-international and purely internal character.75
Common Article 3 and Protocol II, which apply to conflicts of a non-
international character, deem the same transgressions as "violations" and
not as "grave breaches," even though the prohibited acts are described in
substantially similar terms. As a result, the legal consequences between
"grave breaches" and "violations" differ as to the duties to criminalize,
prosecute, punish, and extradite, even though experts argue that they should
note 5, at 34.
72 Bassiouni, Legal Controls of International Terrorism, supra note 3, at 97; Bassiouni,
"Terrorism ": Reflections on Legitimacy and Policy Considerations, supra note 3, at 214.
73 See Bassiouni, Legal Controls of International Terrorism, supra note 3, at 98.
74 See Geneva I, supra note 23, art. 50; Geneva II, supra note 23, art. 51; Geneva III,
supra note 23, art. 130; Geneva IV, supra note 23, art. 147.
Geneva III states:
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the
following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: willful
killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing great
suffering or serious injury to body or health, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces
of the hostile Power, or willfully depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial
prescribed in this Convention.
Geneva IV states:
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the
following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the present Convention:
willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing
great suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful
confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a
hostile Power, or willfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial
prescribed in the present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and
appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly.
75 See Geneva I, supra note 23, art. 3; Geneva II, supra note 23, art. 3; Geneva III, supra
note 23, art. 3; Geneva IV, supra note 23, art. 3; Geneva Convention Protocol II, supra note
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be the same.76 The 1949 Geneva Conventions and Protocol I establish
certain consequences for "grave breaches," which include: the duty for
states to criminalize these violations in their domestic laws; to prosecute or
extradite those who commit such violations; to provide other states with
judicial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of such "grave
breaches[;],77 to establish a basis for universal jurisdiction so that all state
parties to the Geneva Conventions can prosecute such offenders;78 and to
remove statutes of limitation for such offenses.79 In contrast, Common
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions80 and Protocol 1181 do not contain
the same explicit legal obligations. To remedy this inconsistency, some
scholars argue that the obligations to prevent and suppress "violations" of
Common Article 3 and Protocol II should be treated in the same manner
and with the same legal consequences as violations of the "grave breaches"
of the 1949 Conventions and Protocol 1.82
76 See generally MERON, THE HUMANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 54, at
123-29; Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, supra note 54, at 253.
77 Geneva I, supra note 23, art. 49; Geneva II, supra note 23, art. 50; Geneva 111, supra
note 23, art. 129; Geneva IV, supra note 23, art. 146. Protocol I, Article 86 states:
1. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall repress grave breaches, and
take measures necessary to suppress all other breaches, of the Conventions or of this Protocol
which result from a failure to act when under a duty to do so.
2. The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was committed by a subordinate
does not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if
they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances
at the time, that he was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not
take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach.
Geneva Convention Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 86.
Geneva IV, Article 1 states: "The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to
ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances." Geneva IV, supra note 23,
art. 1.
78 The Geneva Conventions do not explicitly provide for universal jurisdiction, but they
do create an "obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed... grave breaches,
[and to] bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before [the signatories'] own
courts" (emphasis added). Geneva I, supra note 23, art. 49; Geneva II, supra note 23, art.
50; Geneva III, supra note 23, art. 129; Geneva IV, supra note 23, art. 146; see also
STEPHEN MACEDO, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF
SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal
Jurisdiction for International War Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary
Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 116 (2001).
79 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq: An Appraisal of the Iraqi
Special Tribunal, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 327, 380 n.319 (2005); see also G.A. Res. 2391
(XXIII), at 40, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (Nov. 26, 1968).
80 Geneva I, supra note 23, art. 3; Geneva II, supra note 23 art. 3; Geneva III, supra note
23, art. 3; Geneva IV, supra note 23, art. 3.
81 Geneva Convention Protocol II, supra note 24.
82 See MERON, THE HUMANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 54, at 123-29.
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The imbalance that exists in IHL with respect to the norms applicable
to conflicts of an international character, conflicts of a non-international
character, and conflicts of a purely internal character is significant. But, the
greater imbalance is in the non-applicability of these norms to what are
legally characterized as conflicts of a purely internal nature. To what extent
this imbalance impacts on compliance with these norms by both state and
non-state actors is conjectural. However, common sense leads to the
conclusion that such an imbalance favoring state actors is a factor that
negatively impacts on their voluntary compliance, as well as that of non-
state actors. Common sense also dictates that since non-state actors in non-
international conflicts do not benefit from the same protections as
combatants in conflicts of an international character, they are likely to be
less motivated to voluntarily comply with IHL than if they had some
inducement to do so.
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF NON-INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNAL CONFLICTS
A. LEGAL CHARACTERIZATIONS
As stated above, international law norms differ in their application to
the different types of conflicts. International law is concerned with the
legal characterization of conflicts, the legal status of combatants and non-
combatants, and the legal status of their public or quasi-public acts, and
thus, to some extent, with the recognition of non-state actors as subjects of
international law. 83 IHL is concerned with the means and methods by
which these groups conduct themselves in the course of armed conflicts,
otherwise referred to as thejus in bello.
International law and IHL first recognized non-state actors in the era of
de-colonization during the 1950s-1980s when these groups were engaged in
what are called "wars of national liberation. '' 84 The limited recognition that
they were given under public international law was based on the likely
expectation that, after independence, these groups would become part of the
legitimate government in their new state. Thus, in effect creating an
83 See, e.g., W. THOMAS MALLISON & SALLY MALLISON, THE PALESTINE PROBLEM IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER (1983); W. Thomas Mallison, The Legal Problems
Concerning the Juridical Status and Political Activities of the Zionist Organization/Jewish
Agency: A Study in International and United States Law, 9 WM. & MARY L. REv. 556, 556-
629 (1968) (discussing the Jewish Agency during the British mandate over Palestine).
84 Bassiouni, "Terrorism ": Reflections on Legitimacy and Policy Considerations, supra
note 3, at 222; Georges Abi-Saab, Wars of National Liberation in the Geneva Conventions
and Protocols, 165 RECUEIL DES COURS 353 (1979); Gerald I. A. D. Draper, Wars of
National Liberation and War Criminality, in RESTRAINTS ON WAR (Michael Howard ed.,
1979); see also DANIEL MORAN, WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION (2006).
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exception for certain non-state actors based on future political expectations.
This and other de facto exceptions, coupled with the post-conflict practices
of impunity and amnesty, have resulted in an unequal application of
international law to different participants engaged in violent conflictual
interactions. This political dimension has undermined the value-oriented
goals of international norms designed to minimize the harmful
consequences of violent conflictual interactions. In turn, this situation
negatively affects individual and collective compliance with principles and
norms designed to minimize harmful consequences to protected persons and
targets in the course of armed conflict regardless of how the given conflict
is legally characterized. The outcome has been an increase in harmful
conduct, which paradoxically enhances political gains. 85 Thus, non-state
actors who have the capacity to commit greater harm, even when violating
IHL, are likely to receive greater political recognition, including the
likelihood of impunity for their violations of IHL.
The policy considerations attendant to international law's recognition
of groups engaged in wars of national liberation, which are reflected in
Geneva Convention Protocol I, differ from those arising out of Common
Article 3 and Protocol II and from those arising under the customary law of
armed conflict applicable to conflict of a non-international character. 86 The
policy considerations of Protocol I are based on the legitimacy of such
conflicts and on the expectation that those engaged in these conflicts will
emerge as the leaders of newly independent states. This is different from
non-state actors who are insurgents against their own legitimate
governments, irrespective of the legitimacy of their claims against the
85 This is evident in so many resolutions of the General Assembly and other specialized
bodies of the United Nations, giving recognition to wars of national liberation and providing
standing for these organizations. For example, the PLO was admitted as an observer to the
United Nations in 1975. See G.A. Res. 3375, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3375 (Nov. 10, 1975).
The recognition gave these groups some immediate legitimacy, and it gave some of their
acts the legal status of a quasi-public entity. However, recognition was dependent upon
certain political considerations. These political considerations were translated into legal
elements, such as the extent of de facto territorial control exercised by these groups, their
presumed level of representation of the indigenous population, the legitimacy of their
ultimate goal, and the public law nature of their actions.
86 See Bassiouni, "Terrorism ": Reflections on Legitimacy and Policy Considerations,
supra note 3, at 225; see, e.g., Roman Boed, Individual Criminal Responsibility for
Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and of Additional
Protocol II Thereto in the Case Law of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, in 13 CRIM.
L.F. 293 (2003); Meron, supra note 68; Lindsay Moir, Non-International Armed Conflict
and Guerilla Warfare, in I INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 2, ch. 4.10; Michel
Veuthey, Remedies to Promote the Respect of Fundamental Human Values in Non-
International Armed Conflicts, 30 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 37, 43 (Y. Dinstein
ed., 2002).
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governments that they oppose. Protocol I, however, establishes conditions
for the members of these groups who are engaged in wars of national
liberation enabling them to fall within the meaning of legitimate combatants
and to benefit from the status of POW, as well as to benefit from other
consequences deriving from their status as lawful combatants if they meet
the normative requirements.8 7
An additional element figures into the calculus of compliance. In
some situations, non-state actor groups exercise dominion and control over
a portion of a state's territory and may even exercise 'some of the
manifestations of sovereignty or public authority over a given part of the
national territory and over its inhabitants.88 In these cases, international law
tends to give such groups enhanced recognition. This means that groups
that do not exercise exclusive dominion and control over a more or less
defined portion of a given territory, because they operate out of a narrow
territorial base from which they carry out incursions in the same or different
parts of the state's territory, have less of a political or quasi-legitimate
status.8 9  The difference between the de facto exercise of territorial
dominion and control and its absence bears upon international law's
recognition of the acts of such groups as quasi-public acts that carry or
imply some internationally recognized legal consequences. However,. it
does not bear upon the lawfulness or unlawfulness of their conduct, which
87 Protocol I, Article 1 is applicable to wars of national liberation. Protocol I, supra note
5, art. 1(4).
88 This is the case of the FARC in Colombia. See JAIME GUARACA, COLOMBIA Y LAS
FARC-EP: ORIGEN DE LA LUCHA GUERRILLERA (1999). This is also the case in Gaza where
the Hamas government is in control. But having broken away from the Palestine National
Authority head quartered in the West Bank city of Ramallah, the Hamas government is a de
facto non-state actors group that falls within the meaning of Protocol I, Article 1(4) or within
the meaning of Common Article 3 and Protocol II, depending upon political perspectives.
See Abi-Saab, supra note 84; Bassiouni, "Terrorism ": Reflections on Legitimacy and Policy
Considerations, supra note 3, at 220; Draper, supra note 84. See also M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,
1-2 DOCUMENTS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: EMERGENCE OF CONFLICT IN PALESTINE
AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI WARS AND PEACE PROCESS (2005) [hereinafter DOCUMENTS ON THE
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT].
89 Consider, for example, such contemporary conflicts as those in the Sudan, Uganda,
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In these conflicts, guerrilla groups or insurgents
move from one area of the territory to another without remaining in established geographic
areas. Nevertheless some of the groups may have fixed bases in some of the regions or
provinces allowing their paramilitary units to go into other areas to operate from which to
operate from. The purpose of this illustration is merely to indicate to the reader that the
geographic positions of protagonists in these types of conflicts vary. As a whole, it is
possible to distinguish between groups which have control over a certain territory and have
an effective presence there and are capable of exercising some dominion and control over the
population, while in other types of conflicts, the protagonists may be more nomadic in terms
of their movement across the territory, region, or province.
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is regulated by IHL.90 Additionally, as experience indicates, these groups
occasionally succeed in their belligerency or insurgency and form a state's
new government, thus acquiring full legitimacy with the consequence that
their wartime depredations go unpunished. Because of the potential
political transformations of these groups, international law, reflecting the
practices of states, grants them a measure of international legal recognition.
While this political recognition should have no bearing on these groups'
compliance or lack thereof with IHL norms, acquiring political legitimacy
unfortunately seems to overshadow their previous violations of IHL. This
situation tends to enhance non-compliance because of the expectations of
later impunity.
91
Since governments refuse to give belligerent and insurgent groups
international legal recognition, the latter may seek to acquire such standing
by declaring themselves willing to abide by IHL.92 By conforming their
conduct to IHL, they may seek partial recognition before the international
community. In their perceptions, they implicitly become legitimate groups
with some semblance of equal status to the governments with which they
are in conflict. Precisely to avert such public recognition, however,
governments strongly oppose the co-opting of these groups into processes
of legitimacy, which in turn removes the incentives for such groups to
comply with IHL and continue to act outside the boundaries of legitimacy.
93
International policy should be that whether state or non-state actors, all
those who engage in armed conflicts are subject to: (1) IHL, which provides
for the regulation of the use of force in the context of armed conflicts and
whose violations constitute war crimes;94 (2) the Genocide Convention,
applicable in times of peace and war,95 which establishes non-derogable
prohibitions deemed erga omnes;96 and (3) the customary law of crimes
90 Mallison, supra note 83.
91 Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni,
Combating Impunity for International Crimes, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 409-422 (2000); M.
Cherif Bassiouni, The Perennial Conflict between International Criminal Justice and
Realpolitik, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 541-60 (2006).
92 See Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Respect for International Humanitarian Law by
Armed Non-State Actors in Africa, 864 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 905, 905-24 (2006). The
ICTR, in deciding the applicability of Protocol II to Rwanda, noted that the Rwandan
Patriotic Front had expressly considered itself bound by IHL. Prosecutor v. Kayishema &
Ruzindana, No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgement, 156 (May 21, 1999); Prosecutor v. Akayesu,
No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, 627 (Sept. 2, 1998).
93 Bassiouni, "Terrorism ": Reflections on Legitimacy and Policy Considerations, supra
note 3, at 223.
94 See supra note 19.
95 Genocide Convention, supra note 39, art. 1.
96 Id. art. 4.
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against humanity, also applicable in times of peace and war, which
establishes non-derogable prohibitions deemed erga omnes (also embodied
in positive international criminal law in the Statutes of the International
Criminal Court (ICC),97 the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY),98 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR)). 99
What is also lacking in this legitimacy dilemma is that the international
community does not link political legitimacy to accountability mechanisms.
In other words, there is no sign-on declaration available in which groups of
non-state actors would be given some legitimacy in exchange for their
formal recognition of the applicability of IHL and the acknowledgement
that those who violate it commit war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide will be subject to prosecution, whether before an international or
national legal institution.
Norms applicable to conflicts of a non-international character and
purely internal conflicts grew out of the conceptual framework of norms
applicable to conflicts of an international character. The norms that
97 Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 7.
98 The ICTY Statute, in Article 5, states:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the
following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in
character, and directed against any civilian population: (a) murder; (b) extermination; (c)
enslavement; (d) deportation; (e) imprisonment; (f) torture; (g) rape; (h) persecutions on
political, racial and religious grounds; (i) other inhumane acts.
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter
ICTY Statute]. The following cases decided whether an internal armed conflict is taking
place. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1 -T, Opinion and Judgement, 561-68 (May 7,
1997); Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic & Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement,
183 (Nov. 16, 1998); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement, 55
(Dec. 10, 1998).
99 The Statute of the ICTR, in Article 3, states:
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible
for the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against
any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds: (a) Murder; (b)
Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation; (e) Imprisonment; (f) Torture; (g) Rape; (h)
Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; (i) Other inhumane acts.
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations
Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States, Between 1 January 1994 and 31
December 1994, art. 3, Annex to S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994)
[hereinafter ICTR Statute]. The following case describes and defines an armed conflict.
Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, ICTR-96-3, Judgement and Sentence, 91 (Dec. 6, 1999).
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emerged from the 1949 Geneva Conventions are not truly part of a separate
legal regime suited to conflicts of a non-international character. Protocol II
attempted to create a separate legal regime for conflicts of a non-
international character, but it is essentially an extension by analogy to the
regime applicable to conflicts of an international character. This
proposition is reinforced by the fact that some of these conflicts are
normatively deemed to be conflicts of an international character as
established in Article 1(4) of Protocol I while others are not. 00 The
reluctance of governments to recognize the peculiarities of conflicts of a
non-international character and to provide for compliance-inducing factors
by non-state actors, while carving out exceptions for transgressions of IHL,
contributes to non-compliance by both state and non-state actors. Lastly,
the absence of conflict resolution mechanisms leaves no alternative options
to violent confrontation. When that occurs, non-state actors find
themselves more often than not facing an asymmetry of forces and power-
relations with state-actors. Consequently, non-state actors engage in
violations of IHL, and in acts of "terrorism," as a way of redressing the
imbalance of power and forces-thus, decreasing their compliance with
IHL.
All of these factors mentioned reduce voluntary compliance, which
already suffers from a significant difference deficit. An analysis of specific
IHL provisions assists in the appreciation of the conflict engendered by
overlapping legal regimes. Before embarking on this task, it is essential to
identify a method of legal interpretation. If that method is legal positivism,
reliance on the specific language of the normative text on the basis of the
original intent with which it was drafted and on the basis of which it was
signed and then ratified by states is required. If, in contrast, the method
employed falls in the broad category of progressive interpretation, then the
textual language will be interpreted in a way that varies in accordance with
the custom and practice of states or in accordance with the "writings of the
most distinguished publicists."
Common Article 3, which is frequently referred to as a "mini-
convention" within the 1949 Conventions, offers a useful starting point. An
interpretation of the scope, content and consequences of this provision is
necessary. If the positivist approach is followed, it will take into account
that the textual language of Common Article 3 and Protocol 11101 is different
from that of "grave breaches" as contained in all four Conventions, 0 2 as
100 Geneva Convention Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 1(4).
101 Common Article 3: Geneva I, supra note 23, art. 3; Geneva II, supra note 23, art. 3;
Geneva It, supra note 23, art. 3; Geneva IV, supra note 23, art. 3; see also Geneva
Convention Protocol I, supra note 5.
102 Grave Breaches Provisions: Geneva I, supra note 23, art. 49; Geneva II, supra note
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well as in Protocol 1.103 This is evident in the use of the terminology
employed in these two normative sources and the consequences that ensue
from their violations. These differences reveal that the drafters of the 1949
Conventions sought to establish a distinction between "grave breaches" and
their consequences, as they arise in the context of a conflict of an
international character, and the "violations" contained in Common Article
3.104 The prohibitions contained in the "grave breaches" provisions are
more specific and more encompassing than the "violations" contained in
Common Article 3105 which are described with less specificity and without
clear and express obligations deriving from their violations. The plain
language and meaning of the relevant provisions reveal that the same legal
consequences do not arise from "violations" of Common Article 3 as do
with respect to "grave breaches." The positivist interpretation would lead to
the conclusion that Common Article 3 "violations" do not have the same
standing and consequences of "grave breaches." In contrast, a progressive
interpretative method, which is advocated in the writings of various
scholars, 10 6 transforms the "violations" of Common Article 3 into the
functional equivalent of "grave breaches," thereby carrying the same legal
consequences. These are: the obligation for all states to enforce and
criminalize the violations in their national legal systems; prosecute and/or
extradite alleged offenders; ensure the punishment of those adjudged
responsible; provide mutual legal assistance to states investigating or
seeking to prosecute; provide universal jurisdiction for all states to
prosecute; eliminate the defense of obedience to superior orders; establish
command responsibility; and to eliminate the immunity of heads of state.107
23, art. 50; Geneva III, supra note 23, art. 129; Geneva IV, supra note 23, art. 146.
103 Geneva Convention Protocol I, supra note 5.
104 Common Article 3: Geneva I, supra note 23, art. 3; Geneva II, supra note 23, art. 3;
Geneva III, supra note 23, art. 3; Geneva IV, supra note 23, art. 3.
105 Supra note 104.
106 See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESSE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2003); Veuthey, supra
note 86; Meron, supra note 68, at 554.
107 The Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR and their jurisprudence confirm the position
taken by the "most distinguished publicists" and serve as evidence of customary practice.
Furthermore, the Rome Statute of the ICC, which entered into force on July 1, 2002 and has
been and ratified by 105 states, is also evidence of opinio juris. International Criminal
Court, Assembly of States Parties, http://www.icc-cpi.int/statesparties.html (last visited Sept.
8, 2008); Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 8. Compare Hague Convention Protocol II,
supra note 24, prmb, with the 1907 Second Hague IV, supra note 25, prmb., "Marten's
Clause." The Marten's Clause was modernized in the Protocol I, Article 1, paragraph 2
which states, "In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements,
civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of
international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from
the dictates of public conscience." The laudable humanitarian purpose of this Clause and its
significance for the advancement of IHL, however, cannot be argued to satisfy any rigid
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A separate interpretive problem arises with respect to conditions
determining the status of combatants. The applicable law is not uniform on
the subject and thus creates norm-defeating ambiguity that detracts from
compliance. The threshold conditions for determining whether combatants
qualify for POW status are defined by both Article 4 of the Third Geneva
Convention of 1949 and Article 1 of Protocol 11.108 The Third Geneva
Convention requires four conditions for combatants to benefit from the
status of lawful combatant and POW.10 9 Article I requires only two of these
conditions, namely that the combatants be commanded by superior officers
and that they accept the obligations contained in the Geneva Conventions
(the 1949 Conventions, as well as those contained in Protocol II).110 Thus,
for some states, the issue of whether a combatant in a conflict of a non-
international character wears a uniform with a distinct emblem or insignia
and carries his arms in the open, as required by Article 4, is critical to the
recognition of the status of lawful combatants and POW status, whereas for
other states these characteristics do not inform the determination.
Nevertheless, the essence of the requirements contained in both Article
4 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 and Article I of Protocol II is
the same, namely whether such combatants are willing to abide by IHL.
The problem, however, is how to ascertain the existence of this. Is it to be
determined subjectively on the basis of each combatant's intention, or
objectively on the basis of some external factors? This problem has not
been sufficiently addressed in the literature on the subject. One approach
could be to establish a legal presumption that non-state actors who engage
in conflicts of a non-international armed character are legally presumed to
have known and accepted the obligations arising under IHL. Another
approach would be to develop a mechanism by which such groups could
communicate their willingness to be bound by IHL to the ICRC. Lastly, a
third approach would be to require states to declare that they will abide by
IHL in any conflict with non-state actors engaging in a conflict of a non-
international character, which would induce said groups to reciprocate.
These three options would in fact co-opt non-state actors into compliance
and enhance state compliance.
approach to legal positivism. See BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW, supra note 1, at 398.
108 Geneva III, supra note 23, art. 4; Geneva Convention Protocol II, supra note 24, art.
1.
109 The four conditions set forth in Article 4, paragraph 2 of Geneva III include: (1) that
of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (2) that of having a fixed
distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (3) that of carrying arms openly; (4) that of
conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. Geneva III,
supra note 23, art. 4(2).
110 Geneva Convention Protocol II, supra note 24, art. 1.
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A further complication is that the practice of states leads to the
conclusion that the determination of whether an insurgent group meets the
two or four conditions required for non-state actors to qualify as lawful
combatants respectively under Article 1 of Protocol II and Article 4 of the
Third Geneva Convention is left to states' unilateral determination. This
problem has recently been highlighted by the position of the United States
in relation to Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan."'
There are also a number of other ambiguous aspects of IHL on which
experts differ as to their interpretations. They include: military necessity,
proportionality, infliction of unnecessary pain and suffering, command
responsibility, the distinction between civilians and non-civilians, and
obedience to superior orders.' 1 2  Judicial and quasi-judicial decisions by
international tribunals, including the ICTY and ICTR have addressed these
111 The Supreme Court belatedly reversed this position in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. 548
U.S. 557 (2006); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). For the
Administration's position, see Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney
Gen., & Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Defense, Application of Treaties
and Laws to Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 9, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE
PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 38-79 (Karen J. Greenburg & Joshua L. Dratel eds.,
2005) [hereinafter THE TORTURE PAPERS]; for a critique of its position, see M. Cherif
Bassiouni, The Institutionalization of Torture Under the Bush Administration, 37 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L LAW 389 (2006). See also JORDAN J. PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW: THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION'S UNLAWFUL RESPONSES IN THE "WAR" ON TERROR (2007). For the inside
story about how the War on Terror turned into a war on American ideals, see JANE MAYER,
THE DARK SIDE (2008). Concerning the legal trail of institutionalization of torture, see
PHILLIPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM (2008). For torture in foreign locations, see Jordan J. Paust,
Secret Detentions, Secret Renditions, and Forced Disappearances during the Bush
Administration's "War" on Terror, in THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 5, at 253. See also Christopher C. Joyner, Terrorizing the
Terrorists: An Essay on the Permissibility of Torture, in THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 5, at 227; Christopher L. Blakesley, Acting Out
Against Terrorism, Torture, and Other Atrocious Crimes: Contemplating Morality, Law and
History, in THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 5, at
155.
112 The term civilian is not used in Common Article 3; however, it does distinguish
between members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and persons taking no part
in the hostilities. It does not make a clear distinction between active participants in
hostilities and membership in the armed forces. Kleffher, supra note 5, at 324. Protocol II
uses the terms civilians and civilian population, but without defining them. Id. However,
civilian is understood to be anyone who is not the member of an armed forces group or an
organized armed group. Id.; M. BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED
CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE Two 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 1949, 671 (1982). Protocol II says that civilians are protected "unless and
for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities." Geneva Convention Protocol II, supra
note 24, art. 13(3). Common Article 3 and Protocol II mention membership in "armed
forces" and "organized armed groups" when stipulating the field of application of Protocol
II. Kleffner, supra note 5, at 325; Geneva Convention Protocol II, supra note 24, art. 1, T 1.
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issues. 
11 3
B. CONTEXT SPECIFIC DIFFERENTIATIONS OF LEGAL NORMS
APPLICABLE TO NON-STATE ACTORS
As stated above, legal norms applicable to non-state actors are context-
specific. Therefore, there are differentiations between norms intended to
protect the same social and human interests that depend upon the context,
the participants, and who determines certain relevant legal facts in a given
armed conflict. The power of factual appreciation and legal
characterization left to the states by IHL gives them the power to determine
legal outcomes pertaining to non-state actors, and that imbalance between
state and non-state actors ultimately leads to non-compliance by both. The
following is an applied analysis of these observations.
1. Wars of National Liberation and Regime Change
Wars of national liberation change are treated as an exception to other
norms applicable to non-state actors in conflicts of a non-international
character. Non-state actors engaged in wars of national liberation under
Protocol I, receive status equivalent to combatants in conflicts of an
international character. The Protocol's Article 1(4) covers "armed conflicts
in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien
occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-
determination."' 14 Thus, wars of national liberation, which before Protocol
I used to be classified as conflicts of a non-intemational character, have
been re-classified as equivalents of international conflicts, 1 5 even though
their combatants are non-state actors. Article 96(3) of Protocol I provides
that these groups can indicate to the International Committee of the Red
Cross their intention to comply with the provisions of the Protocol. 1 6 The
113 Kleffner, supra note 5, at 325; 1-12 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
(Andre Klip & Goran Sluiter eds., 2008) [hereinafter ANNOTATED LEADING CASES].
114 Geneva Convention Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 1, 4.
115 Id. art. 1, para. 4.
116 Geneva Convention Protocol I states:
The authority representing a people engaged against a High Contracting Party in an armed
conflict of the type referred to in Article 1, paragraph 4, may undertake to apply the Conventions
and this Protocol in relation to that conflict by means of a unilateral declaration addressed to the
depositary. Such declaration shall, upon its receipt by the depositary, have in relation to that
conflict the following effects:
(a) the Conventions and this Protocol are brought into force for the said authority as a Party
to the conflict with immediate effect;
(b) the said authority assumes the same rights and obligations as those which have been
assumed by a High Contracting Party to the Conventions and this Protocol; and
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assumptions underlying these provisions are that they will induce
compliance with IHL by the non-state actors. However, a given non-state
actor group who qualifies for Article 1(4) of Protocol I may subsequently
engage in conflicts whose goal is internal regime change and thus fall under
the provisions of Common Article 3 and Protocol II, and lose the legal
status of combatant for purposes of receiving POW protections. Thus, the
characterization of a non-state actor group as engaging in a conflict of an
international or non-international conflict may change depending upon the
evolution of the conflict. 17
Legal distinctions become more difficult when they are dependent on
the goals of the combatants, and that is evident in connection with different
conflict-specific contextual factors as described below.
In the context of de-colonization, the goal of insurgent groups is the
removal of foreign occupying forces from the indigenous territory with a
view to achieving independence. In the case of conflicts against settler
regimes, the goal may be of settler removal from the indigenous territory or
that of a regime change, which shifts power from the settler regime in favor
of the indigenous population.118 In the case of internal revolutionary
transformation, the goal is to wrest power from one regime or group in
order to transfer it to another regime or group.' 19
(c) the Conventions and this Protocol are equally binding upon all Parties to the conflict.
Id. art. 96, 3.
117 For example, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, particularly in Bosnia, was
characterized in part as a conflict of an international character and in part, as a conflict of a
non-international character. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement (July
15, 1999). Another example is the legal status of Hezbollah in Lebanon. In its attack on
Lebanon, which commenced on July 12, 2006, the Israeli government claimed that
Hezbollah was a group that acted either with the consent of the government or as a result of
the complacency of the government of Lebanon. This was said to "justify" the government
of Israel in carrying out an incursion into that country that would otherwise be labeled as
aggression and the destruction of infrastructure in Lebanon far beyond what may have been
required to carry out a simple retaliation against a non-state actor carrying military
operations outside the framework of the state. See Report of the Secretary General on the
Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701, S/2007/641 (Oct. 30, 2007); Bassiouni,
"Terrorism ": Reflections on Legitimacy and Policy Considerations, supra note 3, at 227;
Timeline of the July War 2006, DAILY STAR, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/JulyWar06.asp;
U.N.: Cease-fire Begins Monday, CNN, Aug. 12, 2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/08/12/mideast.main/index.html; see also HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, FATAL STRIKES: ISRAEL'S INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS AGAINST CIVILIANS IN
LEBANON (2006), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/lebanon0806/.
118 This occurred in South Africa with the agreement between Nelson Mandela and F. W.
de Klerk in 1991. See DARYL GLASER, POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN SOUTH AFRICA (2001).
119 Irrespective of the purposes and goals of the group seeking to achieve a power-
outcome, the means and methods employed by the insurgent forces and the degree of
compliance with IHL will depend on the level of symmetry or asymmetry of military power.
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In the case of secession, internal conflicts arise between different
ethnic, national, or religious groups who seek to exercise their "right to self-
determination"12 by resorting to armed force with a view to achieving the
breakup of the state and the establishment of one or more newly
independent states. In this context, the generality of the "right of self-
determination" and the absence of peaceful methods to determine such a
right, or to provide an enforceable peaceful outcome, leaves the proponents
and opponents of this right with no other recourse than to resort to the use
of force to resolve the issue of legitimacy that underlies their respective
claims to the resort to violence. Furthermore, whenever the process of
violence occurs, experience indicates that few, if any, peaceful means to
resolve such conflicts exist. As a result, the level of violence increases, and
only when it reaches a point of intolerability do the parties agree to a
peaceful settlement, either on their own or because of third party military or
diplomatic intervention. Thus, there is an advantage to increased of
violence, enhancing the prospects of IHL violations.
In some cases, the character of the conflict is what conditions third
party military intervention or involvement in the conflict, be it military or
otherwise.
Following are some examples that illustrate the distinctions mentioned
above.
(a) The Vietnam conflict was characteristic of the goal of self-
determination 121 aimed at the reunification of North and South Vietnam,
with the added factor of combating what part of the indigenous population
considered to be a foreign occupying force. The United States, however,
considered the actions of North Vietnamese aggression and the insurgence
of those in South Vietnam a guerilla war.
(b) The conflict in the former Yugoslavia was characteristic of a self-
determination conflict whose goal was the breakup of a federal state into
separate states, based on the predominant ethnic characteristics of the
inhabitants of each geographic region. 122  The same type of conflict
While it can be said that every conflict is sui generis, there are nevertheless patterns of
similarities that arise in part because of the asymmetry of power relations between opposing
groups. Almost invariably, the availability of resources, military equipment, training, and
personnel impacts directly on the means and methods of warfare. See 1 UNDERSTANDING
CIVIL WAR, supra note 11; 2 UNDERSTANDING CIVIL WAR, supra note 1 1..
120 U.N. Charter, supra note 5, art. 1(2); HANNUM, supra note 5; Anaya, supra note 5;
Robert D. Sloane, The Policies of State Succession: Harmonizing Self-Determination and
Global Order in the Twenty-First Century, 30 FORD. INT'L L.J. 1288 (2007); Bassiouni,
supra note 5.
121 Supra note 120.
122 See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI WITH PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA ch. 1 (1996) (describing the background
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occurred in Cyprus, resulting in the separation of its the two ethnic groups
(Greek and Turkish) into de facto separate states. During the conflict the
intervention of a third party, Turkey, gave the Turkish Cypriot community
the opportunity to achieve its goal of de facto statehood.123 However, when
these two conflicts first developed they were respectively characterized in
the former Yugoslavia as a conflict of a non-international character and in
Cyprus as a purely internal conflict. Subsequently, the conflict in the
former Yugoslavia was deemed in certain parts and at certain times to be of
an international character.124 After the Turkish Army's invasion of a certain
part of Cyprus, the conflict was deemed to be of an international character.
(c) The de-colonization conflicts in Africa (Sub-Saharan Africa and
North Africa) were characteristic wars of national liberation against a
foreign occupier, which at the time they started were called internal
conflicts. The non-state actor combatants were labeled "terrorists." As the
level of violence in these conflicts intensified and international political
recognition of the legitimacy of the colonized people's claims become
recognized, these conflicts were deemed wars of national liberation, and as
such, they were equivalent to conflicts of an international character.
Protocol I, however, came to existence after most of these conflicts had
ended and simply codified what had become customary international law. 1
25
(d) The conflicts in South Africa and Palestine were characteristic of
settler regime versus indigenous population conflicts (even though in the
case of Palestine, Jews had ifihabited that land since the time of Moses). In
the case of South Africa, the goal of the non-state actors was to produce a
regime change from white apartheid to indigenous African rule, but without
the expulsion or exclusion of the white settlers. 126 In the case of Palestine,
the United Nations decided on a division between a Jewish and Palestinian
of the conflict); see generally MISHA GLENNY, THE FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA (1996). The
conflict in Yugoslavia was at certain times determined to be of an international character.
123 See generally CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, CYPRUS (1984); CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS,
HOSTAGE TO HISTORY: CYPRUS FROM THE OTTOMANS TO KISSINGER (1997); CHRISTOS P.
IOANNIDES, IN TURKEY'S IMAGE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF OCCUPIED CYPRUS INTO A TURKISH
PROVINCE (1991).
124 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgement, 46-52 (May 7,
1997); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 70 (Oct. 2, 1995); Christopher Greenwood,
International Humanitarian Law and the Tadic Case, 7 EUR. J. INT'L L 265, 267, 269-75
(1996).
125 See generally DAVID BIRMINGHAM, DECOLONIZATION OF AFRICA (1996); GERARD
KREIJEN, STATE FAILURE, SOVEREIGNTY AND EFFECTIVENESS: LEGAL LESSONS FROM THE
DECOLONIZATION OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (2004); MORAN, supra note 84, at 130-31, 138-
51.
126 See generally P. ERIC LoUw, THE RISE, FALL AND LEGACY OF APARTHEID (2004); S.
TERREBLANCHE, A HISTORY OF INEQUALITY IN SOUTH AFRICA (2003).
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Arab state. The partition of Palestine was the international community's
solution in the early stages of the conflict. 127 That conflict has subsequently
evolved into an attempt by the Palestinians to reconstitute the State of
Palestine in whole or part on the territory that used to be under the Mandate
system of the League of Nations12 8 and, prior to that, as Palestine was
constituted under the Turkish Ottoman Empire. 129 For Israel, it meant the
opportunity to expand its boundaries at the expense of the Palestinians.
Israel became a state in 1948, but Palestine has not become a state.
Between 1948 and the present, there have been four wars (1948, 1956,
1967, 1973) involving multiple states, making these conflicts international
in character. 130  But since 1967, when Israel occupied all of what was
formerly Palestine, having seized these territories from Jordan and Egypt, it
has not recognized the Palestinian resistance as a conflict of a non-
international character.
(e) The conflicts in Argentina, 131 Chile, 132 and El Salvador 133 were
characteristic internal regime changes based on different visions of political,
social, and economic systems in these countries.134 The same is true, to
some extent, of the internal conflict that existed in Lebanon135 and in
127 G.A. Res. 181, U.N. Doc. A/RES/181(II)(A+B) (Nov. 29, 1947); Phyllis Bennis, The
United Nations and Palestine: Partition and Its Aftermath-UN Stance on Palestine's
Displacement and Creation of Israel, 19 ARAB STUD. Q. 47 (1997); see generally BASSIOUNI,
DOtUMENTS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, supra note 88.
128 See generally Win. Roger Lewis, The United Kingdom and the Beginning of the
Mandates System, 1919-1922, 23 INT'L ORG. 73, 73-96 (1969); Balfour Declaration,
November 2, 1917, in BASSIOUNI, DOCUMENTS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, supra note
88; JUSTIN MCCARTHY, THE POPULATION OF PALESTINE: POPULATION HISTORY AND
STATISTICS OF THE LATE OTTOMAN PERIOD AND THE MANDATE (1990).
129 See generally PALESTINE IN THE LATE OTTOMAN PERIOD: POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION (David Kushner ed., 1986).
130 For documents on the conflict, see BASSIOUNI, DOCUMENTS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI
CONFLICT, supra note 88.
131 See generally MARGUERITE FEITLOWITZ, A LEXICON OF TERROR: ARGENTINA AND THE
LEGACIES OF TORTURE (1999); PAUL H. LEWIS, GUERRILLAS AND GENERALS: THE DIRTY WAR
IN ARGENTINA (2001); M. PATRICIA MARCHAK, GOD'S ASSASSINS: STATE TERRORISM IN
ARGENTINA IN THE 1970s (1999).
132 See generally SIMON COLLIER, WILLIAM F. SATER, A HISTORY OF CHILE, 1808-2002
(2004); PAMELA CONSTABLE & ARTURO VALENZUELA, A NATION OF ENEMIES: CHILE UNDER
PINOCHET (1993).
133 See generally ELISABETH JEAN WOOD, INSURGENT COLLECTIVE ACTION AND CIVIL
WAR IN EL SALVADOR (2003).
134 Internal regime changes may be aimed at transformation of political, social, and
economic systems or part of a given system. For example, the Red Brigades in Italy, the
Baader-Meinhof Group in Germany, and the Red Liberation group in Japan in the 1960s and
1970s advocated internal social change. Bassiouni, "Terrorism ": Reflections on Legitimacy
and Policy Considerations, supra note 3, at 226.
135 See EDGAR O'BALLANCE, CIVIL WAR IN LEBANON, 1975-92 (1998); ELIZABETH
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Guatemala, although the latter, unlike the former, had a significant ethnic
component.' 36 These conflicts were deemed internal, though they had the
characteristics of non-international conflicts.
(f) The conflicts in Rwanda.37 and in the Great Lakes area of Africa,
including the Congo and Uganda, are characterized as internal ethnic and
tribal warfare, notwithstanding the involvement of combatants from several
states.
138
(g) The conflict in Cambodia was characterized as internal regime
change.139 This was also the case in Russia after the Revolution of 1917
followed by the policies and practices of Lenin and Stalin in the violent
elimination of political opponents for the fulfillment of the Marxist State's
goals. 140  The same was said of post-1949 Maoist repressions in China,
followed by the Cultural Revolution. 141 These were deemed oppressive
regime states using force to achieve domestic political goals.
In all of these conflicts, the predominantly civilian victims were
protected persons under IHL. 142 They were also covered by IHRL and ICL.
In fact, these victims did not benefit from the protective scheme of IHL or
IHRL, and ICL was not applied except in rare cases. 143 The non-state actors
PICARD, LEBANON: A SHATTERED COUNTRY: MYTHS AND REALITIES OF THE WARS IN
LEBANON (2002); Hans-Peter Gasser, International Non-International Armed Conflicts: Case
Studies of Afghanistan, Kampuchea and Lebanon, 31 AM. U. L. REv. 911 (1982).
136 See generally MIQUEL DEWEVER-PLANA & MIQUEL DEWEBER-PLANA, LA VERDAD
BAJO LA TIERRA: GUATEMALA, EL GENOCIDJO SILENCIADO (2007); JOHN WESLEY SHILLINGTON,
GRAPPLING WITH ATROCITY: GUATEMALAN THEATER IN THE 1990s (2002).
117 See generally KINGSLEY MOGHALU, RWANDA'S GENOCIDE: THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL
JUSTICE 9-13 (2005); VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, 1 THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 48, 49 (1998); GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS
(1995); Alan J. Kupperman, Rwanda in Retrospect, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 94, 95 (2000).
138 See generally THE AFRICAN STAKES OF THE CONGO WAR (John F. Clark ed., 2002).
139 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Mixed Models of International Criminal Justice, in III
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 61, ch. 2.4; David Scheffer, Special Tribunal for
Cambodia, in III INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 61, ch. 2.6; Steven R. Ratner,
Accountability for the Khmer Rouge: A (Lack oj) Progress Report, in POST-CONFLICT
JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 613. For a discussion of Cambodia, see generally Aaron J.
Buckley, The Conflict in Cambodia and Post-Conflict Justice, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE,
supra note 1, at 637; Nema Milaninia, Appeasing the International Conscience or Providing
Post-Conflict Justice: Expanding the Khmer Rouge Tribunal's Restorative Role (Bepress
Legal Series, Working Paper 1274, 2006), available at
http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1274/.
140 See generally GEORGE HERMAN HODOS, SHOW TRIALS: STALINIST PURGES IN EASTERN
EUROPE, 1948-54 (1987).
141 See generally GUOKAI LIU, A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION (Anita
Chan ed., 1987); RODERICK MACFARQUHAR & MICHAEL SCHOENHALS, MAO'S LAST
REVOLUTION (2006).
142 Supra note 2.
"' See POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE, supra note 1; JANE STROMSETH & DAVID WIPPMAN, CAN
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combatants were not given POW status, 144 nor were they treated in
accordance with Common Article III. The victimization, which surely
involved war crimes, also involved in some cases genocide and crimes
against humanity. Nevertheless, there were only limited prosecutions,
mostly before the ICTY and ICTR, and some domestic prosecutions.
145
In the course of many conflicts deemed at the time to be of a non-
international or purely internal character, a number of insurgent groups
have succeeded in achieving their goals, namely, the removal of foreign or
colonial forces and civilian settlers, independence or secession and the
establishment of newly independent states (there were seventy-four states in
1946; there are now 192 member states of the United Nations), 46 and
domestic regime change. In many of these conflicts, the high level of
victimization indicates an almost generalized practice of non-compliance by
both governmental forces and non-state actors. Thus, violence
accompanied by IHL violations has tended to produce rewarding outcomes,
which, it can be assumed, is not conducive to compliance with IHL and
other international law norms.
A few non-state actors have, at times, manifested their willingness to
comply with IHL, presumably in exchange for the recognition of lawful
combatant and POW status. 147 However, governments have almost always
rejected such offers from groups like the Irish Republican Army, the
African National Congress, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and
others. 1
48
MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS?: BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS
(2006); Jane Stromseth, Post-Conflict Rule of Law Building: The Need for a Multi-Layered,
Synergistic Approach, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1443 (2008).
144 Geneva IV, supra note 23.
145 See BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 1; MAY, supra note 5;
ROBERTSON, supra note 5; SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5.
146 United Nations Member States, http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html (Oct. 3,
2006).
147 Ewumbue-Monono, supra note 92.
148 For example, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Algeria attempted to
formally adhere to IHL, but Switzerland and France challenged it. Switzerland also
challenged an attempt by the Smith government in Rhodesia. The Kosovo Liberation Army
expressed its desire to sign the Geneva Conventions, but was turned down. ZEGVELD, supra
note 5, at 14 n.18. These groups made offers to comply with IHL with the state with which
they were in conflict; some of these declarations or offers were made in political
communiques, public speeches, or statements. Established governments considered those as
being merely propaganda. These were missed opportunities. The international organizations
such as the UN and ICRC could have used these openings, no matter how narrow they may
have been, to push forward the agenda of compliance. Prior to Geneva Convention Protocol
I, these included the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (1958), the
Provisional Government of Vietnam (1974), the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (1977),
the African National Congress (1980), Unido Nacional pela Independncia Total de Angola
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Limited empirical evidence exists to indicate what factors contribute to
compliance with IHL, such as mutuality of interests, political status
recognition, and the likelihood of post-conflict prosecution. However, the
high level of victimization indicates an almost generalized practice of non-
compliance by both governmental forces and non-state actors engaged in
conflicts of a non-international character and internal conflicts. No
empirical evidence exists to indicate whether non-compliance by state
actors enhances the same by non-state actors, but the emulation factor is
assumed to exist. This is evidenced by the political discourse of non-state
actors, which is in the nature of a tu quoque argument, deemed invalid since
the end of World War 11.149 In the past several decades, state actors have
labeled such violent interactions "terrorism."'' 50  In response, non-state
actors have labeled state actors' conduct as "state-terrorism." The result has
been to reinforce the respective claims of the protagonists to legitimacy, in
turn producing confusion as to the legitimacy of the resort to violence.151
2. Conflicts of an International Character Involving Non-State Actors
Operating on the Side of State Actors
Non-state actors who fight alongside or as part of the armed forces of a
High Contracting Party to the Geneva Conventions in a conflict of an
international character are deemed lawful combatants and benefit from
POW status if they satisfy the requirements of the Third Geneva
Convention's Article 4(2):
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of
(1980), South West Africa People's Organization (1981), and the Palestine Liberation
Organization (1982). Such declarations are filed with the ICRC in Geneva. See, e.g.,
Ewumbue-Monono, supra note 92. The ICTR, in deciding the applicability of Geneva
Convention Protocol II to Rwanda, noted that the Rwandan Patriotic Front had expressly
considered itself bound by IHL. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement,
1 627 (Sept. 2, 1998); Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T,
Judgement, 156 (May 21, 1999).
149 FRITS KALSHOVEN, BELLIGERENT REPRISALS (2005); FRITS KALSHOVEN & LIESBETH
ZEGVELD, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 73 (3d ed. 2001).
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152
war.
Additionally, Protocol I includes the following requirements, in Article
44:
3. In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the effects of
hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian
population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory
to an attack. Recognizing, however, that there are situations in armed conflicts where,
owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish
himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided that, in such situations, he
carries his arms openly:
(a) during each military engagement, and
(b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a
military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is to
participate.
Acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph shall not be considered as
perfidious within the meaning of Article 37, paragraph 1 (c).
4. A combatant who falls into the power of an adverse Party while failing to meet the
requirements set forth in the second sentence of paragraph 3 shall forfeit his right to
be a prisoner of war, but he shall, nevertheless, be given protections equivalent in all
respects to those accorded to prisoners of war by the Third Convention and by this
Protocol. This protection includes protections equivalent to those accorded to
prisoners of war by the Third Convention in the case where such a person is tried and
punished for any offences he has committed.
153
Once the conflict of an international character ends, the non-state
actors who qualified for combatant and POW status but who continue to
engage in armed conflict no longer benefit from their previous status, and
become subject to domestic criminal law.
3. Non-State Actors in Non-International Conflicts
Common Article 3 to the Four Geneva Conventions provides the basic
framework for the application of IHL to non-state actors engaged in combat
and combat support activities in the context of non-international armed
conflicts. This Article provides for protections equivalent to those afforded
civilians in international conflicts, but non-state actors do not benefit from
POW status available to combatants in international conflicts under the
Third Geneva Convention.1 54  This provision sets forth minimum
152 Geneva III, supra note 23, art. 4(2).
153 Geneva Convention Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 44(3), (4).
154 Geneva III states in Article 3:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one
of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum,
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humanitarian standards for parties engaged in such conflicts.1 55  Thus, all
persons who are hors de combat are to be treated humanely, and in
particular there are prohibitions against murder, mutilation, cruel treatment,
torture and other forms of violence, taking of hostages, humiliating and
degrading treatment, and extra-judicial sentences and executions. Protocol
II further develops the law applicable in non-international armed conflict
and offers some clarification as to the factors that trigger the application of
such protections.156 Article I of Protocol II declares that its provisions
apply to all non-international armed conflicts (except "wars of national
liberation," covered by Protocol I) that take place between the armed forces
of a contracting party and other armed groups "under responsible command,
exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry
out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this
Protocol.157
the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have
laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any
other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place
whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment
and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgement
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded, sick and shipwrecked shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may
offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special
agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the
conflict.
Geneva III, supra note 23, art. 3.
155 Id.
156 Geneva Convention Protocol II, supra note 24.
157 Geneva Convention Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 1(1).
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4. Normative, Doctrinal, and Jurisprudential Efforts Addressing Gaps and
Overlaps in the Legal Regimes Applicable to Non-International and
Internal Conflicts
As stated earlier, purely internal conflicts do not fall under Common
Article 3 and Protocol II. This means that IHL does not extend even
minimum humanitarian protections to non-state actors in such conflicts.
Common Article 3 distinguishes between those who engage in
hostilities and those who refrain from an active role in hostilities.
58
Protocol 1I specifically refers to the "civilian population," but fails to define
it.159 Even though it does not define civilians, the distinction between
members of armed groups and civilians has not necessarily been eliminated,
because civilians lose their protection "for such time as they take a direct
part in hostilities."
' 160
Some confusion still exists as to how far the definition of conflicts of a
non-international character can extend to purely internal conflicts. The
ICRC defines IHL as the body of rules that, during wartime, protects people
who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities, and seeks to
limit and prevent human suffering in times of armed conflict.' 6' Some
experts argue that purely domestic conflicts should be included under
Common Article 3 and Protocol II. However, if the conflict is purely
domestic or internal and does not satisfy elements of a conflict of a non-
international character, which the ICRC refers to as "internal disturbances
or strife" and "internal strife," it becomes subject to another legal regime-
that of IHRL. The existence of three sub-legal regimes applicable to
conflicts of an international and non-international character and purely
domestic or internal conflicts is incongruous insofar as the values and goals
of all three sub-regimes are the same, namely the protection of certain
persons and targets in times of conflicts. 1
62
There is a growing doctrinal and jurisprudential trend to combine IHL
and IHRL, at least where they are overlapping, 63 and thus extend their
158 Common Article 3, supra note 104; Kleffner, supra note 5, at 324 (discussing
Common Article 3's mention of "members of armed forces who have laid down their arms"
and "persons taking no active part in the hostilities" as two categories as falling under
protection).
159 Geneva Convention Protocol I, supra note 24, at art. 5(1)(b),(e); Kleffner, supra note
5, at 324.
160 Geneva Convention Protocol II, supra note 24, at art. 13(3); see also Kleffner, supra
note 5, at 324-25.
161 See ICRC, supra note 42; Bassiouni, Introduction to International Humanitarian
Law, supra note 22.
162 See ICRC, supra note 42; Bassiouni, supra note 22.
163 See, e.g., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 (July 9). The Israeli Supreme
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respective protections in a way that reduces the harmful effects of armed
conflicts and violent interactions irrespective of legal characterization. This
is based on the proposition that there is no valid conceptual basis upon
which to distinguish between the protections offered the same persons and
targets as a result of the legal characterization of the conflict. 164  Such
distinctions exist because governments do not wish to grant insurgents
engaged in internal conflicts a legal status likely to give them political
legitimacy. 165 This is why governments usually argue that the resort to
violence by domestic. insurgent groups is "terrorism," and thus that such
groups can be denied not only legitimacy, but the fundamental safeguards
and protections contained in the regulation of armed conflict. 1
66
Court also addressed this issue in HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Isr. [2005],
translated in 45 I.L.M. 202 (2006). For a diverse spectrum of views regarding this issue, see
generally Marc H. Ellis, The Mural-Covered Wall: On Separation and the Future of Jews
and Palestinians in Israel/Palestine and the Diaspora, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 271 (2004); Richard
A. Falk, Towards Authoritativeness: The ICJ Ruling on Israel's Security Wall, 99 AM. J.
INT'L L. 42 (2005); Zaha Hassan, Building Walls and Burning Bridges: Legal Obligations of
the United States with Respect to Israel's Constructions of the Wall of Separation in
Occupied Palestinian Territory, 13 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & Disp. RESOL. 197 (2005); Sean
D. Murphy, Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An IPSE Dixit from the
ICJ?, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 62 (2005); Joel S. Tashjian, Contentious Matters and the Advisory
Power: The ICJ and Israel's Wall, CHI. J. INT'L L. 427 (2005); Geoffrey R. Watson, The
"Wall" Decisions in Legal and Political Contexts, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 6 (2005); Sarah
Williams, Has International Law Hit the Wall? An Analysis of International Law in
Relation to Israel's Separation Barrier, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 192 (2006).
164 MERON, THE HUMANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 54, at 58-61;
Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, supra note 54, at 240; supra note 163; see
Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, supra note 68, at 89; see also
BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 1, at 254.
165 See Moir, supra note 86.
166 See generally HELEN DUFFY, THE 'WAR ON TERROR' AND THE FRAMEWORK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); PAUST, supra note 111. The most glaring contemporary
example is the denial by the Bush Administration of POW status to combatants from the
2001 War in Afghanistan and their detention at Guantanamo, Cuba, where their reported
treatment is in violation of the Geneva Conventions' norms to which the U.S. is a state-party.
Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. § 918 (2001), reprinted in 41 I.L.M. 252
(2002); Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Vice President et al., Feb. 7,
2002, reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note Ill (stating that the Geneva
Conventions did not apply). This was reversed by the Supreme Court in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). See also Bassiouni, supra note 111; Jordan J. Paust, War
and Enemy Status After 9/11: Attacks on the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 325 (2003).
The same applies to the detention and torture of Iraqis by U.S. forces during their occupation
of that country since 2003. See MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU
GHRAIB, AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2004); SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE
ROAD FROM 9/11 TO ABU GHRAIB (2004); LILA RAJIVA, THE LANGUAGE OF EMPIRE: ABU
GHRAIB AND THE AMERICAN MEDIA 11-19, 35-54 (2005); ERIK SAAR & VIVECA NOVAK,
INSIDE THE WIRE: A MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SOLDIER'S EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF LIFE AT
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The ICTY expanded the customary law applicable to non-international
armed conflicts in the Tadic case, holding that violations of the laws and
customs of war include serious violations committed in non-international
armed conflicts. 167  The Tribunal subsequently held that customary law
prohibits attacks on the civilian population in internal armed conflicts.
The ICTR, which has the unprecedented jurisdiction to prosecute
violations of the laws of war in an internal conflict, has applied IHL to non-
state actors. Article 4 of the ICTR Statute provides for individual criminal
accountability for violations of Common Article 3 and Protocol II, shifting
the focus of such provisions from minimum standards to obligations, which
creates internationally enforceable criminal accountability. 168
The ICTY's jurisprudence holds that civilians are those who do not
participate directly in hostilities, a definition that applies regardless of the
type of conflict. 169  In the ICTR, the jurisdiction was specifically over
crimes in a non-international armed conflict, and the Tribunal also
disregarded the labels of combatants in this type of conflict.
70
One expert summarizes the complexity of combatant status as follows:
It is clear from the relevant conventional provisions and customary international
humanitarian law that the formal status of "combatant" does not apply in non-
international armed conflicts. As such, combatant status and its aforementioned
consequences is one of the areas, in which customary international humanitarian law
has not evolved beyond the dichotomy of international and non-international armed
conflicts, despite the imprecise use of the term "combatant" in some texts, which
relate to both types of conflicts. In non-international armed conflicts, therefore, acts
lawful under the laws of armed conflict, such as the killing of a member of the state
GUANTANAMO (2005); see also Diane Marie Amann, Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2085
(2005). Understandably, if the purposes of IHL and human rights law are to protect certain
persons from harm and to prohibit certain means of harm, than the fact that there is a
common socially protected interest should not be distinguished on the basis of which body of
law or legal regime applies thereto. See also Michael Newton, Unlawful Belligerency After
September 11: History Revisited and Law Revised, in NEW WARS, NEW LAWS? APPLYING
THE LAWS OF WAR IN 21ST CENTURY CONFLICTS 75, 117 (David Wippman & Matthew
Evangelista eds., 2005).
167 See generally Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgement,
46-52 (May 7, 1997); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, T 70 (Oct. 2, 1995); Christopher
Greenwood, International Humanitarian Law and the Tadic Case, 7 EUR. J. INT'L L 265, 267
269-75 (1996).
168 See ICTR Statute, supra note 99, art. 4.
169 See Prosecutor v. Blagojevic & Jokic, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgement, 544 (Jan.
17, 2005); Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement, 180 (Mar. 3, 2000);
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, 639 (discussing "civilian population" by referring to Common
Article 3 regarding crimes against humanity); Kleffner, supra note 5, at 326.
170 Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgement, 179
(May 21, 1999); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, 100 (Dec. 6, 1999).
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armed forces or damage to, or the destruction of, a military objective, remain in
principle punishable under domestic law. All that the laws of armed conflict do is to
encourage (not oblige) "the authorities in power" to grant the widest possible amnesty
to persons who have participated in the armed conflict, provided such persons have
not committed war crimes or other international crimes, which states are obliged to
investigate and prosecute. Furthermore, those who have directly participated in
hostilities sin a non-international armed conflict and have been interned or detained
are not entitled to treatment as prisoners of war. The reason for the absence of
combatant status in non-international armed conflicts is obvious: states are not
prepared to grant their own citizens, and even less others who might engage in
fighting on behalf of a non-state group, the right to do so. Nor are they willing to
grant them any further reaching rights than common criminals if captured. Anything
else would, in the eyes of states, undermine their claim to the monopoly of force,
would promote the formation of non-state armed groups by those who are
disenchanted, and encourage individuals to join such groups. In short, none of the
aforementioned aspects of combatant status (combatant privilege and prisoner of war
status) are, therefore, of relevance to non-international armed conflicts. This is only
different for situations in which those who directly participate in hostilities on behalf
of a party to a non-international armed conflict are granted that status in accordance
with a special agreement envisaged under Common Article 3 paragraph 3, or by virtue
of a unilateral act of one or more parties to the conflict.
If compared to the situation under the law of international armed conflict, the
absence of combatant status in non-international armed conflicts creates an imbalance
between the parties under domestic law, with all its negative implications for
compliance with the laws of armed conflict, which so fundamentally rests on the
equality and reciprocal interests of belligerent parties. It reinforces the perception of
state armed forces that they are engaging criminals who, unlike themselves, lack the
right to fight, rather than engaging "equals," who represent a state and its government.
Members of non-state armed forces, on the other hand, may be inclined to ask: "When
compliance with the laws of armed conflict cannot keep me out of jail, why comply?"
The imbalance between state and non-state armed forces, in other words, undermines
the notion that legally equal parties are facing each other. It needs to be emphasised
immediately, however, that this inequality of the parties to a non-international armed
conflict is purely a matter of domestic law. In contrast, the laws of armed conflict
grant equal rights to, and imposes identical obligations on, all parties to an armed
conflict.
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court sets forth the
most recent statement of IHL applicable during non-international, or
internal, conflicts. Like the ICTR Statute, the Rome Statute criminalizes
violations of Common Article 3 under Article 8. This includes a list of
twelve acts that constitute war crimes in internal conflicts, including:
intentionally targeting civilians, medical units, humanitarian assistance
workers or members of a peacekeeping mission; pillage; rape, sexual
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and
other forms of sexual violence; conscripting or enlisting children under the
171 Kleffner, supra note 5, at 322-23 (emphasis in original, citations omitted).
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age of fifteen years; forced displacement; declaring that no quarter will be
given; subjecting persons to physical mutilation or to unjustified or
dangerous medical or scientific experiments of any kind; and destroying or
seizing the property of an adversary.1 72 The ICC Statute also uses a broader
definition of internal conflicts than Protocol II, stating that these provisions
apply to "armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a State when
there is protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and
organized armed groups or between such groups. 173
These and other IHL distinctions, their doctrinal elaboration and the
jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR, and the progressive codification of
IHL in Article 8 of the ICC Statute 174 reveals the legal complexities
pertaining to non-state actors in the various forms of armed conflict. To
presume that non-state actors can understand these complexities and have a
clear understanding of the law of armed conflict is preposterous.
Treaty law distinguishes between civilians and combatants defining
civilians as those who are not members of the armed forces, but without
providing a more detailed definition of civilian.1 75 The ICRC "Customary
Law" study shifts the focus away from defining who is a civilian to what
conditions cause a civilian to lose IHL's legal protections. 176 The "term
'combatant' ... is used in all IHL normative provisions in its generic
meaning, indicating persons who do not enjoy the protections accorded to
civilians, but does not imply a right to combatant status or prisoner-of-war
status" for those who engage in conflicts of a non-international or internal
character.1 77 The ICRC Study focuses on how a "civilian" can lose civilians
status and protection. 178 Rule 5 of the ICRC study states that "persons who
are not members of the armed forces" are civilians. 179 It is not clear,
however, whether "members of armed opposition groups are civilians
subject to Rule 6 on loss of protection from attack in case of direct
participation or whether members of such groups are liable to attack as
such, independently of the operation of Rule 6. ' 80
None of these efforts have yet resolved the problems of gaps and
172 Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 8(2)(c); D6rmann, supra note 21; BASS1OUNI,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ICC, supra note 21.
173 Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 8(2)(f).
174 BASSIOUNI, supra note 21, at 55-94.
175 Id. at 324.
176 ICRC, supra note 19, at 19 R. 6; Kleffner, supra note 5, at 324.
177 ICRC, supra note 19, at n.35.
178 Kleffner, supra note 5, at 326.
179 ICRC, supra note 19, at 19 R. 5; see also Geneva Convention Protocol I, supra note
5, art. 50(1).
180 ICRC, supra note 19, at 19 R. 6.
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overlaps of the multiple legal and sub-legal regimes applicable to conflicts
of a non-international and internal character. Thus, the status of non-state
actors engaged in these conflicts remains the same, which may in part
explain why these combatants feel that they have no inducement for
compliance. This conclusion in no way means that non-state actors would
otherwise comply with IHL in view of the asymmetry of forces and the
culture of new wars, as discussed below.
5. The United States' Exceptionalism
As of September 2001, the George W. Bush administration has taken
the position that the "war against terrorism" does not have to be subject to a
formal declaration of war as ordinarily required by the Constitution.'
81
Moreover, President Bush declared that the Geneva Conventions do not
apply to the Taliban or other "terrorist" groups, and authorized a policy of
torture of detainees by United States government officials. 8 2 Through this
policy of torture, the Bush administration has not only violated its
obligations under IHL, as well as under the 1984 Convention Against
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CAT),183 but it has also provided an added incentive for non-state actors to
take the position that IHL does not apply to them. If a government's claim
of legitimacy can override the obligations of IHL, then a non-state actor can
make the same claim with the same consequence. This signals the end of
the relevance of IHL, which is predicated on the assumption that
irrespective of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of any claim by any party to
engage in armed conflict, the parties to such a conflict must abide by the
neutral rules of armed conflict, which regulates its means and methods. In
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court reversed the United States'
181 U.S. CONST. art. VIII, § 8, cl. 11; War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2000).
182 Bassiouni, supra note 111; see also Military Order of November 13, 2001, Detention,
Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918
(2001); Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Vice President et al., supra
note 166; Steven W. Becker, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall... ": Assessing the Aftermath of
September 11th, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 563, 580-92 (2003) (describing President Bush's
Military Order in detail and arguing that it is ultra vires because it was issued without
Congress first formally declaring war); Paust, supra note 166, at 325. The Military Order
was patterned after a proclamation/military order by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1942
concerning the trial by a military commission of Nazi agents. See Proclamation No. 2561, 3
C.F.R. 309 (1938-1943); Curtis A. Bradley, The Military Commissions Act, Habeas Corpus,
and the Geneva Conventions, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 322, 323-24 (2007) (discussing Exparte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)). For a collection of the orders and directives, see THE TORTURE
PAPERS, supra note 111; Newton, supra note 166, at 78. For a critical appraisal of the Bush
Administration's orders in this context, see PAUST, supra note 111; Bassiouni, supra note
111.
183 Convention Against Torture, supra note 5.
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position, holding that the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
required the application of Common Article 3 to all combatants.
184
Common Article 3's prohibition on the "passing of sentences and carrying
out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly
constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized
as indispensable by civilized peoples" was determined by the Supreme
Court to be required by Section 821 of the UCMJ.' 85
As of 2004, judicial decisions and actions have evidenced a gradual
trend tending to curtail the administration's policies and practices that
violate IHL and CAT. Regrettably, however, even if this trend manages to
entirely overturn prior practices, some of which are still ongoing, the United
States will have lost its position of moral rectitude in the eyes of the
international community.
186
IV. THE CULTURE OF WAR IN NON-INTERNATIONAL AND PURELY
INTERNAL CONFLICTS: ITS METHODS AND MEANS, AND ITS IMPACT ON
COMPLIANCE AND NON-COMPLIANCE WITH IHL
A. THE NEW CULTURE OF WAR
A new culture of war which emerged after World War II resulted in
greater non-compliance with the laws of armed conflict. The reasons for
that outcome derived in part from the absence of effective conflict
resolution mechanisms, the asymmetry of military power between state and
non-state actors and also because legal norms are premised on certain
assumptions about the methods and means of warfare in existence at the
time that the norms were formulated, namely: that conflicts are between
regularly constituted armed forces that share mutuality of interests.
However, as the methods and means of war have radically changed in
recent years, it is difficult to maintain that the same expectations of
compliance that existed heretofore between regularly constituted armed
forces are still valid, as between armed forces and non-state actors.187 Non-
184 548 U.S. 557, 571-84 (2006).
185 Id. at 628-29 (citing Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions).
186 See Bassiouni, supra note 111.
187 John Keegan's classic book, The Face of Battle, began the study of modem wars and
the culture of war since World War II. JOHN KEEGAN, THE FACE OF BATTLE (1976). It was
followed by his remarkable work, A History of Warfare, in which the author contradicts the
heretofore dominant view of von Clausewitz that "war is the continuation of diplomacy by
other means." JOHN KEEGAN, A HISTORY OF WARFARE 3 (1993); CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, 1
ON WAR 22, 119 (1982); see also STEPHEN C. NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS: A
GENERAL HISTORY 161-214 (2005); MARTIN VAN CREVELD, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WAR
33-42 (1991) (discussing the "Trinitarian War" concept developed by von Clausewitz).
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state actor groups tend to fight in accordance with their own opportunistic
rules. 188
The first generation of modem warfare can be said to have its genesis
in the Napoleonic Wars of 1803-1815; the second generation developed in
the First World War; and the third generation in the Second World War.
The fourth generation of warfare, arising after World War II, involves loose
networks that become more powerful and resilient through information
technology,18 9 and does not aim at defeating the enemy's forces but
"directly attacks the minds of the enemy-decision makers to destroy the
enemy's political will.'
190
Today's conflicts are seen as evolutions of the "irregular warfare" of
Mao Tse Tung (Zedong)'s "protracted war" in China, the Spanish guerrilla
attacks against Napoleon in 1812-1813, America's revolutionary war of
independence against Britain, and others. However, modem versions of
this "irregular warfare" has had significant consequences: the British were
driven out of Palestine, the French from Algeria, the Americans from
Vietnam, the Russians from Afghanistan, and the Israelis from Lebanon.' 91
The lesson of failed counter-insurgency efforts by state actors is that "one
Keegan asserts that war "is always an expression of culture." KEEGAN, A HISTORY OF
WARFARE, supra. Keegan further expands on the iconoclastic view of Victor Davis Hanson
in The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece and other works. See John
Keegan, Foreword to VICTOR DAVIS HANSON, THE WESTERN WAY OF WAR: INFANTRY
BATTLE IN CLASSICAL GREECE (1989); see also VICTOR DAVIS HANSON, CARNAGE AND
CULTURE: LANDMARK BATTLES IN THE RISE OF WESTERN POWER (2001); DAVID KENNEDY,
OF WAR AND LAW (2006). Conversely, John A. Lynn in Battle: A History of Combat and
Culture shows how culture, irrespective of values, laws, and humanitarian concepts, is a
dominant factor in war. JOHN A. LYNN, BATTLE: A HISTORY OF COMBAT AND CULTURE
(2003); BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE, supra note 10; BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945,
supra note 10.
188 Brains, Not Bullets, ECONOMIST, Oct. 27, 2007, at 15, available at
http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story-id= 10024437. Nearly 2,000
years ago, Jewish militants, called Zealots, revolted against the Romans in Palestine.
Bassiouni, Legal Controls of International Terrorism, supra note 3, at 215; M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Forward: Assessing "Terrorism" in the New Millennium, 12 DEPAUL BuS. L.J. 1,
1 (2000). The Romans responded by destroying the temple in Jerusalem and taking the
treasure in it. Bassiouni, Legal Controls of International Terrorism, supra note 3, at 216.
But these practices are also used by state actors. Great Britain used its air force to easily
quell rebellious tribes in Iraq in the 1920s, as well as the Mahdi's rebels in Sudan in the
nineteenth century. See generally FERGUS NICOLL, THE SWORD OF THE PROPHET: THE MAHDI
OF SUDAN AND THE DEATH OF GENERAL GORDON (2004).
189 After Smart Weapons, Smart Soldiers, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 27, 2007, at 33,
available at http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story-id
10015844 [hereinafter Smart Weapons].
190 Id.; see also THOMAS X. HAMMES, THE SLING AND THE STONE: WAR IN THE 21ST
CENTURY (2004); KENNEDY, supra note 187.
191 Smart Weapons, supra note 189; HAMMES, supra note 190.
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side can win every battle, yet lose the war."'
192
Although regularly constituted armies are superior in firepower,
technology and mobility, non-state actors' weapons are "agility, surprise,
the support of at least some sections of the population, and above all,
time." 193 The central objective of guerilla warfare is not destruction of their
enemy, but rather the support of the population and the de-legitimating of
state actors. State actors are learning in Afghanistan and Iraq that a
comprehensive strategy including political and economic strategies needs to
be employed when fighting non-state actors.
The type of military hierarchy that exists in conventional armies is
lacking in the force structure of non-state actors engaged in the fourth
generation of warfare. Frequently, these combatant forces consist of
independent units varying in size, commanded by a leader who is mostly
free of hierarchical control. The absence of hierarchical command and
control in these conflicts is also dictated by geography, since different units
operate in different geographic locations and frequently without contact
with other units operating in different areas. These self-contained units
living off the land and free of command and control are dominated by the
personality of the leader or small group of persons in command of such
units. These commanders have life and death powers over their
subordinates who may be commanded to commit violations of IHL.
Moreover, the subordinates have no expectations that their field
commanders will be prosecuted or punished for the crimes they order to be
committed. To assume that individual morality will overtake the
expectations of harsh punishment and death in the case of disobedience of
orders is utopian. Thus, there is every incentive to comply with unlawful
orders and almost no incentive to disobey them in order to comply with
IHL.
Experience indicates that in regularly constituted armies, discipline
achieves a higher level of military performance and enhances states'
military and political goals. It is well settled "war is the continuation of
diplomacy through other means," as stated by von Clausewitz.194 However,
192 HAMMES, supra note 190; see also JOHN NAGL, COUNTERINSURGENCY LESSONS FROM
MALAYA AND VIETNAM: LEARNING TO EAT SOUP WITH A KNIFE (2002) (describing the
problems of waging war against counterinsurgents). According to Mao, guerrillas must be
like fish swimming in the water of the general population; T.E. Lawrence described regular
armies as plants-"immobile, firm-rooted, nourished through long stems to the head," while.
guerrillas were like a "vapour." He said a soldier was "helpless without a target, owning
only what he sat on, and subjugating only what, by order, he could poke his rifle at." Smart
Weapons, supra note 189, at 34; MAO TSE-TUNG, ON GUERILLA WARFARE 93 (Samuel B.
Griffith II trans., 1961).
193 Smart Weapons, supra note 189; HAMMES, supra note 190; MORAN, supra note 84.
194 CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 187.
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in the case of conflicts of a non-international and purely internal character,
these conflicts are not the continuation of diplomacy, nor are they aimed at
achieving a diplomatic goal. Instead, these conflicts are aimed at achieving
political power-outcomes. Consequently, the structures of the non-state
actor groups that engage in these types of conflicts and use unconventional
means and methods of warfare have, for reasons discussed through this
article, little or no inducement to comply with IHL. In fact, the opposite is
probably more accurate, namely that the more such groups engage in
indiscriminate violence or what is more commonly called "terrorism," the
more likely it is that they will achieve their desired political results.' 95
The gap between the ideal and the real is strikingly evident in conflicts
of a non-international and purely internal character, irrespective of whether
the protagonists are state or non-state actors. The resort to indiscriminate
attacks on protected persons and targets has become a common feature in
almost all armed conflicts since the Korean War began in 1951. It has also
become the main characteristic of so-called "terrorism" or ideologically
motivated violence by non-state actors in the pursuit of power-outcomes.
Ideologically motivated violence differs from that traditionally and
historically associated with conventional wars between the opposing armed
forces of states. 1
96
The model of the universal combatant in a conventional army, in
which discipline and compliance with the law of armed conflicts is part of
the ethic and honor code of armies and is enforced by effective command
and control, has significantly eroded since the end of World War II. Since
then, conflicts have been mostly characterized by the participation of non-
state actors as the core combatants, who do not share the ethic that exists as
a matter of honor in regularly constituted armed forces, and who are not
subject to the discipline of effective command and control. 97 Maybe more
significantly, they feel that to abide by IHL would put them at a
disadvantage with their state-actors opponents because of the asymmetry of
195 See supra note 3.
196 Bassiouni, Legal Controls ofInternational Terrorism, supra note 3, at 84.
197 It should be noted that the terms ethic and honor have different philosophical
meanings. Probably that which better applies to military structures is the term
professionalism, which includes a sense of ethic and honor that is more related to the
organization itself as opposed to the broader meanings of ethic and honor in legal
philosophy. Larry May in his recent book, War Crimes and Just War, refers to the notion of
honor in his introduction, but fails to make this important distinction. LARRY MAY, WAR
CRIMES AND JUST WAR intro. (2007). While it is possible to find in military units a shared
understanding of certain ethical and moral values, as these may exist in that particular
society, it is not usually what is understood by the military honor code of conduct, which
varies from army to army and which sometimes includes matters that are contrary to ethics
and morality, such as covering up on the illegal acts of one's comrades in arms.
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power between the protagonists. This new reality has marginalized the
combatant model upon which conventional armies are built, and upon
which the assumptions of compliance with IHL are based.1 98
Victory in any conflict, but particularly in conflicts of a non-
international or purely internal character, means different things depending
upon the conflict and the power-outcome goals sought by the protagonists.
In non-international conflicts, it could mean any of the following: (1)
removing the ruling regime from power (however that regime may be
characterized, i.e. foreign colonial regime, settler regime, ethnic dominated
regime, or a junta regime); (2) acquiring political or economic concessions
from the ruling regime; (3) removing foreign forces stationed in-country
with the consent of the ruling regime; (4) impacting on foreign economic
interests in-country; (5) impacting on national and foreign policy. All of
the above are power-outcomes, obtained through the use of violence, which
produces human victimization and negative economic consequences. These
conflicts are about winning on the political end even if it means losing on
the human end. 199 For the humanist, they are Pyrrhic victories, 200 for the
political realist, they are all that matters if they achieve the desired political
result.
20 1
What follows are observations based on a variety of publicly available
sources, including the views of experts and this writer's personal
experience. To gauge the culture of these new wars, it may be useful to
have a standard for purposes of comparison-the North African theater of
World War II. The German forces were under the command of Field
Marshal Erwin Rommel, an officer in the tradition of the Prussian military
system developed by Kaiser Frederick 11.202 The Allied forces were
commanded by Generals Alexander, Montgomery, and Patton, who were
professional military officers brought up in the best British and American
military traditions.20 3 The opposing forces were professional soldiers, well-
198 See RUPERT SMITH, THE UTILITY OF FORCE: THE ART OF WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD
(2005) (describing, inter alia, the changing faces of war-from war among duly constituted
combatants to indiscriminate war against the general population).
199 ZEEV MAOZ, PARADOXES OF WAR: ON THE ART OF NATIONAL SELF-ENTRAPMENT 251
(1990) (describing, inter alia, the paradox of winning the war and losing the peace).
200 Id. at 251 (In 279 B.C.E., Pyrrhus makes the well-known and now popular statement
"Another such victory and we are lost.").
201 See generally ROGER D. SPEGELE, POLITICAL REALISM IN INTERNATIONAL THEORY
(1996); HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY (1995).
202 See generally B.H. LIDDELL HART, THE ROMMEL PAPERS (1982).
203 See generally MARTIN BLUMENSON, 1 THE PATTON PAPERS, 1885-1940 (1972);
MARTIN BLUMENSON, 2 THE PATTON PAPERS 1940-1945 (1976); ALUN CHALFONT,
MONTGOMERY OF ALAMEIN (1976); Brian Holden Reid, Alexander, in CHURCHILL'S
GENERALS (John Keegan ed., 1991).
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trained and well-disciplined. They were commanded by officers who had
leaders' training, discipline, and shared an unwritten honor code. The
opposing forces conducted war in the desert and, with few exceptions, away
from cities. Consequently, civilian casualties and destruction of property
were at a minimum. Combatants treated each other with chivalry and
respect. There was no unnecessary infliction of pain and suffering. POWs
were treated humanely and respectfully in accordance with high standards
later established by the Third Geneva Convention of 1949. The relatively
exemplary conduct of war between these opposing forces has been
unparalleled in any similar theater of military operations. °4 The culture of
war that these combatants reflected was a consequence of the
professionalism of the combatants and their sense of tradition, honor, and
duty. Discipline was enforced by an effective command structure and the
attitudes and values of the senior commanders, particularly the respective
Commanders-in-Chief. In the judgment of this writer and based on
numerous accounts of the military history of that period, the characteristics
mentioned above shaped the strategies and the tactics employed in the field
by the combatants.
While this model may be deemed too ideal to be expected as a
standard model for all conflicts, it is nonetheless useful to gauge the extent
of the departure from the culture and practices of this model in comparison
with the culture of new wars of a non-international and internal character
and their practices.
Most of the conflicts of a non-international and internal character that
have occurred since World War 11 pitted governmental forces consisting of
army, police, and, in some cases, paramilitary forces, either working
directly for the government or independently thereof, but pursuing the goals
of the government, against a range of opposition groups, often termed
rebels, insurgents, or guerrillas.2 °5 A number of publications describe the
various conflicts of a non-international character and purely internal
conflicts, and the harmful consequences that derived therefrom.20 6 The
204 See generally GEOFFREY BEST, CHURCHILL AND WAR (2006); BEST, WAR AND LAW
SINCE 1945, supra note 10; JOHN KEEGAN, THE BOOK OF WAR (1999); KEEGAN, THE FACE OF
BATTLE, supra note 187; JOHN KEEGAN, THE SECOND WORLD WAR 320-43 (1989); B.H.
LIDDEL HART, HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1999).
205 HOWARD S. LEVIE, THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT: PROTOCOL II
TO THE 1949 GENEVA 27 (1987); see generally Antonio Cassese, The Status of Rebels Under
the 1977 Geneva Protocol on Non-International Armed Conflicts, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
416(1981).
206 Jennifer L. Balint, Conflict, Conflict Victimization, and Legal Redress, 1945-1996, 59
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 231 (1996); see also Balint, supra note 1; M. Cherif Bassiouni,
The Need for International Accountability, in III INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note
61, ch. 1.1; MOIR, supra note 5, at 1-2; MICHEL VEUTHEY, GUERILLA ET DROIT HUMANITAIRE
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composition and mixture of these governmental forces and paramilitary
forces varies depending upon the character of the conflict. State-actor
forces opposing those waging wars of national liberation have been
primarily military and police forces representing the state and seeking to
preserve the status quo. In contrast, non-state actors may or may not attain
a level of organization and resources that would allow them to be
considered as having the characteristics of military units, as they do not
have the organizational structure and effective command and control that
regularly constituted armies have,2 °7 and they do not have the economic
resources and access to sophisticated weapons that state actors have.
Moreover, they do not usually have international legitimacy and support by
governments in other states.
In almost all of these conflicts, clear dividing do not always separate
the opposing forces, whether in the field of battle or in the field of politics.
These conflicts have been waged, in large part, in populated areas,
including cities and villages, thus leading to a higher number of civilian
casualties and the greater likelihood of violations of IHL. Precisely because
of the typology described above, which is different from that of
conventional wars in which opposing forces are distinguishable from one
another and in which the geography of the conflict is characterized by the
occupation and control of specific territories, conflicts of a non-
international character are characterized by the protagonists' desire to
control the civilian population in addition to the territory, but more
importantly their strategic political goals determine their tactics. As a
result, in many of these conflicts, non-state actors seek to control civilian
populations by subjecting them to terror, by displacing them, or by
exterminating those that they deem to be enemies or even unfriendly
(2d ed. 1983); Veuthey, supra note 86.
207 It should be noted that in the context of non-international and purely internal
conflicts, particularly those involving regime changes, the state may create or support
paramilitary units, which are designed to operate outside the context of regular military units
for purposes of plausible deniability. in other words, if these military groups commit
violations of IHL, the state can deny any knowledge or involvement. These groups are
usually organized on the same basis as military and police units in that country, and in many
cases they involve former military and police personnel. This was the case for example in
the paramilitary units in the conflict in El Salvador. See WOOD, supra note 133. Israel
during its occupation of Southern Lebanon between 1971-1981, which created the Army of
Southern Lebanon which was involved in the Sabra and Shatilla massacres, while the Israeli
army gave the external protection. KAHANE COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF
INQUIRY INTO THE EVENTS AT THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN BEIRUT (1983), available at
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/; Linda Malone, The Kahan Report, Ariel Sharon and the
Sabra-Shatilla Massacres in Lebanon: Responsibility Under International Law for
Massacres of Civilian Populations, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 373 (1985).
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civilians.2 °8 This is usually part of a strategy designed to terrorize,
intimidate, and demoralize civilian populations in order to control both
territory and the population. This, in turn, prevents the opposing
governmental forces from exercising dominion and control over that portion
of the state's territory and population. Whenever such territory has
important economic resources or a strategic value for the state, territorial
control by non-state actors becomes an important goal whose pursuit is
seldom constrained by humanitarian considerations. Governmental forces
are all too frequently motivated by the same considerations of outcomes
leading them to engage in the same tactics as their opponents, committing
IHL violations. When the opposing forces engage in these same tactics, the
tendency is for the humanitarian harmful consequences to spiral upwards.
Some of these conflicts have been characterized as "ethnic
cleansing,' as in the conflicts in Bosnia,21 ° certain parts of Croatia,
Kosovo, and the Great Lakes of Africa.2t  Other methods of terrorizing
civilian populations in order to control territory have been used in such
conflicts as Angola,21 2 Mozambique,213 East Timor,214 and, to some extent,
in El Salvador215 and Colombia.21 6 These types of situations inevitably
208 In any conflict, territorial control is included among the goals and is frequently linked
to the control of power. Territorial control may be done in conventional military fashion, as
has been known throughout the history of war, or whenever there is a significant population
mix by means of transferring out of the territory the population group that would not be
considered friendly. See KEEGAN, A HISTORY OF WARFARE, supra note 187. The policy of
ethnic cleansing was particularly evident in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. See
BASSIOUNI, supra note 122.
209 U.N. Final Report, supra note 12; Annexes to U.N. Final Report, supra note 12,
Annex IV (policy of ethnic cleansing).
210 id.
211 Michael J. Matheson, United Nations Governance of Post-Conflict Societies: East
Timor and Kosovo, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 523. In Rwanda, it took the
form of genocide.
212 See generally PHILIPPE LE BILLON, FUELLING WAR: NATURAL RESOURCES AND ARMED
CONFLICTS (2006); Justin Pearce, War, Peace and Diamonds in Angola: Popular
Perceptions of the Diamond Industry in the Lundas, 13 AFR. SECURITY REV. 51, 51-64
(2004).
213 See generally LANCE S. YOUNG, MOZAMBIQUE'S SIXTEEN-YEAR BLOODY CIVIL WAR
(1991).
214 See generally EAST TIMOR: LESSONS LEARNED (David Cohen & Suzannah Linton
eds., 2007); Suzannah Linton, East Timor and Accountability for Serious Crimes, in III
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 61, ch. 2.7.
215 See generally Paul Seils, The Limits of Truth Commissions in the Search for Justice:
An Analysis of the Truth Commissions of El Salvador and Guatemala and Their Effect in
Achieving Post-Conflict Justice, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 775; WOOD,
supra note 133.
216 See generally STEVEN DUDLEY, WALKING GHOSTS: MURDER AND GUERRILLA POLITICS
IN COLOMBIA (2004); MARCO PALACIOS, ENTRE LA LEGITIMIDAD Y LA VIOLENCIA: COLOMBIA
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carry the "war" indiscriminately to the civilians, causing large scale
victimization.
17
As stated above, modem warfare has evolved, according to some
military experts, through four generations.218 Unlike prior generations, the
fourth generation of warfare is not intended to achieve battlefield victory,
occupation of territory, or destruction of the enemy's forces. Instead it is
directed at achieving internal power-outcomes, including regime-change,
altering domestic and foreign policies and achieving socio-political
transformation. Fourth generation warfare relies essentially on methods
and means designed to maximize the effectiveness of the relatively weak
military and economic power of the non-state actors and to drain the
resources of state actors by protracting the conflict.219
Unlike conventional wars, fourth-generation wars are not strictly
limited to the national context and rely a broader network of support, based
on political, economic, social, military, or public relations factors, to carry
out their overall strategy. This means that external spill-over effects occur.
These networks available internally and externally make use of the state's
need for domestic political support which, as experience shows, is usually
limited in duration. Thus, the strategy of the fourth generation of warfare is
to turn factors that would normally disfavor non-state actors into factors
that disfavor state actors, and to advance intended power-outcome goals by
whatever means available and through whatever alliances can be made.
Thus, the distinctions between lawful and unlawful means and methods of
warfare have been substantially blurred with respect to combatant groups
pursuing legitimate and illegitimate goals, and to those having legitimacy in
pursuing their goals and those who do not.22°
1875-1994 (1995); RAFAEL PARDO RUEDA, LA HISTORIA DE LAS GUERRAS (2004); BERT Ruiz,
THE COLOMBIAN CIVIL WAR (2001).
217 BASSIOUNI, supra note 122.
218 HAMMES, supra note 190, ch. 1.
219 This is evidenced by the long duration of such conflicts in China (1921-1949) and
Vietnam (1945-1975); those in the decolonization contexts in Africa, such as Algeria,
Angola, and Mozambique; regime change struggles such as the Sandinistas in Nicaragua
(1961-1979) and in Africa (the anti-apartheid struggle which went on for over 30 years); and
the conflicts in Palestine (1948 to date) and Chechnya (1995 to date) and now Afghanistan
(2002 to date) and Iraq (2003 to date), to name only a few. Thus, these types of warfare are
measured in years, if not decades, because they are sustainable and parties have the
knowledge that resoluteness and time is on their side, as evidenced by the historic record of
these conflicts. The United States, in its only military defeats in over two hundred years, can
be said to have lost a major war in Vietnam and two smaller wars in Lebanon and Somalia at
the hands of groups that resorted to fourth generation war methods.
220 During the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and at present in Iraq that some militias
or elements thereof, claiming to act on the basis of a political or religious motive, also
engage in for-profit activities commonly associated with organized crime groups. The
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Parts of the tactics of fourth generation warfare is for the protagonists
to involve the entire society in the conflict and the use of the politics of
hate, in order to divide the civil population. As the entire society becomes
involved in the conflict, not necessarily by choice but because of the
combatants' strategies as described above, the traditional distinction
between combatants and non-combatants is blurred. Civilians necessarily
become drawn into the conflict, in part as a means of survival and in part
because they are compelled by the protagonists to do so. When this occurs,
civilians are no longer deemed to be outside the sphere of the conflict,
irrespective of the degree of their involvement, which ranges from passive
sympathizing to active assistance. Civilians may have a limited role, such
as providing material support, concealing combatants, providing supplies,
or simply giving information. In exchange for such aid, civilians receive
protection and even life-saving supplies, the latter frequently being the
principal motivation for civilians to take sides. Combatants often use food
as their principal instrument of coercion and control.221 The involvement of
entire societies in this type of conflict enhances human harm, particularly
with regard to women and children, the most vulnerable elements of
222society.
In these conflicts, IHL violations have brought great harm to the
civilian population at large, including the physical destruction of private
and public property, the dislocation of civilian populations, and the
destruction and breakup of families.223 In some of the more recent
conflicts, three particularly heinous practices have emerged: the systematic
Commission of Experts on Yugoslavia Annexes identified eighty-nine paramilitary groups,
many of them operating independently, but others operating under the direct or indirect
command of the formal military structure. Geneva Convention Protocol I, supra note 5,
Annex liA; on Iraq, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, America's Iraq Policy, INT'L LAW NEws 6
(2006).
221 Blocking humanitarian relief sought to be delivered by United Nations High
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the ICRC and various non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) has been all too frequent, at times necessitating foreign military intervention when
combatants deny these organizations the ability to assist refugees. This was one of the
reasons that the United States sent troops into Somalia during the Clinton Administration.
Thus, food and refugees become not only instruments of control and coercion, but also
instruments of war in violation of IHL.
222 This is evident in almost every conflict of a non-international character that has
occurred in the last thirty years, especially in former Yugoslavia (1991-1995), Liberia (1989-
1996, 2002-2003), Sierra-Leone (1991-2002), Cambodia (1967-1975), Somalia (2006), and
Afghanistan (1979-1989).
223 For the overall victimization arising out of these conflicts, see note 1 (discussing the
conflicts since World War II). In addition, there are numerous reports by UNHCR with
respect to different conflicts and different areas of conflict which have produced
victimization. See generally UNHCR, The UN Refugee Agency, www.unhcr.org (last
visited Sept. 1, 2008).
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rape of women, which occurred in Bosnia, Liberia, Uganda, Sierra Leone,
and Darfur;224 the coerced use of children in combat in Sierra Leone and
Uganda; and the horrifying practice of hacking off the limbs of children to
prevent their recruitment as combatants by the opposing group.225
Non-state actor groups engaging in the fourth generation of warfare are
unlikely to voluntarily comply with IHL because it is contrary to their
overall strategy. Moreover, voluntary compliance cannot exist without
mutuality of interest. In fact, the opposite is true since such wars often
resort to indiscriminate and terror-inspiring violence, committed
intermittently but consistently, and timed in a way to maximize surprise,
generate horror, and inspire fear.226 As to the likelihood of accountability,
224 U.N. Final Report, supra note 12; Annexes to U.N. Final Report, supra note 12,
Annexes It, IX; see Christine Chinkin, Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women in International
Law, 5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1 (1994); see also Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape,
Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices During Armed Conflict, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n
on Hum. Rts., 50th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13
(1998); KELLY DAWN ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN: PROSECUTIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS (1997); ASIAN CTR. FOR WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS,
COMMON GROUNDS: VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN WAR AND ARMED CONFLICT SITUATIONS
(Indai Lourdes Sajor ed., 1998); M. Cherif Bassiouni & Marcia McCormick, Sexual
Violence: An Invisible Weapon of War in the Former Yugoslavia (IHRLI Occasional Paper
No. 1, 1996); Susan Jeanne Toepfer & Bryan Stuart Wells, The Worldwide Market For Sex:
A Review of International and Regional Legal Prohibitions Regarding Trafficking in
Women, 2 MICH. J. GENDER& L. 83 (1994).
225 See Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, delivered to the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1299 (Nov. 26, 2002); see also GREENBURG RESEARCH,
INC., THE PEOPLE ON WAR REPORT: ICRC WORLDWIDE CONSULTATION ON THE RULE OF WAR
9-10 (ICRC ed., 2000) [hereinafter PEOPLE ON WAR REPORT]. Thomas Lubanga, the
notorious Lord's Liberation Army Chief is on trial before the ICC for kidnapping and
coercing children as soldiers and having them commit heinous crimes, as well as kidnapping
girls and offering them as a reward to these child soldiers. See, e.g., JIMMIE BRIGGS,
INNOCENTS LOST: WHEN CHILD SOLDIERS Go To WAR (2005); ILENE COHN & GUY S.
GOODWIN-GILL, CHILD SOLDIERS: THE ROLE OF CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT (1994).
226 Part of that tactic feeds into the overall strategy of showing the ineffectiveness or
impotence of state actors-government, armed forces, and police-to predict, prevent,
protect, and ultimately to suppress and punish. Such a strategy is also designed to push state
actors into engaging and unreasonable measures, including curtailing constitutional legal
rights, abusing executive power, and establishing a repressive social environment. These
measures drain resources from the economy and direct them towards police and military,
which places the state on war footing and generally creating a social, political, and economic
environment that cannot be tolerated for a long period of time. The more burdensome the
cost of a war type environment is to a given society, the more likely the society is to weaken
in its resolve to continue the struggle. Thus it becomes more amenable to political
concessions to the otherwise much weaker non-state actor belligerent or insurgent groups. In
many cases it also means admission of failure and defeat. ROBERT B. ASPREY, WAR IN THE
SHADOwS: THE GUERRILLA IN HISTORY (1975); J. BOYER BELL, ON REVOLT: STRATEGIES OF
NATIONAL LIBERATION (1976); WESLEY K. CLARK, WAGING MODERN WAR: BOSNIA,
Kosovo, AND THE FUTURE OF COMBAT (2001); RICHARD A. CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES:
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as discussed below, it can hardly be said to have existed until the
establishment of the ICTY and ICTR (1994) and the ICC (2002-date of
entry into force).
B. THE MILITARY STRUCTURE AND THE STRATEGY OF VIOLENCE BY
NON-STATE ACTORS
The methods and means of warfare engaged in by non-state actors in
the fourth generation of warfare, irrespective of each group's goals,
purposes, and ideology, are determined by their strategy. They focus on the
use of indiscriminate violence in order to cause terror within a given
population, to inflict indiscriminate harm and damage against society at
large or a segment of society, and to show the government's vulnerability
and weakness while draining its resources.227 The inability of government
to protect the civilian population and public and private property, as
demonstrated by the harm itself, reveals its inability to deal with the violent
tactics employed.228 To overcome this situation, governments frequently
engage in the same or similar internationally unlawful uses of force and
also commit violations of domestic law. The result is that such tactics
discredit governments, causing them to lose credibility and even legitimacy,
and that places government at the same moral and legal level as the non-
state actors. This outcome is what the strategy of non-state actors seeks to
achieve.229
State actors resorting to conventional war also have power-outcome
goals; because they seek legitimacy, or the appearance thereof, they are
more likely to comply with IHL or to minimize their violations. Members
of regular armies who commit IHL violations usually rationalize their
conduct by claims of legitimacy, military necessity,230 or obedience to
INSIDE AMERICA'S WAR ON TERROR (2004); GUERILLA STRATEGIES: AN HISTORICAL
ANTHOLOGY, FROM THE LONG MARCH TO AFGHANISTAN (Gerard Chalind ed., 1982).
227 See infra notes 187 and 189 (discussing the new wars).
228 For example, the United States, with all of its might, was unable to prevent the attacks
of September 11, 2001, which exposed the vulnerability of American civilians, as well as
private and public property, to attack by what President Bush subsequently referred to as a
"warring party" when he declared war against Al Qaeda.
229 This has been evident in so many conflicts that have been referred to as "dirty wars"
that Colonial Algeria by the French forces mainly in 1956, in Argentina, Chile, Guatemala,
El Salvadaor, and in so many parts of the world. On a much smaller scale, this is what
happened when the Bush Administration did what Vice President Cheney referred to as
"going to the dark side" by resorting to torture in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Guantanamo. See
Bassiouni, supra note 111; see also supra note 112. See also MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY,
PUNISHMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007).
230 Armies, however, tend to expand the doctrine of "military necessity" to justify their
transgressions of IHL. See CHARLES GUTHRIE & MICHAEL QUINLAN, JUST WAR-THE JUST
WAR TRADITION: ETHICS IN MODREN WARFARE (2007); Burrs M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber
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superior orders even though they know or should have known that military
necessity has its constraints and that obedience to superior order is not a
defense to IHL violations, save for when it can be deemed a form of
duress.
2 31
Anecdotal data reveals that most combatants, particularly non-state
actors, when asked if they consider IHL violations moral, conclude for the
most part that they are not.232 They may in general recognize the illegality
of their conduct, but discount it either on the basis of their perceived
necessity or because they perceive that their legitimate goals justifies it.
They also see illegality as something conditioned upon being caught, and
take comfort in the knowledge or belief that their superiors will disregard
the violations or cover-up for them. Moreover, individual combatants
separate the morality and legality of IHL from their own behavior,
reflecting a dichotomy between the abstract recognition of immorality and
illegality and the de facto acceptance of such conduct for the reasons stated
above. 33 All of this explains the lack of compliance with IHL by both state
and non-state actors.
Following are some telling examples of such wars. In the conflict in
the former Yugoslavia (1993-1994), there were eighty-nine paramilitary
groups operating at one time alongside six regular armies.234 Some of these
paramilitary groups turned to tactics similar to those of organized crime.
They engaged in black market sales of contraband and pillaging as a way of
rewarding the volunteer combatants in these units. This was particularly
evident in the former Yugoslavia, where one such unit called the "Tigers,"
and the Laws of War: The Origins and Limits of the Principle of Military Necessity, 92 AM.
J. INT'L L. 213 (1998); Craig J.S. Forrest, The Doctrine of Military Necessity and the
Protection of Cultural Property During Armed Conflicts, 37 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 177 (2007);
E. Jaworski, "Military Necessity" and "Civilian Immunity": Where is the Balance?, 2
CHINESE J. INT'L L. 175, 175-206 (2003); Michael A. Newton, Modern Military Necessity:
The Role and Relevance of Military Lawyers, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 877 (2007).
231 See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE DEFENSE OF "OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR ORDERS" IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965); LESLIE GREEN, SUPERIOR ORDERS IN NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1976); NIcO KEIJZER, MILITARY OBEDIENCE (1978); EKKHART
MULLER-RAPPARD, L'ORDRE SUPtRIEUR MILITAIRE ET LA RESPONSIBILITt PtNALE DU
SUBORDONNE (1965); Leslie Green, Superior Orders and Command Responsibility, 1989
CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 167.
232 See, e.g., Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in
Conflict Situations, 863 INT'L REv. RED CROSS 491, 491-523 (2006).
233 This is mostly based on three rationalizations. The first is that the ends justify the
means. The second is that their opponents do the same. The third is that their opponents
deserve it. The latter comes close to rationaliation of dehumanizing the enemy, discussed
below as the "politics of hate."
234 U.N. Final Report, supra note 12; Annexes to U.N. Final Report, supra note 12,
Annex III(A).
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commanded by "Arkan" (Zjelco Raznatovic), engaged in the worst acts of
ethnic cleansing, civilian murder, rape, pillage, and destruction of
property. 235 The combatants were encouraged to pillage as a reward for
volunteering into this unit.23 6 "Arkan" developed a network of black
market operations in food as well as fuel that made him very wealthy after
the war ended.237 It is also believed that he used his paramilitary
organization for drug trafficking.238 Thus, such units are more like
organized crime operations.
This is also evident in the present conflict in Iraq, where some political
parties with affiliated militias have allowed them and other splinter groups
to engage in a variety of organized crime related activities.239
Although the results were similar, a different pattern developed in the
internal conflict in Afghanistan, which started with various resistance
movements against Russian occupation in 1979. After the Afghani fighters
successfully forced the USSR to withdraw in 1989, an internal conflict
erupted between warlords leading to Taliban control of the country. From
1989-2002, the warlords and the Taliban engaged in wholesale violations of
IHL, IHRL, and ICL. After the American-led invasion of Afghanistan in
2001 and the subsequent overthrow of the Taliban, and the quasi-
legitimatization of these warlords by the U.S. as a way of establishing local
alliances, some of these groups, warlords, and local commanders have
converted into drug lords. Thus, they achieved their transformation to this
type of organization.24 °
C. NON-STATE ACTORS AS STATE SURROGATES
Throughout the history of warfare, states have frequently used either
235 Id. (describing "Arkan").
236 Id.
237 Id.; CHRISTOPHER S. STEINROD, HUNTING THE TIGER: THE FAST LIFE AND VIOLENT
DEATH OF THE BALKANS MOST DANGEROUS MAN (2007).
238 STEINROD, supra note 237.
239 As president of DePaul University's International Human Rights Law Institute and as
President of the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences, I oversaw
judicial training, education, and human rights projects in Iraq from 2003 to date. See M.
Cherif Bassiouni, Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq, 33 HUM. RTS. 15 (2006); M. Cherif
Bassiouni, In Afghanistan and Iraq: Strengthening the Rule of Law through Judicial
Education and Law School Development, 47 THE JUDGES' J. 24 (2008).
240 I served as the United Nations' Independent Expert on Human Rights in Afghanistan
and described this situation in two official reports. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council
[ECOSOC], Report of the Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in
Afghanistan, 45, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/122 (Mar. 11, 2005); U.N. GAOR, Report of the
Independent Expert of the Commission on Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in
Afghanistan, U.N. Doc. A/59/370 (Sept. 21, 2004).
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mercenaries or other groups to work for them or on their behalf. After
World War 1I, this became a feature of the Cold War. Both the USSR and
the U.S. resorted to a strategy of employing non-state actors, either
connected to a given state or not, in order to carry out their respective
foreign policy objectives in other countries without assuming the
responsibilities arising from the actions of such surrogate groups.2 4'
The USSR usually supported national groups engaged in wars of
national liberation in decolonization and regime change contexts. The U.S.
seldom supported such groups; instead, it usually relied on groups operating
as paramilitaries in support of existing regimes, particularly in Latin
242America. This strategy allowed the superpowers to fight their wars
through surrogates and on territory other than their own, while the harmful
consequences of these wars were borne by others, particularly in terms of
human casualties.24 3 More significantly, it gave the superpowers what is
euphemistically referred to as "plausible deniability," which means that
each side could deny, with some degree of plausibility, responsibility for
the conduct of these groups.244 Thus, the superpowers could not only avoid
responsibility for their respective actions, but they could also shield their
surrogates from responsibility for their violations of IHL, ICL, and IHRL.245
The leaders and field commanders of these groups were protected by the
military and political influence of those powers on whose behalf they acted.
Consequently, non-state actors who were surrogates of superpowers were
operating under de facto impunity for their international crimes. Such an a
priori de facto protection eliminates any inducement for compliance with
IHL and other international law norms; in fact, it can be argued that such a
policy encouraged the commission of higher levels of violations producing
even greater harmful results than in other conflicts. As knowledge of these
practices and their immunity outcomes became more widely known,
whether in the context of a given conflict or as such information became
known to participants in other conflicts, the overall levels of IHL non-
241 This was evident in a number of conflicts in Africa, such as Angola and Mozambique,
where two opposing factions confronted each other. Each was supported respectively by the
USSR and the USA. See generally RICHARD J. BLOOMFIELD, REGIONAL CONFLICT AND U.S.
POLICY: ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE (1988); HELEN A. KITCHEN, ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE,
AND THE WEST (1987).
242 See also ANN HIRONAKA, NEVERENDING WARS: THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY,
WEAK STATES, AND THE PERPETUATION OF CIVIL WAR (2005); IGNATIEFF, supra note 17;
SANDS, supra note 17. See generally HUTCHAUSEN, supra note 17; JOHNSON, supra note 17.
243 BLOOMFIELD, supra note 241; KITCHEN, supra note 241.
244 See, e.g., the case of the US's covert military action against Nicaragua described
below. See also HUTCHAUSEN, supra note 17.
245 While the proposition stated above is self-evident, on occasion, responsibility attaches
as in the case of the Nicaragua case concerning the Contras. See infra note 247.
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compliance increased as did the overall levels of human harm and economic
destruction.246
Only one international judicial case exists concerning such activities
by one of the superpowers-the United States. Here, Nicaragua brought an
action against the United States before the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) for, among other allegations, the latter's support of the "Contras"-a
non-state actor group that carried out military operation inside Nicaragua-
and for laying mines in Nicaraguan harbors.24 7 The U.S. armed, trained,
equipped, and funded the Contras, whose base of operations was on U.S.
military bases in Honduras. The Contras were for all practical purposes
surrogates used by the United States in their struggle to unseat the elected
Nicaraguan government-the "Sandinistas."
This conflict was part of the worldwide Cold War conflict between the
U.S. and the USSR mentioned above. 248 Since the question in this case
arose under the customary law principles of state responsibility, it involved
the issue of agency relationship, could the Contras be deemed U.S.
agents? 249 The ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility reflect customary
international law and establish that an agency relationship requires a state's
exercise of control over the actions of the agent.2 50  Providing support,
246 As stated above, there is a substantial lack of data on factual questions dealing with
compliance and non-compliance; however, the resulting harmful outcomes in these conflicts
necessarily speak for the proposition of heightened levels of violations. The attribution of
the causes for these violations is based on experiential observations and anecdotal data. The
assertion made above is my own deduction.
247 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27); see
also Antonio Cassese, The Nicaragua and Tadic Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ
Judgment on Genocide in Bosnia, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 649 (2007) (discussing Nicaragua after
the Bosnia decision).
248 This was most noticeable in Angola and Mozambique, but in other African conflicts
as well. In Latin America, Che Guevara, the Cuban revolutionist supported by the Castro
communist regime, went on to export that revolution to other Latin American countries,
recruiting local revolutionists, but also using those from other Latin American countries. See
ERNESTO GUEVARA, CHE GUEVARA ON GLOBAL JUSTICE (Oceana Press 2002); ERNESTO
GUEVARA, GUERILLA WARFARE (1969).
249 See also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 91 (Feb. 26); BASSIOUNI,
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 1, at 85-88 (discussing the
international criminal responsibility of states). For discussion of responsibility of states for
acts of agent that were ultra vires or contrary to instructions, see Ireland v. United Kingdom,
24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 159 (1978); Yeager, 17 Iran-US Claims Tribunal Rpts. 92, 43
(1987); Angelo Piero Sereni, Agency in International Law, 34 AM. J. INT'L L. 638, 638-60
(1940).
250 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
Report of the ILC on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess, Supp No 10,
p 43, UN Doc A/56/10 (2001); JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S
ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES (2002).
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aiding and abetting, and having an agency relationship whereby the
principal controls the action of the agent, are factors that establish the basis
of state responsibility for non-state actors.
In Nicaragua, the ICJ weighed the responsibility of the United States,
both directly and indirectly, for the injuring and killing of Nicaraguan
citizens through its support of the Contras, and for laying mines and other
explosives.251 Regarding indirect responsibility, the ICJ found that the U.S.
legislative and executive branch had funded and designed the strategy and
tactics of the Contra forces.2 52 Although the U.S. claimed that funding was
not support, the Court noted that once the Contras received U.S. funding
their numbers grew from an initial body of 500 men to over 10,000 at their
peak.253 Although the financing of the ontras was initially undisclosed in
the U.S., it "subsequently became the subject of specific legislative
provisions and ultimately the stake in a conflict between the legislative and
executive organs of the United States. ' 254
The control that the U.S. had over the Contras through funding,
training, providing logistical support, and devising their military tactics was
also discussed in the case, as was the United States' control over the timing
of Contra operations.25 5 The ICJ noted that although not every single
operation launched by the Contras was totally devised by the United States:
[I]t is in the Court's view established that the support of the United States
authorities for the activities of the contras took various forms over the years, such as
logistic support, the supply of information on the location and movements of the
Sandinista troops, the use of sophisticated methods of communication, the deployment
of field broadcasting networks, radar coverage, etc. The Court finds it clear that a
number of military and paramilitary operations by this force were decided and
planned, if not actually by United States advisers, then at least in close collaboration
with them, and on the basis of the intelligence and logistic support which the United
States was able to offer, particularly the supply aircraft provided to the contras by the
United States .... [T]he financial support given by the Government of the United
States to the military and paramilitary activities of the contras in Nicaragua is a fully
established fact. The legislative and executive bodies of the respondent State have
moreover.., openly admitted the nature, volume and frequency of this
support .... [T]he Court holds it established that the United States authorities largely
251 Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 76 (discussing the mines), 81 (discussing CIA planted
explosions and other attacks), 87 (discussing overflights on Nicaraguan territory), 92
(discussing joint military maneuvers with Honduras).
252 Id. 102-05. The ICJ's judgment followed Article 8 of the ILC Draft Articles on
State Responsibility, which according to the court reflected customary international law. Id.
398. Article 8 requires "instructions," "directions," or "under the control of the state" in
order to have conduct attributed to a state. Id.
253 Id. 94.
254 Id. 95. The initial funds went to the CIA for "covert" actions. Id. 96, 99.
255 Id. 102-05.
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financed, trained, equipped, armed and organized the FDN.
25 6
Although the Court found that the acts of the Contras were not directly
attributable to the U.S., 257 it found that the U.S. breached its obligations
under customary international law not to intervene in the affairs of another
state by training, arming, equipping, financing, and supplying the contra
forces, or otherwise encouraging, supporting, and aiding military and
paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua.258
The significance of the case is based on the assumption that it
established a sufficient deterrent to states against using non-state actors as
surrogates. After Nicaragua, states using surrogates could no longer easily
claim "plausible deniability" in order to avoid responsibility for the
surrogate actors.259
D. FINANCING, FUNDING, AND ARMING OF NON-STATE ACTORS
The military and civilian structure of non-state actors depends on their
funding and access to supplies. This includes both money and weapons,
which come from both foreign and domestic sources.26 ° One of the ways
these groups finance their operation is through control of certain natural
resources in the areas under their power. An early example of such
financing occurred in the 1960s in the Congo where one faction sought to
261control the region of Katanga, rich with precious stones. It was also
evident in the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone with respect to the
control of diamond mines, whose product was then used to finance the
rebels' war.262 The diamonds were smuggled abroad and sold to legitimate
256 Id. 106-08.
257 Id. 11 114-16.
258 Id. 292.
259 In Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, 145 (July 15, 1999), the
ICTY decided that the standard of "overall control" goes beyond financing and equipping of
such forces and involves also participation in the planning and supervision of military
operations); see also Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgement, 407-08,
421, 511 (Sept. 27, 2006) (acquitting the defendant because of no effective control);
Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic & Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgement, 268,
293, 313-14, 1047 (Feb. 20, 2001) (affirming acquittals of Delalic and Delic; confirming
conviction of Mucic of sexual assaults through a command responsibility theory). But the
ICJ in the case of Bosnia v. Serbia found that Serbia had some responsibility for Genocide in
Srebrenica in 1995, yet it managed to avoid condemning Serbia, and failed to hold it liable to
damages. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 91
(Feb. 26).
260 Bassiouni, Legal Controls ofInternational Terrorism, supra note 3, at 86.
261 See generally EDGAR O'BALLANCE, THE CONGO-ZAIRE EXPERIENCE, 1960-98 (2000);
THOMAS TURNER, THE CONGO WARS: CONFLICT, MYTH AND REALITY (2007).
262 CAMPBELL, supra note 13. There has been a meager effort after the terrible tragedies
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businesses in the West, and the proceeds were then laundered through
western banks.263 A number of conflicts exist where combatants finance
their operations from income generated either by directly trading in drugs or
by providing protection to drug traffickers, as in Columbia but also in as the
case of the PKP in the Kurdish areas of Turkey, and that of the Afghan
warlords.264 Although terrorism financing is proscribed,265 it does not
appear that these efforts have had any impact on curtailing terrorism in
various parts of the world.266
In addition to using diamonds to finance, small weapons have flooded
the world market, are easily available on the black market, and in many
instances have been made available by interested or complicit
267governments.   More significantly, small weapons are cheap.
International embargos and limits on the sale of such weapons have proven
ineffective. 268 It is well-established that illicit arms traders have made a
large quantity of small arms available throughout Africa, which has not
only contributed to the number of conflicts, but more significantly, to the
in Sierra Leone and Liberia, in what is called the Kimberley Process, for the diamond
industry to improve its human rights record. However, this process is far too ineffective,
relying on voluntary self-regulation. Kimberly Process Homepage,
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com (last visited Sept. 8, 2008).
263 For anti-laundering measures, see PAUL ALLAN SCHOTT, REFERENCE GUIDE TO ANTI-
MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM (International
Monetary Fund 2003); Dimitri Vlassis, Challenges in the Development of International
Criminal Law: The Negotiations of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, in I
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 2, ch. 7.2; Andreas Schloenhardt, Transnational
Organized Crime, in id. ch. 7.3.
264 UNODC issues an annual report on international drug trafficking as does the U.S.
The UNODC World Drug Reports are available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-
analysis/WDR.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2008). The U.S. International Narcotics Control
Strategy Reports are available at http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls (last visited Sept. 1, 2008).
265 S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 13; S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 13; G.A. Res. 54/109, U.N.
Doc. AIRES/54/109 (Feb. 25, 2000); INT'L MONETARY FUND, SUPPRESSING THE FINANCING
OF TERRORISM: A HANDBOOK FOR LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING (2003); Bantekas, supra note 13,
at 315-33; Dawla, supra note 13.
266 Supra note 162.
267 United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the
Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and
Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, June 26-July 7, 2006, Report of the United Nations
Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action to
Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its
Aspects, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.192/2006/RC/9 (July 12, 2006); CLIVE GIFFORD, THE ARMS
TRADE (2004).
268 Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts
and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime, U.N. Doc. A/55/383/Add.2 (July 2, 2001). It has only been
ratified by sixty-seven countries.
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large number of victims. Yet paradoxically, the withholding of arms from a
given group that is being attacked either by another group or by
269governmental forces tends to enhance victimization. Weapons
trafficking, even though illicit, is in part made possible by financing
obtained by money laundering.
This new category of non-state actors who are not directly involved in
combat, but whose role is indispensable to the sustenance of conflict escape
has developed in connection with financial operations, money laundering,
and arms trafficking. This category of participants also involves lawyers,
accountants, financial advisers, bankers and others, who when they engage
in the same or similar activities in the domestic context are deemed "white
collar" criminals. International criminal law and domestic criminal law has
not proven effective with respect to such persons who should be deemed
part of the non-state actor groups that they support, aid and abet by their
270actions. If they were deemed responsible for the conduct of others, they
would be accountable under IHL. But, so far, they are not, even though
without them certain violent conflicts would not exist or would not last as
they do. Funding and weapons is what makes conflicts last and produce
harm.
E. THE POLITICS OF HATE
Hate has always been a factor in the incitation of violence. Most
frequently, however, hatred is couched in religious or racist terms. History
reveals how often wars have occurred in the name of religion.27' Veiled
and euphemistic motivation for violence, ranges from the outright hate
269 This occurred as a result of an arms embargo on Bosnia during the conflict in the
former Yugoslavia, which left Bosnia in an imbalanced relationship with Serbia and in turn
to the higher victimization of Bosnians by Serbs. This is also evident in the conflict in
Darfur where one group, the Janjaweed, supported by the government, had more access to
weapons than the groups they attacked, thus leading to the significant victimization suffered
by civilians including harm suffered as refugees in a desert area to which humanitarian
organizations had limited access. S.C Res. 1779, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1779 (Sept. 28, 2007)
(extending mandate of expert panel monitoring weapons ban on Darfur); S.C. Res. 1591,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1591 (Mar. 29, 2005); Human Rights Watch, Darfur Documents Confirm
Government Policy of Militia Support, Briefing Paper, July 20, 2004; Julie Flint & Alex de
Waal, Ideology in Arms: The Emergence of Darfur's Janjaweed, DAILY STAR, Aug. 29,
2005.
270 Since they are not encompassed within the meaning of Common Article 3 and
Geneva Convention Protocol II, they are not covered by IHL.
271 Suffice it to recall the Crusades between Christians and Muslims, the Hundred Years'
War between Protestants and Catholics, and many others throughout history. For a
contemporary assessment, see CHRIS HEDGES, WAR IS A FORCE THAT GIVES US MEANING
(2003).
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propaganda of the Nazis272 to the assumptions underlying anticipated
civilizational clashes.273 The former was also glaringly evident in the
Rwandan genocide of the Hutus against the Tutsi. z7 4 Whatever its basis,
hate is a significant factor in almost all conflicts and is an almost
indispensable component of the process of dehumanization, which makes
acts of violence against persons easier to commit. Experience indicates that
the lower the level of education in a given society, the higher the prospects
of the dissemination of hatred and the dehumanization of the targeted
enemy.275 This leads to a higher level of non-compliance with IHL, which
presupposes the recognition of the enemy's human rights or at least the
272 Racial hatred was made the most obvious in connection with the Holocaust. See
EUGENE DAVIDSON, THE TRIAL OF THE GERMANS 525 (1966) (describing the case of Hans
Fritzsche, who was tried before the IMT at Nuremberg instead of Joseph Goebbels, who
killed himself in the bunker with Hitler). The chapter is appropriately named "The
Propagandist." Joseph Goebbels, Fritzsche, and his collaborators were putting into action
Hitler's Mein Kampf, which meant that they devised and propagated a policy of hatred
toward Jews and other people they considered inferior. It was the task of the SS to carry out
the policy of exterminating such persons, as was made evident in the Eichmann case
described in GIDEON HAUSNER, JUSTICE IN JERUSALEM (1966). The policy of hatred was a
precursor to the Holocaust as well as to other crimes against different groups of people. This
is also evident in so many other conflicts.
273 See SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF
WORLD ORDER (1996); ROBERT JAY LIFTON, SUPERPOWER SYNDROME: AMERICA'S
APOCALYPTIC CONFRONTATION WITH THE WORLD (2003).
274 ROBERT GELLATELY & BEN KIERNAN, THE SPECTER OF GENOCIDE (2003); MANUS I.
MIDLARSKY, THE KILLING TRAP: GENOCIDE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2005); SAMANTHA
POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL (2003) (describing the conflict in Rwanda). The entire
jurisprudence of the ICTR addresses issues of Hutu genocide of the Tutsi including the use
of hate propaganda. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgement
(Sept. 4, 1998); Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgement and Sentence
(Sept. 4, 1998).
275 It should be noted that this is not universally true. There are societies with a low level
of formal education that have not exhibited hatred toward a targeted enemy, but that may be
due to the fact that such groups may exist in areas where there are no other groups of an
ethnic or religious identity. As a general example, the Tibetan population may have a lower
level of education than those of Western European societies, but because of their religious
beliefs they have a much higher level of tolerance then their counterparts in those societies
that have higher levels of formal education. Tolerance cannot be equated to formal
education. However, it seems that in the context of African conflicts, involving different
ethnic and religious groups, there is a correlation to education. For example, in the Nigerian
conflict, pitting the government's majority of Muslim tribes against the Christian Ibo tribes,
an estimated one million Ibos were killed by government forces and by their supporters in
the local population. See generally OSITA AGBU, ETHNIC MILITIAS AND THE THREAT TO
DEMOCRACY IN POST-TRANSITION NIGERIA (2004). The same can be said of the war of
independence of Bangladesh, once a part of Pakistan, where East Pakistanis, who are
Muslims, killed close to one million West Pakistanis, who are also Muslims. Ved P. Nanda,
Self-Determination in International Law: The Tragic Tale of Two Cities-Islamabad (West
Pakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistan), 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 321, 336 (1972).
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recognition of the enemy's humanity. The process of dehumanization
regardless of its source seems to have been a much greater driving force and
motivating factor in conflicts of a non-international character and in purely
internal conflicts involving non-state actors than any other factor.
The politics of hate lead the protagonists to rely on ethnic, religious,
and social distinctions to fan the fires of hatred which, in turn, increases the
levels of indiscriminate violence against protected civilian populations
under IHL, IHRL, and ICL (subject to the reservations made earlier about
the applicability of certain ICL crimes to non-state actors and IHRL). In
these contexts, governments have sometimes utilized the technique of
public dissemination of hatred as a way of spurring spontaneous reactions
by the general public as was the case with the Nazi's hate propaganda
against the Jews276 and the Hutus against the Tutsi.
277
The incitation to hatred invariably escalates violence, engendering
circularity and reciprocal self-justification. Acts of revenge perceived as
justifiable reprisals fuels the escalation of retaliatory violence. 278  These
actions include IHL, IHRL, and ICL violations which the protagonists may
not morally or legally justify per se, but which they rationalize through the
distortion in perception caused by the propaganda of hate. 279 Because many
276 These techniques were developed by Joseph Goebels, a defendant at the Nuremberg
Trials of War Criminals. DAVIDSON, supra note 271, at 525-53.
277 See Arrest Warrant of II April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb.
14) (arrest warrant issued by Belgium for Congolese foreign minister based on incitement to
genocide). In Cambodia, the propaganda was framed in ideological terms. See BEN
KIERNAN, THE POL POT REGIME (2002) see also Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza &
Ngeze, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Sentence (Dec. 3, 2003).
278 Although this is anecdotal, I experienced this firsthand in April 1993 in a Serb-
controlled area outside of Sarajevo. At the time that I chaired the Security Council
Commission to investigate violations of international humanitarian law in the former
Yugoslavia, I met with a group of Serb militias who were shelling the city of Sarajevo. For a
record of the shelling of Sarajevo, see U.N. Final Report, supra note 12; Annexes to U.N.
Final Report, supra note 12. Their leader told me that "the Turks" who were in Sarajevo,
meaning Bosnian Muslims (who are not Turks, nor descendants of the Turks, with few
exceptions) deserved to be killed because of what they did to the Orthodox Serbs when the
Turkish Ottoman Empire invaded the Kingdom of Serbia, which culminated in the Battle of
Kosovo in 1389. To my utter dismay, the entire Serb militia group consisting of eleven men
had compressed time, and what had happened in 1389 was perceived as if it had happened
yesterday. There are many similar incidents or historical grievances that are stored in social
psychology and conveyed from one generation to another, until such time as another conflict
occurs bringing together in an indiscernible fashion not only historical claims but also
terrifying legends and lore, fueling whatever conflict is ongoing.
279 In social psychology, dehumanizing one's enemy makes it easier to inflict upon him
or her inhuman or degrading treatment. Almost every experience in history involving mass
killings rising to the level of genocide or crimes against humanity has involved a campaign
of hatred and dehumanization, if not sub-humanization, of the identified enemy. In fact,
even the ordinary training of regular armed forces involves a dimension of it, particularly
[Vol. 98
2008] NEW WARS AND THE CRISIS OF COMPLIANCE 781
of these combatants are young and uneducated, the impact of hate
propaganda is more effective in altering ordinary inhibitions against
violence, and thus intensifies aberrant human behavior. 280  The history of
war since antiquity is a testimony to this phenomenon whose biblical
origins are in Cain's slaying of Abel.
V. FACTORS ENHANCING AND DETRACTING FROM COMPLIANCE WITH IHL
A. CLAIMS OF LEGITIMACY
In the context of armed conflicts, claims of legitimacy, 281 however
they are characterized, play a role in connection with violations of IHL. At
the risk of oversimplification, state actors pretend to have a greater claim to
legitimacy than non-state actor insurgents, whether the conflict is
characterized as a conflict of a non-international character or a purely
internal one. 282 States seek to de-legitimize non-state actors' claims while
advancing their own claims of legitimacy. In more common terms,
protagonists in conflict seek legitimacy by respectively claiming to be the
"good guys" fighting the "bad guys." The implication is that the "good
guys" may have a greater margin of acceptance for their transgressions than
the "bad guys. ' ' 283  Thus, even when the "good guys" are on occasion
investigated or prosecuted, the outcomes tend toward dismissing the
with respect to bayonet training in the infantry. It is difficult for a human being to stick a
bayonet into another human being without either perceiving an overwhelming sense of
danger, or by looking at the other person as being somewhat less deserving to be treated as
an equal human being.
280 See BEST, supra note 10.
281 This goes back to the formulation of doctrines of just war in natural law philosophy,
which were first developed by St. Augustine of Hippo. See SAINT AUGUSTINE OF Hippo, THE
CITY OF GOD (Marcus Dods trans., 2000). These doctrines were elaborated by St. Thomas
Aquinas in his Summa Theologiae, and by the founder of modem international law, Hugo
Grotius. SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE (Fathers of the English Dominican
Province trans., 1998); HuGo GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI Ac PACIs LIBRE TRES (Francis Willey
Kelsey trans, 1962); see also GUTHRIE, supra note 230; MAY, supra note 197.
282 To my knowledge, a state has never claimed that its use of force against a non-state
actor was illegitimate. In every case in which a state has been involved in a conflict with a
non-state actor, it has claimed legitimacy or higher legitimacy. If nothing else, the state
claims to have a monopoly on the use of force. When non-state actors challenge that
monopoly, the state's declare their use of force as lacking legitimacy. This frequently leads
to the state claiming that the non-state actor group's use of force constitutes terrorism,
whether that group engages in violations of IHL or not.
283 Israel always claims that all forms of violence by Palestinians, even when used in
accordance with IHL, are terrorism, and that all of its retaliations, even when in violation of
IHL, are justified. In bombing impermissible targets in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S.
claims "collateral damage" of civilians as a justification, and engages in torture under pseudo
arguments.
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charges or acquittal,284 and when convicted, the penalties are lower in
comparison with the penalties meted out for the same crimes to the "bad
guys.
285
Presumably if international instruments held out legitimacy as an
inducement to compliance with obligations under IHL, the violations would
be lessened. This is not presently the case with Common Article 3,286 but
more so with the two Protocols.287 Protocol I, which applies to wars of
national liberation, characterizes non-state actor combatants in this type of
conflict as combatants, which is one of the reasons some states refuse to
ratify it, even though Article 4 specifically states that such recognition does
not affect the legal status of the parties.288 Protocol II, which applies to
other categories of non-state actors in the context of conflicts of a non-
international character, emphasizes in Article 3 that none of its provisions
shall be interpreted as affecting the sovereignty of a state or justifying
interventions whether direct or indirect.289 Some governments, including
the United States, refuse to ratify Protocol II because they believe that it
gives non-state actors too much legal, and thus political recognition. 290 The
same problem exists with respect to the less explicit Article 3 of the Third
Geneva Convention of 1949, notwithstanding paragraph 4, which was
intended to mitigate that reaction.29' Governments resist granting
insurgents the status of lawful combatants, particularly the status of POWs,
in order not to give these groups legal and political legitimacy. They also
believe that doing so would encourage insurgencies. Instead, governments
who are confronted by insurgent groups frequently label them terrorists,
whether the use of force by such insurgent groups is within or outside the
284 For example, in the Abu Ghraib tortures, not a single officer has been convicted. See
supra note 111.
285 Contrast the absence of any convictions in the United States for the Abu Ghraib and
Guantanamo human rights abuses. There have also been no convictions for acts of
"extraordinary rendition" whereby tortures is committed by others for and at the request of
the United States. See Leila Nadya Sadat, Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary
Rendition under International Law, 37 CASE WEST. RES. J. INT'L LAW 309 (2006). A review
of the sentences of the ICTR and ICTY also shows that those deemed to be "good guys" got
lesser sentences than those who were "bad guys." See, e.g., 1-12 ANNOTATED LEADING
CASES, supra note 113.
286 Geneva I, supra note 23, art. 3; Geneva II, supra note 23, art. 3; Geneva III, supra
note 23, art. 3; Geneva IV, supra note 23, art. 3.
287 Geneva Convention Protocol I, supra note 5; Geneva Convention Protocol II, supra
note 24.
288 Geneva Convention Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 4; Bassiouni, Legal Controls of
International Terrorism, supra note 3, at 98.
289 Geneva Convention Protocol II, supra note 24, art. 3.
290 Id.
291 Geneva III, supra note 23, art. 3.
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scope of its proper use in a conflict of a non-international character.292
Such refusal by governments to give insurgent forces the recognition of
lawful combatants and POW status removes the inducement for such
groups to comply with IHL norms, assuming that such recognition would
indeed constitute an inducement for compliance. 293 This non-recognition
gives governments the opportunity to deny such combatants the protections
of the Geneva Conventions and to engage in reprisals that violate IHL,
without incurring legal consequences. 294 By considering insurgent groups
terrorists, governments claim only the applicability of domestic legal
norms, rather than of IHL, to the commission of crimes within the national
context. Such governmental actions, in turn, provide a basis for the
insurgent groups to consider themselves free of the limitations imposed by
IHL.295  The interactive process of violence leads to escalation and to
increased IHL, IHRL, and ICL violations by both sides.
296
Occasionally, governments will announce that they intend to act in
accordance with the requirements of the Geneva Convention, thus giving it
de facto application, but not de jure recognition. For example, Israel
declared that it intended to apply the protections of the Fourth Convention
to the Palestinians, but that it is not legally bound by it.297 In addition,
292 For example, the United States considers the Taliban who are fighting in Afghanistan
against U.S. occupation to be terrorists, much as it does various militias in Iraq who are
fighting U.S. occupation of that country. Similarly, Israel considers Palestinians fighting
against Israeli occupation to be terrorists. In these conflicts, the labels are used consistently
and indiscriminately, meaning that they are applied by these governments to the insurgents
whether these insurgents are acting within or without the bounds of IHL. Without question,
suicide bombings directed against civilian targets are war crimes, and if they are widespread
and indiscriminate, they also fall within the category of crimes against humanity.
Conversely, these governments, when they engage in similar indiscriminate violence against
civilian populations, either characterize their conduct as justified under the theory of
"military necessity" or argue that the targeting of civilians was not intentional and that it was
"collateral damage." These and other examples demonstrate the application of double
standards that reflect non-compliance by one set of combatants and in a perverse way invite
or enhance non-compliance by non-state actor groups.
293 It was the position of President George W. Bush in his Executive Order regarding
unlawful combatants that such persons were not subject to the Geneva Conventions. This
position was overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hamdan. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126
S. Ct. 2749 (2006). Nevertheless, Congress established Military Commissions for trial of
such persons, where there is less than full compliance with the Geneva Conventions with
respect to the rights of defense. Moreover, the Bush Administration took the position that
U.S. citizens arrested in U.S. territory could be held in indefinitely in detention without
regard to the U.S. Constitution. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
294 KALSHOVEN, supra note 149; KALSHOVEN & ZEGVELD, supra note 149.
295 Bassiouni, "Terrorism ": Reflections on Legitimacy and Policy Considerations, supra
note 3, at 224.
296 Id. at 225.
297 It was criticized for that position by the United Nations. See G.A. Res. ES- 10/6, U.N.
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Israel has refused to apply the Third Convention to the Palestinians, thus
depriving Palestinian combatants of POW status.2 98 The U.S. did the same
with respect to Taliban combatants held in Guantanamo Bay until the
Supreme Court reversed this position in Hamdan.
299
The expectation of compliance with IHL is accepted de jure by
governmental combatants, consequently, it is expected that they will also
comply de facto. As a result, it is assumed that non-compliance will be the
exception and that compliance will be the rule. This assumption is
strengthened by the obligation accepted by all governments to provide their
combatants with appropriate training, which, coupled with the assumption
that a disciplined command structure exists and will enforce compliance,
enhances overall compliance by all interested parties. These factors cannot
be extrapolated to non-state actors engaged in conflicts of a non-
international character.
Insurgent groups consider that the factual assumptions underlying the
usual norms do not apply when their forces oppose governmental forces,
because of the military and economic asymmetry that exists between
them.300 The outcome of this reasoning is that insurgent groups can engage
in some violations of IHL as a way of redressing the military and economic
imbalance.3 1 Insurgent groups draw on the legitimacy of their cause to
support that proposition. The perception of legitimacy by insurgent forces
leads these groups to rationalize their violations of IHL by confusing the
legitimacy of their purpose with the illegitimacy of their means, thus
eliminating an element of compliance inducement or at the very least by
Doc. A/RES/ES-10/6 (Feb. 9, 1999) (Illegal Israeli Actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and
the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the Applicability of the Fourth Geneva
Convention). See also BASSIOUNI, DOCUMENTS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, supra note
86, at 204.
298 Issa Qaraqea, The Legal Status of Palestinian POWs, Through the lens of
International Law, JERUSALEM TIMES, May 14, 2004, available at http://wwwjerusalem-
times.net/article/news/details/detail.asp?id=57&edition=529.
299 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004);
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
300 See generally IVAN ARREGUIN-TOFT, HOW THE WEAK WIN WARS: A THEORY OF
ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT (2005); ROGER W. BARNETT, ASYMMETRICAL WARFARE: TODAY'S
CHALLENGE TO U.S. MILITARY POWER (2003); STEVEN METZ & DOUGLAS V. JOHNSON I1,
ASYMMETRY AND U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY: DEFINITION, BACKGROUND, AND STRATEGIC
CONCEPTS (Strategic Studies Institute/U.S. Army War College 2001); Ivan Arreguin-Toft,
How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, 26 INT'L SECURITY 93, 93-128
(2001); Andrew J.R. Mack, Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric
Conflict, 27 WORLD POLITICS 175, 175-200 (1975); J. Paul Dunne et al., Managing
Asymmetric Conflict, 58 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 183, 183-208 (2006).
301 Bassiouni, "Terrorism ": Reflections on Legitimacy and Policy Considerations, supra
note 3, at 20.
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removing an inhibiting factor to the commission of such violations.
B. ASYMMETRY OF FORCES
Insurgent groups claim that an asymmetry exists between their forces
on the one hand and governmental forces on the other, both in terms of
military personnel and military means. 30 2 They argue that such asymmetry
does not permit them to comply with the same norms applicable to conflicts
of an international character where governmental forces, having more or
less equal characteristics, can fight each other with some degree of military
equality. 30 3 The assumption that non-state actors will voluntarily comply
with IHL notwithstanding asymmetry and the lack of mutuality of interest
they have with state actors makes the likelihood of compliance with IHL
less likely.
In the conflicts that have occurred since World War II, the question of
asymmetry takes on three distinct, but related, dimensions.30 4 The first is
the economic asymmetry, which gives governmental forces greater
advantages both in combat and in non-combat situations. The second is
control of the means of communication, either directly or through
government-controlled access to information, which places insurgents at a
disadvantage. The third is military technology, which gives governments
greater advantages than insurgents can ever achieve. As to the latter,
insurgents point to the greater destructive capabilities, for example, of aerial
bombardment and other sophisticated weapons-systems capable of
inflicting damage and harm at distance. The public perception of these
means of warfare is that they are more antiseptic, even though they are
more destructive and produce more harm to protected persons and targets.
The permissibility of the use of such means raises a presumption that their
harmful and destructive consequences are also legitimate. The harm and
damage to protected persons and targets caused by these weapons are
euphemistically called "collateral damage., 30 5 Insurgent groups, however,
cannot respond in kind and benefit from the same latitude given to
governmental forces. Their weapons are primitive by comparison to those
of governmental forces, but the harm they cause to protected persons and
302 Dominic D. McAlea, Post- Westphalian Crime, in NEW WARS, NEW LAWS? APPLYING
THE LAWS OF WAR IN 21ST CENTURY CONFLICTS 111, 112 (David Wippman & Matthew
Evangelista eds., 2005).
303 Bassiouni, "Terrorism ": Reflections on Legitimacy and Policy Considerations, supra
note 3, at 220.
304 id.
305 Yoram Dinstein, Collateral Damage and the Principle of Proportionality, in NEW
WARS, NEW LAWS? APPLYING THE LAWS OF WAR IN 21 ST CENTURY CONFLICTS 1 11 (David
Wippman & Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005).
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targets is more visible and less antiseptic.3 °6 Thus, a smart bomb launched
from miles away, which kills the same number of civilians as a suicide-
bomber, will never be judged by the same standards. Government forces
benefit from a presumption of legality, which, due to their ability to control
access to information (and thus its dissemination) and to control the
decision-making process by which their conduct is assessed, almost always
results in a mostly de facto determination of legality.30 7  Conversely,
insurgent forces which commit similar in-kind violations are almost always
publicized as criminal and result in a de facto determination of illegality.
Interestingly enough, with respect to political achievement, the more
destructive bombardments and similar military responses are, the less likely
a positive outcome becomes for government forces. Conversely, the more
visible and psychologically shocking the acts of violence committed by
insurgents against protected persons and targets, the more likely the positive
political outcomes become. The reason for this dichotomy is that the first
situation detracts from the legitimacy of the governmental use of force and
enhances the legitimacy of the use of force by insurgents, even when in
clear violation of existing norms. It also increases recruitment into
insurgent forces' ranks and enlarges the base of support they can obtain
from the civilian population. One of the consequences of this situation is to
increase the level of intolerability within the society that suffers the
consequences of these violations, which in due course leads to the search
for a political solution. In a perverse way, this asymmetry ultimately tends
to work against the political interests of government forces and in favor of
non-state actors.
306 Bassiouni, Legal Controls of International Terrorism, supra note 3, at 85.
307 It is almost always the case that an attack by Israeli armed forces against Palestinian
targets is presented in the public discourse as being legitimate both in purpose and in means,
while a Palestinian attack upon on Israeli targets is almost invariably described in opposite
terms. An attack upon military targets is permissible under IHL. Thus, if the Palestinians
attack Israeli armed forces, they are legitimate targets. However, Israel always describes
such attacks as terrorist attacks. For Israel to recognize the legitimacy of such attacks upon
its armed forces would be a major political concession to Palestinian nationalistic claims and
would add significantly to the legitimacy of their conflict against Israel as being a war of
national liberation. Geneva Convention Protocol I would apply to such a conflict, thus
giving the Palestinian combatants the status of POWs, which Israel has denied to date. The
analogy in this case extends only with respect to Israeli armed forces. With respect to Israeli
attacks on Palestinian targets, the target may be a civilian one, which is not authorized under
IHL, or a legitimate military target, but attacked with disproportionate use of force that
causes civilian casualties and destruction of private property, which would be prohibited by
IHL. In both of these cases, the attack would be a violation of IHL, but is almost always
presented as justified. Conversely, when the Palestinians attack a legitimate military target,
it is almost always labeled an act of terrorism. Without question, if Palestinians attack a
civilian target, that violates IHL. See Bassiouni, "Terrorism": Reflections on Legitimacy
and Policy Considerations, supra note 3.
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The premise of IHL with respect to non-international conflicts is that a
quid pro quo can exist between governmental and insurgent forces. But
since the latter receive no recognition as lawful combatants and are denied
the status of POWs, they cannot exchange their acceptance of restrictions
imposed by IHL on the means and methods of the use of force contained in
these norms. The benefit for governmental forces would be that insurgent
forces would abide by these norms. But experience indicates that
governmental forces and insurgent forces do not live up to these exceptions
negating the assumptions mentioned above.308 The clear absence of quid
pro quos in conflicts of a non-international character or in internal armed
conflict enhances the level and intensity of IHL violations by the
protagonists in these conflicts.
IHL has chosen to focus on the means and methods of using force, i.e.,
jus in bello, irrespective of the legitimacy of the resort to the use of force.30 9
As a result, it removes from consideration the issue of legitimacy of resort
to the use of force from both sides, restricting only the means and methods
they can employ. Insurgent groups claim that such a choice necessarily
favors governmental forces because of the military asymmetry that exists
between them. Thus, insurgent groups seek to introduce the legitimacy of
their cause as a justification for violating the restrictions on means and
methods. 3'0 The consequences are increased lack of compliance, and thus
increased IHL violations.
The issues of legitimacy and asymmetry are as related to one another
as the issues of counterpart behavior. These arguments are not new.
Niccolo Machiavelli argued in the 1500s that "the ends justify the means,"
which is the antithesis of IHL's premises and values. 31  Robespierre and
308 As discussed throughout this Article, IHL assumes a mutuality of interests between
parties to a conflict who share the same characteristics in respect to their military forces,
irrespective of their military parity. In other words, there is a quid pro quo that enhances
voluntary compliance for the protagonists in conflicts of an international character whose
combatants are duly constituted armies. This does not exist with respect to conflicts of a
non-international or internal character. Experience indicates that quite contrary to the
expectation of mutuality of interest, there are divergent interests that push the opposing
parties in opposite directions, and therefore reduce incentives to compliance while enhancing
non-compliance. Thus, for example, as governments deny insurgent groups the status of
combatants and POWs to avoid having such groups' claims enhance their political
legitimacy, they explicitly remove an important factor which is likely to enhance compliance
with IHL by these groups if they received such legal protections. In addition, when
government forces fail to comply with IHL norms and offer double standards as explanations
for their conduct, they also encourage reciprocal non-compliance by non-state actors.
309 Supra note 3.
310 Supra note 3.
311 See generally NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, IL PRINCIPE: LE GRANDE OPERE POLITICHE
(G.M. Anselmi & E. Menetti trans., 1992); KARMA NABULSI, TRADITIONS OF WAR:
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Lenin, more conscious of legal concepts, rationalized the precept by
articulating in realpolitik terms that the outcome differentiates between
those who become criminals and those who become heroes. 312 Robespierre
reportedly said to the revolutionary masses assembled at a rousing speech
he gave to ferret out the monarchists and those of the ancien regime:
"Victory will decide whether you are rebels or benefactors of humanity.
313
Later, Mao Tse Tung, echoing the same concept, said, "Political power
grows out of the barrel of a gun. ' 3 14 Obviously none of the above believed
in Thomas Hobbes' assertion: "non autoritas sed veritas lexfacit. '315 The
legitimacy argument is far from easy to resolve. On the contrary, it is
intractable so long as we do not have, to paraphrase Aristotle, the same laws
in Athens and in Rome-laws that apply equally to all. 316 Double standards
enhance non-compliance.
A number of conflicts have demonstrated that when governments grant
some recognition to insurgent groups in order to conduct negotiations, the
level of violence is reduced. This has been the case in the conflict in El
Salvador and, to some extent, in Colombia. Conversely, when the
government of Serbia refused to recognize the Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA), this resulted in the escalation of violence in Kosovo, and ultimately
led to NATO intervention. Israel refused to recognize the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO) as a negotiating counterpart until the 1993
317Oslo agreements. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
(MPLA) in Angola was refused similar recognition, leading to a protraction
of that conflict. 3 8 The same occurred with the governments of Georgia and
Russia in Abkhazia and Chechnya, respectively. 319  Thus, recognition
OCCUPATION, RESISTANCE AND THE LAW 84-90 (1999).
312 See ALBERT PARRY, TERRORISM: FROM ROBESPIERRE TO ARAFAT (1976).
313 Id.
314 MAO ZEDONG, II PROBLEMS OF WAR AND STRATEGY: SELECTED WORKS 22 (1938).
315 See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN: SIVE DE MATERIA, FORMA, ET POESTATE
CIVITATIS ECCLESIASTICAE ET CIVILS (1841).
316 See generally ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (David Ross trans., Batoche
Books 1998).
317 Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, Isr.-Palestine Liberation Org., Sept. 4, 1999, 38
I.L.M. 1465; Wye River Memorandum, Isr.-Palestine Liberation Org., Oct. 23, 1998, 37
I.L.M. 1251; Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, Note for the Record, Isr.-
Palestine Liberation Org., Jan. 17, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 650; Israeli-Palestinian Interim
Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Isr.-Palestine Liberation Org., Sept. 28, 1995,
36 I.L.M. 551; Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Isr.-
Palestine Liberation Org., Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1525; BASSIOUNI, DOCUMENTS ON THE
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, supra note 86.
318 LE BILLON, supra note 212; Pearce, supra note 212.
319 M. LORD KIPANIDZE, THE ABKHAZIANS AND ABKHAZIA (1990); I. Maxine Marcus,
Post-Conflict in Chechnya: Faltering Justice, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE, supra note 1.
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serves to reduce violence and enhances the prospects of a political
settlement.
IHL is predicated on certain assumptions of mutuality of interest
reflected in the quid pro quo described above. In examining the outcome of
conflicts of a non-international character, it is clear that either these
assumptions are not valid or that there is insufficient inducements to
compliance. In part, this may be due to the absence of positive inducement
factors but it is also due to the absence of deterrence factors resulting from
the lack of enforcement of these norms. Along with mutuality of interest,
the following factors are believed to lead to compliance. Their listing
below does not represent a hierarchy among them. They are: (1) positive
inducement factors, (2) commonality of shared values, (3) enforcement, and
(4) the removal of double standards applicable to governmental forces and
non-state actors.
C. POSITIVE INDUCEMENT FACTORS
Notwithstanding two significant disincentive factors, the refusal to
give POW status to non-state actors, and the resort by governmental forces
to reprisals which are in violation of IHL, past experience has demonstrated
that certain conditions can create positive inducements for compliance.
One anecdotal example is that of the revolutionary forces during the El
Salvador conflict, who minimized their attacks upon civilian populations
under the control of governmental forces when they received some political
recognition in the course of the peace process.32 0 In this situation, the
inducement was the peace process, intended to lead to a legitimate place at
the negotiating table for the insurgents. 32' That inducement ultimately led
to the cessation of hostilities and the achievement of peace.3 22
In the Algerian War of Independence, the violence and the violations
on both sides raged, particularly when French governmental forces engaged
in torture, killing of prisoners whose status as POW was never recognized,
extra-judicial executions, and unlawful reprisals against civilians led the
insurgents to assassinations and indiscriminate killing of civilians.3 23 This
lasted until Charles De Gaulle's French government opened the door for
negotiations leading to the independence of Algeria and the withdrawal of
320 Seils, supra note 215.
321 Id.
322 Id.; WOOD, supra note 133.
323 See generally MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, LAW AND THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION (1961);
TODD SHEPARD, THE INVENTION OF DECOLONIZATION: THE ALGERIAN WAR AND THE
REMAKING OF FRANCE (2006); LA BATTAGLIA DI ALGERI (THE BATTLE OF ALGIERS), directed
by Gillo Pontecorvo (1966); see also infra note 358.
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French forces and settlers from that country.324 These instances seem to
indicate that conflict resolution mechanisms are probably the strongest
inducement for compliance than any other factor. But internal political
processes of this type are few and far between.
There is a current line of thinking that argues in favor of educating
insurgent forces in IHL as a means of achieving greater compliance with its
norms.3 25 These views, however, are predicated on the assumption that
insurgent forces have the military discipline necessary to ensure, through
superior officers commanding these forces that compliance will be carried
out by subordinates. Such an assumption may, however, prove unfounded
if the rank and file of these forces does not have the necessary educational
and cultural background to understand the scope and application of these
norms.
Even if education of insurgents is accomplished, the assumption that it
would achieve greater compliance is vitiated by the fact that substantial
asymmetry in the military forces eliminates any inducement to compliance
unless strongly outweighed by the benefits of legitimacy and recognition,
which governments opposing such forces are reluctant to concede.
Furthermore, unlawful reprisals by governmental forces and excessive use
of force, as well as torture, extra-judicial executions, destruction of public
and private property, and other human rights violations have clearly
signaled to non-state actors that they have no reason to be bound by norms
that the opposing governmental forces violate at will and with impunity.326
Moreover, non-state actors have no expectations of accountability and thus
feel no deterrence.
D. VALUES AND BEHAVIOR
Many conflicts of a non-international character have pitted opponents
against one another who claim to adhere to substantially the same values,
and yet this has done little to alter their behavior.327 For example, in the
324 Supra note 323.
325 The ICRC has for years sought means of educating insurgent groups by indirect
means, since governments would usually oppose having formal training as offered to the
military personnel of armed forces of the High Contracting Parties to the Geneva
Conventions. The ICRC has regular training programs, oversees training programs at the
San Remo Institute in Italy, and has regional offices in various parts of the world that
conduct regular training sessions for armed forces. None of these, however, include non-
state actors. For further information on ICRC military training programs, see International
Committee of the Red Cross , Promoting Humanitarian Law to Armed Forces, Police, and
Other Weapon Bearers, http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsfihtml/armedforces?
OpenDocument (last visited Sept. 6, 2008).
326 The situation in Palestine/Israel since September 1999 evidences this situation.
327 For example, the present conflict in Darfur is Muslim versus Muslim; the War of
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conflict in the former Yugoslavia, Christian Serb Orthodox and Christian
Catholics fought one another, each committing violations against the other,
even though they share the same fundamental Christian values. These two
groups in their conflicts with the Muslims in Bosnia also committed the
same type of violations as did the Bosnian Muslims, even though
Christianity and Islam share the same values embodied in IHL's
prohibitions.32 s In the conflict between Russian and Chechnyan forces, the
Russian governmental forces were well-organized and well-disciplined, and
they were commanded by superior officers who are knowledgeable in IHL.
Nonetheless, they committed IHL violations against the Chechens.329 In
turn, the Chechens, who adhere to the values of Islam, committed against
the Russians violations of these norms which embody their religious values.
In the conflict between Israel and Palestine, Judaic and Islamic values
coincide with respect to the protection of civilians, and yet both sides have
committed violations of these norms.33 °
In all sorts of conflicts in which the protagonists adhere to certain
religious values, it has been evident nonetheless that their behavior has not
conformed to these values. Consequently, there is a vast field to be
explored as to why the commonality of values does not result in the
adherence to these values in the combatants' behavior. It could well be that
this is simply due to the belief by these groups that the higher legitimacy of
their cause over that of their opponents justifies their violations. More
often, however, each side claims the other's violations as justification of
their own. If that assertion is valid, it would lead to the assumption that
enhanced compliance by the protagonists would lead to reduced violations.
It may be, however, that the issue of legitimacy perceived by opposing
forces has overtaken the values reflected in the restrictions on means and
methods. It is therefore necessary to reconsider what may constitute
inducement and deterrence leading to behavioral conformity in conflicts of
a non-international character and also, for that matter, in the context of
conflicts of an international character. Lastly, it should be observed that
religious leaders, far from opposing these violations, have either
encouraged them or failed to take action to oppose them.331
Independence of Bangladesh was fought by East Pakistan, and both groups involved were
Muslims; in Rwanda, Catholic Hutus fought against Catholic Tutsis; and for one hundred
years Catholics fought Protestants in Europe. See generally JONATHAN SUMPTION, THE
HUNDRED YEARS WAR (2001).
328 Bassiouni, Introduction to International Humanitarian Law, supra note 22.
329 Marcus, supra note 319.
330 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Evolving Approaches to Jihad: From Self-Defense to
Revolutionary and Regime-Change Political Violence, 8CHI.J. INT'LL. 119 (2007).
331 For example, most of the Christian clergy living in the Nazi regime did not oppose the
atrocities committed against the Jews and others. See JAMES BENTLEY, MARTIN NIEMOLLER
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E. CRIMINOLOGICAL FACTORS-COMPLIANCE/DETERRENCE ISSUES
IN IHL
The basic assumptions underlying national legal prescriptions are
substantially absent in the IHL enforcement system. These assumptions
include at the national level that: (a) norms reflect prevailing commonly
shared social values; (b) norms protect commonly perceived social
interests; (c) norms prohibit conduct commonly deemed to constitute a
social harm; (d) the prohibited conduct is clearly enunciated in law; (e)
promulgation and public dissemination gives notice to potential violators;
(f) there is a strong likelihood of apprehension, prosecution, adjudication,
and punishment if found guilty; and (g) there is a high probability of
receiving a punishment that outweighs the benefits of committing the
violations.332
Every criminal justice system throughout history has been predicated
on all or some of these assumptions.333 More importantly, modem criminal
justice systems are dedicated to the goal of prevention, even where in part
also based on retribution. Similarly, the criminalization of IHL norms seeks
to achieve the goal of prevention. This goal cannot be achieved, however,
without accountability and the prospects of effective sanctions, which are
presumed to have a deterrent effect.334
Notwithstanding the historic debate in national criminal justice
systems about the effectiveness of general deterrence, it is nonetheless
recognized by all criminal justice systems in the world as having some legal
validity. Prosecutions do not have the limited or exclusive goals of
providing retributive punishment, but also include other goals such as
rehabilitation and social reintegration.335 While it is impossible to assess
(1984). In the conflict in Rwanda, the Catholic Hum clergy not only did not oppose the
genocide, but actively participated. In the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the Serb
Orthodox, Croatian Catholic, and Muslim religious leaders did not voice their opposition to a
war in which religion and religious hatred was a factor. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
there are no religious voices on either side that decry attacks upon innocent civilians. In this,
and other conflicts involving protagonists from different religions, or for that matter of the
same religion, there are few religious voices that decry human rights violations. It seems as
if religious establishments have been co-opted by governments or that they feel compelled to
support their coreligionists no matter how immoral or unlawful their conduct may be. For
one courageous Israeli secular voice, see SHLOMO BEN-AMI, SCARS OF WAR, WOUNDS OF
PEACE: THE ISRAELI-ARAB TRAGEDY (2006).
332 CHARLES P. NEMETH, CRIMINAL LAW (2003); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS
OF CRIMINAL LAW (1998).
333 The exceptions are when' criminal processes are used by dictatorial regimes as a
repressive means to establish, maintain, and preserve their power.
334 H. L. A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968); supra note 333.
335 For example, social integration and rehabilitation as well as considerations of
individual responsibility have caused every legal system in the world to distinguish between
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the potential deterring effect of prosecutions on non-state actors engaged in
conflicts of a non-international character, it is valid to draw from the
experiences of national criminal justice systems that: (1) some potentially
deterring effect exists in the knowledge that a given conduct is criminalized,
(2) it is likely to be prosecuted, and (3) in the event of conviction, there is
likely to be some punishment whose effects will outweigh the benefits of
committing the prohibited act.
All of these assumptions extend to conflict situations involving non-
state actors. In fact, all of these assumptions are operative upon non-state
actors within the same territory where such conflict occurs. These same
non-state actors are in some way individually deterred by the domestic
criminal laws of the state in the ordinary course of their lives, which is
evidenced by the fact that they do not commit the same crimes that they do
once they join non-state actor groups and engage in conflicts of a non-
international or internal character. The common sense conclusion is that
they are deterred in their individual action in the former context, but they
are not deterred when they become part of a group that commits acts of
violence in the second context. Logic would dictate that there are reasons
for the breakdown of the deterrent effect of the law. Among these reasons
are the following:
(1) Domestic criminal law creates a higher expectation of enforcement
than international humanitarian law.
(2) Enforcement at the domestic level by means of law enforcement,
prosecutorial, and/or judicial systems has a demonstrable effect even
though with varying degrees of efficiency in different national legal
adults and juveniles, thus, treating juveniles in different ways than adults both as to
procedure and substance, even when they commit the same crimes as adults. It is
noteworthy that this criminological and human rights consideration has been disregarded by
the Bush Administration's decision to prosecute an individual under the Military
Commissions Act who at the time he was captured in Afghanistan was fifteen years old. His
prosecution under the Act is a violation of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child (CRC). G.A. Res. 44/25, art. 37, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989).
Moreover, a number of human rights instruments, such as the U.N. Minimum Standards for
the Treatment of Offenders (1955), prohibit keeping minors in the same places of
confinement as adults, a rule also violated in this case. U.N. Doc. A/CONF/611 (1957),
Annex I, E.S.C. res. 663C, 24 U.N. ESCOR Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. E/3048, amended by
E.S.C. res. 2076, 62 U.N. ESCOR Supp. No. 1, at 35, U.N. Doc. E/5988 (1977). Lastly, the
U.N. has adopted the Beijing Rules for the prosecution of juveniles, which also provide the
same prohibitions. United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of
Juvenile Justice (The Beijing Rules), G.A. Res. 40/33 Annex, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp.
No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/40/53/Annex (Nov. 29, 1985). The CRC has an optional protocol
which prohibits the use of children in armed conflicts. Optional Protocol to the Convention
on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts, G.A. Res.
54/263 (May 24, 2000), entered into force on 12 February 2002. It provides that those who
use children in armed conflict are the ones to be criminalized, not the children.
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systems, but no such mechanisms exist in IHL. Thus for example, there is
little expectation that an ad hoc tribunal such as the ICTY or ICTR is going
to be established for every non-international and internal conflict, and it is
highly doubtful that the ICC, which is still in its nascent stage, will be
dealing with anything but a few representative perpetrators in leadership
positions.
(3) As a result of this prior experience, the expectation of punishment
is significantly remote. Even with respect to those who may be deterred by
the prospects of being prosecuted before an international ad hoc tribunal or
before the ICC, the long duration of these proceedings and their exclusion
of the death penalty and long term imprisonment tend to diminish the
already limited prospects of deterrence.
(4) More important is the falsity of the assumption that IHL is as well
known as domestic criminal law among the general population of states
where such conflicts occur. Instead, the general assumption by non-state
actors who become part of militias is that they have the same privileges of
resorting to acts of violence as do members of the armed forces of the state.
Admittedly this begs the question of the lawfulness of the means, however,
since regularly constituted armed forces in these types of conflicts
frequently engage in the same type of violations of IHL as do non-state
actors. One can infer the existence of an emulation factor or the assumption
that combatants draw on one another's practices as setting up the
parameters of expected practices,
(5) There is a significant counter-deterring factor operating against
compliance within non-state actor groups namely that commanders in the
field have power of life and death over members of their groups and they
are almost unaccountable for their conduct.336
(6) There is a substantial lack of clarity in the legal norms that convey
obligations to those who are to abide by the law, particularly with respect to
the legal status of combatants in conflicts of a non-international character
and those engaged in purely domestic conflicts.337
336 See supra note 1. As indicated above, in connection with the over 250 conflicts
which have occurred between 1948 and 1998, there has been very little evidence of
international prosecutions other than those before the ICTY and ICTR. See Bassiouni, supra
note 139; Roman Boed, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in POST CONFLICT
JUSTICE 487 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002); Megan Kaszubinski, The International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in POST CONFLICT JUSTICE 459 (M. Cherif
Bassiouni ed., 2002). There have been few national prosecutions. See The National Judicial
Model, in POST CONFLICT JUSTICE 487 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002). While the ICC has
indicted four persons it has not started prosecutions as of this writing.
337 Combatants covered by Common Article 3 are not given POW status. They are
subject to national law and can therefore be charged and punished as common criminals.
Protocol II encourages giving such combatants amnesty except for war crimes. See Geneva
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(7) Double standards applied by governments and the lack of, or
merely selective, enforcement by governments contributes to reciprocal
non-compliance by non-state actors.338
Just as IHL offers no incentives for compliance to non-state actor
groups, international criminal law conventions defining prohibited acts of
terrorism also offer no incentives for compliance with IHL and ICL.339
What is likely, however, to produce a greater level of compliance than what
has been historically witnessed in these types of conflicts is a higher level
of deterrence. However, deterrence is essentially predicated on some
reasonable certainty of apprehension, prosecution and punishment if guilt is
established. Historic experience with non-international conflicts and purely
internal conflicts occurring since the end of World War II reveals that
impunity, rather than accountability, has been the norm.34 ° It should be
underscored that criminological research on deterrence, no matter how
Convention Protocol II, supra note 24, at 6(5); COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS, supra note 19, at 1402 (discussing Paragraph 5); KALSHOVEN, supra note 107.
338 Bassiouni, "Terrorism ": Reflections on Legitimacy and Policy Considerations, supra
note 3, at 220.
339 See supra note 3; see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Perspectives on International
Terrorism, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS (1937-2001) 1 (M.
Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2001); Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft (Tokyo Hijacking Convention), Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S.
219; Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague
Hijacking Convention), Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Montreal
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation
(Montreal Hijacking Convention), Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 177;
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International
Civil Aviation (Montreal Protocol), Feb. 24, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 627; Convention on the High
Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; United Nations Convention on Law
of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/122, 21 I.L.M. 1261; Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including
Diplomatic Agents (Diplomats Convention), Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S.
167; Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel (U.N. Personnel
Convention), G.A. Res. 49/59, U.N. Doc. A/Res/49/59 (Feb. 17, 1995); Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988,
1678 U.N.T.S. 221; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 304;
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (Hostage-Taking Convention),
Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. 11,081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings (Terrorist Bombing Convention), Dec. 15, 1997, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/52/164; Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (Terrorism
Financing), Dec. 9, 1999, 39 I.L.M. 270; see also INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS RELATED TO
THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (United Nations 2001);
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS (1937-2001), supra; 1-2
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A COMPILATION OF U.N. DOCUMENTS (1972-2001) (M. Cherif
Bassiouni ed., 2002).
340 POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE, supra note 1; Bassiouni, supra note 206.
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tenuous its conclusions, reveals that the absence of any high level of
certainty of prosecution and punishment essentially eliminates the deterrent
effect.
Common experience also reveals that deterrents are more effective
when they come from the top down, rather than from the bottom up. This is
the premise of the theory of command responsibility, which exists in
international humanitarian law as well as in the military laws of every
country of the world. Command responsibility, however, is very difficult to
establish, let alone to enforce, within the command structures of non-state
actor groups, which as stated above, are sometimes akin to organized crime
groups where the leaders have the power of life and death over their men. It
may even be said, though this is purely deductive and without any empirical
foundation, 341 that positive command responsibility theories exist in this
typology of conflicts and violent interaction.
The exception to the assumptions of impunity which prevail in
conflicts of a non-international and purely internal character are the
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 342 which have seen the
establishment of international investigation commissions, 343 followed by
international tribunals, and some example of mixed model institutions in
Sierra Leone, and East Timor.34  In these conflicts, the doctrine of
command responsibility has been the basis for prosecution, but that
jurisprudence is limited and its general popularized impact is doubtful,
owing to limited public dissemination.
Non-military leaders in conflicts of a non-international character and
purely internal conflicts have, with few exceptions, historically managed to
insulate themselves from criminal responsibility. It is unclear whether this
factual outcome is the result of the ability of such leaders to negotiate some
341 In fact, there is no empirical research into the methods and structures of the type of
warfare described herein, or into what may or may not cause compliance or have an effect on
deterrence. Surprising as it may seem, there has been very little criminological research in
connection with this type of conflict, which is probably due to the fact that criminologists
have not yet expanded their field of research from the problems of domestic violence and
deviance to international violence and deviance.
342 1-12 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES, supra note 113.
343 Commission of Experts on Yugoslavia, Annexes has identified 89 paramilitary
groups, many of them operating independently, but others operating under the direct or
indirect command of the formal military structure. Annexes to Final U.N. Report, supra
note 12, Annex IIIA.
344 Bassiouni, supra note 139; see also Theodor Meron, Reflections on the Prosecution of
War Crimes by International Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 551 (2006). There are other
examples of mixed tribunals such as Cambodia, but the latter in particular is yet to produce
evidence that it is anything more than a limited, if not sham, exercise. See M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Mixed Models of International Criminal Justice, in III INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW, supra note 61, ch. 2.4.
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form of explicit or implicit amnesty or if it is simply the natural outcome of
the realpolitik that usually characterizes how these conflicts are resolved.345
Lastly, based on general observation and not empirical study, most
combatants, including commanders, of non-state actor groups engaged in
these types of conflicts are poorly educated, if at all, and have very little if
any, knowledge or understanding of IHL, international criminal law, and
IHRL. Thus, the assumption that education produces some deterrence is
either totally or significantly flawed in the context of these conflicts.
Another factor which should be taken into account in connection with
the enhancement of voluntary compliance and with the enhancement of
deterrence is the double standard applied to governments and insurgents. It
is quite customary for government forces, whether military, police, or
paramilitary, to use the same methods and tactics as their opponents, which
they label "terrorism," but deem them "justified" when used by their side.
It is generally believed that enforcement is the key factor lacking in
fostering compliance with IHL, particularly with respect to the leaders who
all too frequently benefit from impunity. If the assumptions mentioned
above are valid, then the lack of enforcement is conducive to the lack of
compliance.346 In other words, the absence of prosecution and punishment,
particularly of the leaders of such conflicts, may well be considered a
determining factor leading to non-compliance. But that, too, is not
supported by available empirical data, and can only be assumed on the basis
of anecdotal data and common sense observation based on experiences in
the national criminal justice context.
347
345 See infra notes 377-86 discussing recent prosecutions of heads of state.
346 See Newton, supra note 166, at 75; DRUMBL, supra note 229.
141 S.C.Res. 780, 2, U.N. Doe. S/Res/780 (Oct. 6, 1992). During the last few months of
1993 in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, at a meeting of ICRC officers in Geneva
attended by myself in my capacity as Chairman of the Security Council Commission, it was
reported that several Serb prison camp commanders invited ICRC observers to visit their
camps in order to show that they were not committing violations with respect to prisoner
treatment. As reported by these ICRC officers, prison camp commanders indicated that the
existence of the U.N. Security Council Commission established pursuant to Resolution 780
(1992), coupled with the establishment of the ICTY, was the reason they wanted to establish
their respective personal records of compliance. This highlights the efficacy of general
deterrence. Indeed, as the Commission of Experts observed, the level of violations of the
laws and customs of war diminished significantly as of the beginning of 1994. Dr. Yves
Sandoz, former legal advisor to the ICRC, attests to my close relationship to the ICRC in The
ICRC and International Humanitarian Law, in THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 5, at 431.
In the Rwanda conflict, the presence of a French military contingent may have been
responsible for the reduction of the level of violence, as Tutsi forces had by then overcome
Hutu forces. It could be argued that a foreign military presence reduced the level of
vengeful violence that the Tutsis could have inflicted on the then near-defeated Hutus. In the
Cambodian conflict, the military intervention by Vietnam brought about the elimination of
M CHERIF BASSIOUNI
The underpinnings of enforcement are the likely expectations of
prosecution, the relatively swift adjudication, the knowledge of a significant
penalty in case of guilt, the equal application of law and its consistent (as
opposed to occasional) application, as well as occasional or symbolic
application undermining deterrence. This means that enforcement should
be applied in the same way to state actors and to non-state actors and also
applied to all perpetrators. Without these characters, enforcement becomes
selective and loses much of its legitimacy. In fact, it becomes counter-
productive if it is used only against non-state actors. Consistency is related
to the issue of legitimacy, but is also necessary as a norm-reinforcing
mechanism.
Enforcement must be viewed as an accountability mechanism;
consequently, it should be part of other accountability mechanisms,348 such
as truth and reconciliation and reparations to victims. 349 In other words,
IHL enforcement should not be viewed solely as post hoc retribution. It
should be viewed as a process that ranges from criminal prosecutions
during an ongoing conflict, to post-conflict justice modalities, including
integration with domestic conflict resolution mechanisms. Enforcement
should particularly be developed as an educational system whose goals
include retribution, recording history, addressing victims' needs, and
providing deterrence.
The means by which retributive and restorative justice are achieved
rely the choice of international or national jurisdictions. The former are
more costly and cumbersome; the latter are more effective and less costly,
but frequently unavailable. National jurisdictional mechanisms have a
more direct impact on the culture of violence in a given society, but only
when the political will exists to accomplish the goals of justice. More
significantly, the inability of these national justice systems to function often
leads to a failure to achieve justice. The international community has not
sufficiently focused on the means to rebuild national justice systems.35°
the Khmer Rouge as a force and the establishment of a new regime, which, from all available
information, has not engaged in massive retaliation against the former Khmer Rouge.
348 See Chicago Principles on Post-Conflict Justice (IHRLI 2008); POST-CONFLICT
JUSTICE, supra note 1.
349 See, e.g., Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation
for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 147, U.N. Doc. A/Res/60/147 (Mar. 21,
2006); CHICAGO PRINCIPLES ON POST CONFLICT JUSTICE (Int'l. Hum. Rts. L. Inst. 2008); M.
Cherif Bassiouni, International Recognition of Victims' Rights, 6 HuM. RTS. L. REV. 203
(2006).
350 For example, this is the situation in Afghanistan, which I have mentioned in my
capacity as U.N. independent expert on the human rights situation in Afghanistan.
ECOSOC, Comm. On Human Rights, Report of the Independent Expert on the Situation of
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The ICC may be used as an international mechanism, but it should be
reserved for the more serious violations and punishing the higher-ups who
are responsible for these violations. It should not be trivialized with the
trials of lesser offenders.
Enforcement at the national level which is believed to be the preferred
and most effective option is however problematic. First, because of
domestic political factors, second because most states have not incorporated
into their law IHL and ICL norms. The first and foremost hurdle is the
reluctance of governments to prosecute state actors and this is frequently
done by de jure or defacto amnesty for perpetrators of international crimes
committed during an armed conflict.351
The political and practical impediments to international and national
enforcement mentioned above, raise the question about whether the
prospects of enforcement have the potential to deter. Consequently, the
expectations that enforcement will achieve the goals of retributive and
restorative justice are questionable. The best that can be expected is that an
incremental process of enforcement can be developed and that this can
gradually strengthen compliance.
Finally, the assumption that government forces are more likely to
enforce IHL because of their command structure and system of internal
discipline has been proven to be largely incorrect. State actors' violations
against insurgents have historically benefited from impunity, even when
Human Rights in Afghanistan, 45, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/122 (Mar. 11, 2005) (prepared
by M. Cherif Bassiouni); ECOSOC, Comm. On Human Rights, Report of the Independent
Expert of the Commission on Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan,
delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. G.A. A/59/370 (Sept. 21, 2004) (prepared by
M. Cherif Bassiouni). It was further evidenced in the Rome Conference, convening donors
to rebuild the justice system, where I was also a rapporteur. See Rome Conference on the
Rule of Law in Afghanistan, July 2-3, 2007, http://www.rolafghanistan.esteri.it
/ConferenceRol; M. Cherif Bassiouni & Daniel Rothenberg, An Assessment of Justice
Sector and Rule of Law Reform in Afghanistan and the Need for a Comprehensive Plan,
Executive Summary for the Rome Conference on the Rule of Law in Afghanistan (delivered
July 2-3, 2007), available at http://www.rolafghanistan.esteri.it/NR/rdonlyres/Fl6F08B8-
5C24-48C6-BOFO-8D65B4003521/0/Assessmentjusticesectorandruleoflawreform.pdf; M.
Cherif Bassiouni, The Need for a Comprehensive Strategy for Justice Sector and Rule of
Law Reform in Afghanistan, Report of Rapporteur of the Institutional Strategies Panel,
Rome Conference on Rule of Law in Afghanistan (delivered July 2-3, 2007), available at
http://www.rolafghanistan.esteri.it/NR/rdonlyres/41AD15EC-F4BO-4445-82B4-E8AD6D79
D4D8/0/FinalReportGL2.pdf.
351 In July of 2008, the ICC prosecutor presented to the pre-trial Chamber an indictment
to be confirmed against eleven Sudanese public officials, including the sitting head of state,
General Omar AI-Bashir. The government of the Sudan, with strong support from other
Arab and Muslim state governments, rejected the indictment. Understandably heads of state
are not likely to voluntarily or cooperatively submit themselves to international or national
prosecution. Their prosecution occurs when they are out of power for one reason or another.
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they rise to the level of war crimes and crimes against humanity. For all
practical purposes, insurgents are not deemed lawful combatants because of
the uncertain status of the law, making them quasi-legitimate prey. This
was evident among U.S. armed forces during the Vietnam conflict, where
the only two prosecutions were of Lt. William Calley 352 and Capt. Ernest
Medina.3 53 The first was convicted then pardoned, and the second was
acquitted. During the 1956 and 1967 wars between Israel and Egypt, ample
evidence existed that Israeli forces killed Egyptian POWs and civilians, but
Israel refused to investigate, even after some of its own officers admitted in
public disclosures that they had committed such crimes.354 Another
example is the Sabra and Shatila massacre of Palestinian civilians in
refugee camps by Lebanese militias acting under the command of Israeli
forces.355 An investigation in Israel, the Kahane Commission, found
grounds which would have been sufficient to court martial somc of the
officers who were involved in this operation, but no prosecution ensued.356
The only principal sanction was to remove Ariel Sharon, then Minister of
Defense, from that post, and to deny him and another general officer the
right to military command.357
In France, a retired special operations officer, General D'Aussaresses,
who admitted in a book to committing torture and extra-judicial executions
of Algerian civilians over several years during that war of independence,
was not investigated.3 58 Since that bloody war, during which an estimated
one million Algerians were killed, France has never investigated any
violations, let alone brought about any prosecutions. The government of
352 United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19 (1973); Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 (5th
Cir. 1975); see also THE MY LAI MASSACRE AND ITS COVER-UP: BEYOND THE REACH OF THE
LAW (Joseph Goldstein et al. eds., 1976); Jordan J. Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms,
Myths and Leader Responsibility, 57 MIL. L. REV. 99 (1972).
353 Medina v. Resor, 43 C.M.R 243 (1971).
354 CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (Egyptian Organization for Human Rights 1996); Ronal
Fisher, Mass Murder in the 1956 War, MA'ARIV, Aug. 8, 1995; Gabby Bron, Egyptian
POWs Ordered to Dig Graves, Then Shot By Israeli Army, YEDIOTH AHRONOTH, Aug. 17,
1995 (reporting on the admissions of then-Captain Aryeh Biro, who knowingly killed a
number of civilians and a number of POWs in the 1956 war). For an eyewitness account,
see DR. AHMED SHAWKi EL-FANGARI, ISRAEL AS I KNEW IT (1960) (telling the story of a
physician at the Rafah hospital near Gaza, where he witnessed the wholesale killing of
injured and sick patients and medical personnel).
355 KAHANE COMMISSION, supra note 207; Malone, supra note 207.
356 KAHANE COMMISSION, supra note 207.
357 Id. Subsequently, however, he became Prime Minister and was able to command the
Israeli military.
358 Beauge Florence, L 'accablante confession du G~njral Aussaresses sur la torture en
Algrie, LE MONDE, May 3, 2001; see PAUL AUSSARESSES, SERVICES SPECIAUX, ALGERIE
1955-1957 (2001); PAUL AUSSARESSES, THE BATTLE OF THE CASBAH: COUNTER-TERRORISM
AND TORTURE (2005).
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Vietnam also has never investigated any of the allegations of torture of U.S.
POWs by its forces. Recently, however, Russia has started to investigate
and prosecute its military personnel who have committed crimes against
Chechnyan combatants and civilians, and since then it is believed that the
level of violations has abated in comparison with the earlier stages of that
conflict. 35 9 But by then, Russia had defeated the Chechnyans and controlled
the territory.
In all the cases where enforcement by governments has not taken
place, the reason appears to be political. Thus, it is valid to ask whether the
culture of humanitarianism has sufficiently permeated the political culture
of governments. Most interestingly, an ICRC survey, the People on War
Report, revealed that non-state actors and victims lament the lack of
enforcement even when they are the ones committing the violations.3 6 °
They particularly blame lack of enforcement by governments and by the
international community for the high level of non-compliance with IHL.361
In addition, they underscore that the impunity given to the leaders is a
factor in non-compliance and in the reduction, if not elimination, of
deterrence.362  Since leaders believe that they will not incur any
consequences for their crimes because they can barter peace for impunity,
they are not deterred; in fact, they may even be induced to commit crimes to
enhance their chances of success in the arena of political negotiations. But
even if there are a higher number of international prosecutions
notwithstanding the political difficulties that face these prospects,36 3 limited
or symbolic prosecutions are not likely to achieve general deterrence.364
F. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS: THE POLITICAL QUICK FIX FOR
ENDING CONFLICTS
So far, the international community has not adopted the principle of
"Responsibility to Protect," as expressed in U.N. General Assembly
Resolution 60/1 of 2005.365 Consequently, the Security Council is
359 Report by Mr. Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for Human Rights for the Council of
Europe, on his visits to the Russian Federation, 15 to 30 July 2004, 19 to 29 September 2004
(April 20, 2005), available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=846655.
360 PEOPLE ON WAR REPORT, supra note 225.
361 Id.
362 id.
363 This is evident in the Darfur situation, which was referred to the ICC by Security
Council Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005), a resolution which excluded
U.N. funding for the case. Since then the Security Council has withheld support for the ICC.
364 See JOHANNES ANDENEAS, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE (1974); Frank Zimring &
Norval Morris, Deterrence and Corrections, 381 ANNALS AMER. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC.
137, 137-146 (1969)'.
365 G.A. Res. 60/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/I (Oct. 25, 2005); RICHARD H. COOPER &
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completely free to decide when to intervene to prevent potential or control
ongoing conflicts. The result has been to reduce international interventions
and for the U.N. to develop political quick fixes to end conflicts, which
provide de facto impunity.366 Moreover, the limited access, or total lack
thereof, of international and regional organizations and NGOs during
conflicts of a non-international character has prevented the effective
monitoring of such conflicts as they unfold. As a result, there is little to no
information available that would otherwise permit the international
community to exercise some influence on limiting the level of violence and,
more particularly, the level of IHL violations either by exerting external
influence or by military intervention. Humanitarian organizations such as
the ICRC and the UNHCR, as well as humanitarian relief and refugee
NGOs, have more access but do not disclose what they witness in order to
preserve their access and ability to assist, and thus do little to increase
public awareness.
Sanctions are frequently ineffective, and they are mostly unfair since
they tend to penalize an entire society whose individuals have very little or
no control over their governments. This was particularly true of Iraq, where
United Nations sanctions resulted (albeit indirectly) in the deaths of an
estimated 500,000 children due to lack of pharmaceuticals and food.367
This type of sanction inevitably reinforces the government's hold on the
civilian population and serves to direct blame against those who sponsor the
sanctions. Such a government can then get on to yet another round of IHL
violations and rationalize it on the basis of the inhumane results of
sanctions.
The pursuit of political settlements to end conflicts invariably requires
negotiating with the leaders of such conflicts. Such negotiations all too
frequently offer amnesty or impunity, de jure or de facto, as an exchange
for the cessation of hostilities.368 This was evident in the initial efforts to
bring about peace in Sierra Leone, 3 69 as well as in Haiti.3 70 Amnesty is
JULIETTE VOINOv KOHLER, THE "RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT:" THE NEW GLOBAL MORAL
COMPACT (2006), available at http://r2pcoalition.org/media/R2PUS.pdf.
366 The Secretary-General, Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of
Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects, delivered to the Security Council and the
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/55/305, S/2000/809 (Aug. 21, 2000).
367 S.C. Res. 660, U.N. Doc No S/RES/660 (Aug. 2, 1990); S.C. Res. 661, U.N. Doc No
S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 1990); JEREMY MATAM FARRALL, UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND THE
RULE OF LAW (2008); HANS KOCHLER, THE UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS POLICY &
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1995); Christopher C. Joyner, United Nations Sanctions After Iraq:
Looking Back to See Ahead, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 329 (2003).
368 Bassiouni, supra note 206.
369 The Lome Agreements were reversed with the establishment of the Sierra Leone
tribunal, which is presently prosecuting Charles Taylor, the former dictator who seized
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presently one of the principal demands of the FARC in Colombia. Offers
of amnesty were also used as part of the process of ending the internal
conflicts in Argentina and Chile, although since then the situation in these
two countries has changed significantly. Argentina has had a number of
prosecutions and is currently expanding their scope; 371 Chile had been
pursuing criminal action against its former head of state until his recent
death.372 In addition, the peace agreement in El Salvador only provided a
fig leaf to what was otherwise a de facto amnesty.373 The same is true with
respect to Cambodia, even though the United Nations in cooperation with
Cambodia has established a mixed international-national tribunal, which
has yet to start its operations and is not likely to prosecute more than five
persons.
After the regime change in Uganda (1987-present) and Ethiopia (1974-
1991), the respective heads of states, Idi Amin and Mengistu Haile Mariam,
have respectively sought refuge in Saudi Arabia and Zimbabwe. Demand
for their prosecution has never been made. 374 In the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia, it was not until Slobodan Milosevic started "ethnic cleansing"
in Kosovo that the ICTY indicted him his crimes.
375
power in Sierra Leone and who was party to the previous agreement which gave him
immunity. The Special Court for the Sierra Leone, www.sc-sl.org/ (last visited Sept. 6,
2008); see also David Crane, Special Court for Sierra Leone, in III INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 61, ch. 2.4.
370 The then military strongman, General Jean Cedras, was given impunity and asylum in
Panama thanks to a deal made by the United States. Rodolfo Mattarollo, The Transition to
Democracy and Institution Building: The Case of Haiti, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE, supra
note 1, at 763; Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty to
Prosecute International Crimes in Haiti?, 31 TEX INT'L L.J. 1 (1996).
371 Human Rights Watch, Argentina: Amnesty Laws Struck Down: Supreme Court's
Long-Awaited Ruling Allows Prosecution of 'Dirty War' Crimes (June 14, 2005),
http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/06/14/argent 11119.htm.
372 R. v. Bow St. Metropolitan Magistrate and Others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 1),
3 WLR 1456 (H.L.(E.) 1998); Christine M. Chinkin, United House of Lords: Regina v. Bow
Street Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), 93 Am. J. INT'L L. 703, 704
(1999); see also R. v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [2000] 1
A.C. 147, 225-29 (H.L. 1999); R. v. Bow St. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet
Ugarte (No. 3), 2 WLR 827 (H.L.(E.) 1999); Diane F. Orentlicher, Whose Justice?
Reconciling Universal Jurisdiction with Democratic Principles, 92 GEO. L.J. 1057 (Aug.
2004).
373 Seils, supra note 215.
374 Although Amin passed away, Mengistu's prosecution is still possible.
375 Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37, Indictment (May 22, 1999). Speculation
was that he had a tacit understanding of impunity as a reward for signing the Dayton
Accords. Only after he was no longer in power and after he was surrendered to the ICTY
were indictments returned against him for IHL violations in Bosnia and Croatia. Prosecutor
v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37, Amended Indictment (June 29, 2001). Notwithstanding all
the information in the Commission of Experts Final Report and Annexes, supra note 12,
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The decision-makers who led these conflicts, senior field commanders,
and low-level perpetrators of violations of IHL, genocide, and crimes
against humanity, have consistently benefited from impunity.37 6 Recently,
however, decision-makers have not been as immune from accountability as
they have been in the past. Jean Kambanda, the Hutu former head of state
of Rwanda, was found guilty by the ICTR and is serving a 30-year
sentence.3 7 Milosevic died while on trial before the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY); 378 Radovan Karadzic, the
former head of state of the Republica Srpska of Bosnia is presently on trial
before the ICTY; Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi leaders were tried before
a tribunal in Iraq and executed;37 9 Charles Taylor, former head of state of
Liberia, who sought refuge in Nigeria was ultimately surrendered to the
special tribunal in Sierra Leone, which has established a chamber for his
which could easily establish Milosevic's command responsibility, it appears that until such
time as the third ICTY prosecutor, Carla del Ponte, issued the first indictment against
Milosevic there were no investigatory files opened by her two predecessors that she could
find, as she related to me.
376 Bassiouni, Combating Impunity for International Crimes, supra note 91; M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Proposed Guiding Principles for Combating Impunity for Internatioral Crimes,
in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 255-82. But see Rome Statute, supra note 21,
art. 27 (with respect to head of state responsibility), which states:
Article 27: Irrelevance of official capacity
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official
capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a
Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in no case
exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself,
constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person,
whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its
jurisdiction over such a person.
Id.; see also BASSIOUNI, supra note 21. For other immunities of government officials, see
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Cong. v. Beig.), [2002] ICJ Rep 3 (14 Feb.); M.
Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction Unrevisited: The International Court of Justice
Decision in Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of II April 2000 (Democratic Republic of
the Congo v. Belgium), 12 PALES. YEARBOOK INT'L L. 27, 27-48 (2002-2003) [hereinafter
Universal Jurisdiction Unrevisited].
377 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgement and Sentence (Sept. 4,
1998); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgement (Sept. 4, 1998).
378 Milosevic died in his cell on March 11, 2006. See Report of Judge Parker to the
President, Death of Slobodan Milosevic, May 30, 2006, available at http://www.un.org
/icty/milosevic/parkerreport.pdf.
379 See M. Cherif Bassiouni & Michael Wahid Hanna, Ceding the High Ground: The
Iraqi High Criminal Court Statute and the Trial of Saddam Hussein, 39 CASE WEST. RES. J.
INT'L L. 21 (2007); Bassiouni, supra note 139; Michael Wahid Hanna, National
Prosecutions of International Crimes: A Historical Overview, in III INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 61, ch. 3.2.
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trial in the Hague;380 Hissene Habre, former head of state in Chad, is under
prosecution in Senegal; 381 Alberto Fujimori who was head of state in Peru
and committed a multitude of fundamental human rights violations in that
country, has been extradited from Chile to Peru.382 General Augusto
Pinochet of Chile was indicted in Chile, but his trial was suspended because
of his age and presumed lack of mental capacity.383 General Jorge Videla,
former head of state of Argentina, was tried, convicted, and sentenced to
jail.384 Last, but not least, the ICC prosecutor filed an indictment before the
pre-trial chamber for confirmation, against Sudan's sitting head of state,
General Omar Al-Bashir. 385 The ICJ, however, dealt a set-back to this trend
in Congo v. Belgium386 when it upheld the rule that sitting heads of states,
incumbent ministers, and diplomats have temporal immunity.
38 7
These prosecutions are few and far between, however, and they seldom
involve the key perpetrators and senior executors of the major crimes
committed during these conflicts. The 120 some prosecutions before the
ICTY and ICTR have surely advanced international criminal justice. But
how far they advanced general deterrence among the populations in
380 See Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor-Special Court for Sierra Leone,
http://www.sc-sl.org/Taylor.html. Taylor was indicted on March 7, 2003, for crimes against
humanity, violations of Common Article 3 to the Geneva conventions, and other violations
of international humanitarian law. The indictment was sealed until June 4, 2003. On March
16, 2006, the Judge of the Special Court approved an amended indictment reducing the
number of counts to eleven. Id.
381 See Trial Watch: Hissene Habre, http://www.trial-ch.org/en/trial-watch/profile/db
/legal-procedures/hissene habre_86.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2008):
In May 2006, the United Nations' Committee Against Torture (CAT) rebuked Senegal for
failing to bring Hiss~ne Habr6 to justice. The panel requested Senegal to prosecute Habr6 in
Senegal or extradite him to stand trial in Belgium or elsewhere. In July 2006, an AU panel
recommended that Habr6 be tried in Senegal, Chad or another African nation that has adopted
the international Convention Against Torture, rather than in Belgium. The AU decided that
Senegal should serve as the location of Habr&'s trial. Senegal's President Wade agreed with this
solution, but cautioned, that the necessary legal bases had to be laid first. On 12 July 2007,
Senegal's Justice Minister Sheik Tidiane Sy announced that Habr& will stand trial before a
Senegalese criminal court, rather than before a special tribunal as previously decided.
382 An international arrest warrant was issued for Fujimori in November of 2006, and the
Supreme Court of Chile ordered extradition on September 21, 2007. He was extradited the
next day to Peru. Trial Watch: Alberto Fujimori, http://www.trial-ch.org/en/trial-
watch/profile/db/facts/alberto fujimori-320.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2008).
383 See supra note 372.
384 See Argentine Court Overturns "Dirty War" Pardon, Reuters, Apr. 10, 2007,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSN2545319320070425.
385 See Trial Watch: Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, http://www.trial-ch.org/en/trial-
watch/profile/db/facts/omar-hassan-ahmad al--bashir_779.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2008).
386 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Cong. v. Belg.), [2002] ICJ Rep 3 (14
Feb.).
387 Id.; Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction Unrevisited, supra note 376.
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question and throughout the world is probably limited.388
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The recommendations that follow are reasonable and achievable, but
the long and arduous history of IHL attests to the fact that government and
their militaries are intractable on certain matters even if their obstinacy
incurs enormous human and material costs. These state actors are solidly
anchored in a culture of war that has existed for millennia. The military's
goal is to achieve victory over "the enemy," who is necessarily somewhat
dehumanized in order to make the killing of fellow human beings possible
without paralyzing inner compunction or guilt. The goals of war are
essentially: to kill, more people, faster, and more efficiently; to secure
military victory; to prevail politically; to occupy territory; and to subjugate
people. IHL has been used to enable, in whole or in part, these and other
political and military goals, but subject to certain limitations. IHL and
IHRL have tried to limit the human harm and destruction, but progress has
been slow and grudgingly advanced. We continue to have multiple legal
regimes, which overlap, which have gaps and ambiguities, and which create
imbalance between combatants depending upon the legal characterization of
the conflict. It is unnecessary, unreasonable, and contrary to the
humanitarian values admittedly pursued not to have complete uniformity in
the protective legal scheme applicable to any violent processes, irrespective
of the context's legal characterization. Protected persons and targets should
be the same, and, for example, the prohibition of torture should not depend
on how a conflict is defined.389 In a similar vein, combatant status should
be extended to all contexts, including purely domestic conflicts, provided
that non-state actors abide by the conditions required for them to qualify as
legal combatants.
Mutuality of interest and legitimacy should be enhanced through
education at all levels to enhance compliance; and by the monitoring and
reporting of violations by one or more independent bodies such as the
ICRC; special unit(s) in the office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights; the European High Commission for
Human Rights; and regional human rights bodies in the Americas and
Africa. The United Nations in particular should have a database of prior
and ongoing conflicts, as well as investigative and other reports that
388 Moreover, the costs of such prosecutions are so high that the international community
has already signaled its intentions to avoid them. The Security Council has decided that both
the ICTY and ICTR should be closed by 2010. By then, it is estimated that their costs will
reach $2 billion.
389 As is the case with the U.S. under the Bush Administration, see Bassiouni, supra note
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establish a historic record, now shockingly absent. International civil
society should become more involved in the monitoring and reporting on a
consistent basis what occurs in conflicts.
More importantly, states must include in their domestic criminal
legislation the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes,
torture, slavery and slave-related practices (including trafficking and other
forms of sexual abuse against women and children), prohibition of the use
of child-soldiers and mercenaries. Domestic jurisdictions must enforce
these crimes after the end of conflicts, as if there is a realistic threat of
prosecution and punishment, deterrence is enhanced, otherwise it fails.
National civil society, and also international civil society, should be
vigilant against the propagation of hate, and against acts of discrimination,
both of which lead to dehumanization and to victimization.
The asymmetry of forces between state and non-state actors is almost
always going to lead to violations of IHL by the weakest protagonist.
Political inducements may not be enough, nor likely to be feasible. What is
needed is to develop and put in place mechanisms of conflict resolutions
and an effective system of action to prevent violence based on the
developing concept of the "Responsibility to Protect. 3 90
Another important issue is the control by governments of the media, as
well as access by the media to information about ongoing conflicts, results
in a covering-up of government violations, and thus encourages violations
by non-state actors. This situation drives non-state actors to engage in
particularly dramatic violations which the media cannot ignore in order to
propagate their claims or assert their presence or effectiveness. The use of
terroristic violence and the symbiotic relation it creates with the media
becomes an important, if not indispensable, strategy in the perception of
non-state actors, thus leading to their non-compliance.
The battle for the "hearts and minds" of the people in a society where
conflict exists is a primary goal of both state and non-state actors. Thus, the
media's role, public perceptions, and legitimacy are among the
protagonists' main strategic goals.
Finally, the culture of observance of the law and adherence to the Rule
of Law is all too frequently lacking in conflict situations. This is evident
even in societies which in non-conflict times observe the law and adhere to
the Rule of Law. The temptation of governments to set aside observance of
the law and adherence to the Rule of Law in what they deem to be times of
emergency is all too evident. This undermines the legitimacy of
governments and enhances the claims by non-state actors of their own
390 For more details on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), see Responsibility to Protect:
Engaging Civil Society, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2008).
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legitimacy. It also provides non-state actors with opportunities to
rationalize their violations of IHL.
Following are some conclusions and recommendations:
" A Protocol to the Geneva Conventions should be added to eliminate the
disparities in protections between all forms of conflicts, and to give
combatants willing to abide by IHL the status of lawful combatant and
that of POW. This Protocol should address the peculiarities of the new
wars and the rights and responsibilities of non-state actors. In addition,
the Protocol should address the questions raised in this article and which
are reflected in the recommendations which follow. More importantly, it
should address issues of education and training for non-state actors.
* Governments should drop their reluctance to recognize non-state actors
engaged in conflicts of a non-international character by recognizing them
as lawful combatants and granting them lawful combatant and POW
status when they agree to comply with IHL.
* The emergence of new categories of non-state actors who have a
supporting role in conflicts of a non-international character is so far not
specifically included in the normative scheme of IHL and is also not
covered by the traditional norms of criminal law in many national legal
systems should be included in a new Protocol to the Geneva Conventions.
* The use of non-state actor surrogates by governments to engage in armed
violence with de facto assurances of impunity should be included in the
prohibition against mercenarism.
" The elimination of double standards reflected in the practice of
governments, who consider their violations as legitimate while
characterizing the same kind of violations by non-state actors as
illegitimate.39'
" IHL norms should be consistently enforced with impartiality against state
and non-state actors.
" Legitimacy of goals all too frequently becomes the rationale for resorting
to unlawful means by both state and non-state actors. This approach
tends to escalate the interactive processes of violence. More particularly,
it is used to rationalize unlawful reprisals by both sides in conflict, thus
escalating and feeding processes of violence.
* Reinforcing domestic justice systems in their exercise of criminal
391 The resort by governments to characterizing non-state actors' actions as terrorist, even
when they are within the permissible bounds of IHL, evidences a double standard that
detracts from compliance by non-state actors and should be remedied by the adoption of a
comprehensive convention on terrorism. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A COMPILATION OF
U.N. DOCUMENTS, supra note 339, at 263-304 (draft comprehensive Convention on the
International Suppression of Terrorism).
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jurisdiction over perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide.
" Establishing within the United Nations and the ICRC of a permanent
monitoring system to document the practices of state and non-state actors
in conflicts of a non-international character. Such monitoring bodies
should be published and disseminated.
" The United Nations should recognize the Responsibility to Protect. This
recognition supported by state action would be one of the measures to
prevent certain conflicts.
392
" The new Protocol should emphasize the prohibition of reprisals under any
name or form.393
" Last but not least, ICL needs to be revisited with respect to the
responsibility of non-state actors. In particular, the Genocide
Convention 394 and the Convention Against Torture395 must be amended to
specifically reflect their applicability to non-state actors whenever the
latter have a structure which has some of the characteristics of the state
and particularly when they control territory and exercise dominion and
control over it and over individuals on it whether they be combatants or
non-combatants. Moreover, crimes against humanity require that they be
embodied in a convention that would hopefully have the same widespread
acceptance as the Genocide Convention. 396  Such a convention should
specifically allude to the responsibility of non-state actors.
Large-scale IHL violations that reward the perpetrators with impunity
violate the victims' need for justice.397 The memory of such violations
among victims is not erased simply because a peaceful settlement has been
achieved by political leaders. There is no such thing as a political erasure
of the memory of such crimes. At best, it remains in the limbo of a victim's
392 Experience indicates that international intervention, either military or diplomatic,
does not take place before a conflict has reached a high level of violence. Consequently, it
encourages non-state actors to escalate violence, including IHL violations, which in turn
brings about a general escalation of violence, including violations by state actors. Thus,
there is a premium on the escalation of violence which seems to necessarily include a high
level of IHL violations.
393 Governmental actions that constitute unlawful reprisals and which escalate violence,
reduce legitimacy and enhance counter-claims of legitimacy, and provide a rationalization
for committing similar in-kind violations by opponents, should be discouraged by means of
the ICRC's monitoring and reporting.
394 Genocide Convention, supra note 39; SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 5.
395 Convention Against Torture, supra note 5; Daniel H. Derby, The International
Prohibition of Torture, in I INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 61, ch. 5.3.
396 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity: The Need for a Specialized
Convention, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 457 (1994). See also supra note 5.
397 See DRUMBL, supra note 229.
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psyche, occasionally presses itself to consciousness, and then, like the
embers of a fire, may re-ignite and demand retribution.398 The absence of
justice is not conducive to reconciliation, and without reconciliation, peace
is only ephemeral. Peace can hardly be expected to occur without justice,
and justice cannot occur unless the truth is known to the satisfaction of the
victims. These self-evident truisms are reflected in the three Abrahamic
faiths as follows:
If you see a wrong [you should seek to] right it;
With your hand if you can, otherwise
With your words, otherwise
With your heart, and that is the weakest of faith.
-Prophet Mohamed, from a Hadith
If you want peace, work for justice.
-Pope Paul VI
The world rests on three pillars: on truth, on justice, and on peace.
-The Talmud
The three are really one, ifjustice is realized, truth is vindicated and peace results.
-A Talmudic commentary
398 Chicago Principles on Post-Conflict Justice, supra note 349.
